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In The Elusive Made Present: Art and the Incipiency of Images, I offer a new 
conception of images by exploring the relations between sensation and 
composition through the prism of new media, film, video, and painting. 
Examining Paul Sharits’ flicker films, John F. Simon Jr.’s internet art, Wood 
Vasulka’s metamorphic videos, and the resonate paintings of Piet Mondrian and 
Robert Irwin, I proposes that all images, regardless of medium, emerge through 
the shared encounter between viewers and artworks.  Acknowledging the 
significance and influence that Deleuze’s thought has had in the areas of art, 
cinema and visual studies, The Elusive Made Present works from a “Deleuzian” 
perspective, arguing that images are not preexisting, static representations or 
simply a transition from one fixed state of experience to another. Instead, I 
suggest that images are intimately entangled with experience and undergo a 
continuous process of emergence and change, which I call the incipiency of 
images. These changes may not be dramatic or even visible, but, as I contend, 
they are felt as an intensity that unfolds through the activity of seeing. From this 
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idea of intensity, which is central to the incipiency of images, I develop a concept 
of compositional force that demonstrates how images do not exist in the 
materials of artworks or within the minds of viewers; rather, they reside in a 
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and the Becoming-Image,” appeared in Cinematic Folds: The Furling and Unfurling 
of Images, ed. Firoza Elavia (Toronto: Pleasure Dome, 2008).  Finally, an early 
version of Chapter Five’s final section on Robert Irwin’s “Disc” paintings was 
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It is the late 1980s and John F. Simon Jr., an artist with computer 
savvy, disputes the postmodern notion that the world is running 
out of images. In response he devises a work for a new medium 
called “the Internet” that will sequentially generate one-hundred 
different images a second for the next billion, billion, billion, billion, 
billion, billion, billion, billion, billion, billion, billion, billion, billion, 
billion, billion, billion, billion, billion, billion, billion, billion, billion, 
billion, billion, billion, billion, billion, billion, billion, billion, billion, 
billion, billion, billion years. Simon launches his artistic rebuttal on 
January 27, 1997 at 9:42 AM.1  
 
Parable Two – A Grid Begins to Dance 
It is the spring of 2009 in Ottawa, Canada, a visitor of the National 
Gallery of Canada stands in front of Piet Mondrian’s painting 
Composition No. 12 with Blue (1936-42). As he looks at the grid of 
black perpendicular lines that divide the white background into 
smaller rectangles, he notices a flash in one of the intersections of 
 2 
the black lines. Then he suddenly notices several other intersections 
are also flickering. As his eyes start darting around the canvas 
trying to see all of these sparkling points, the grid begins to dance 
in the seeing.2 
 
Parable Three – The Strange Occurrence 
While watching one of Paul Sharits’ early flickers films that were 
made in the late 1960s, a film studies professor experiences a truly 
strange occurrence. Unlike most films that he has seen, which 
appear to fit precisely within the confines of the film screen, this 
film pulses beyond the edges of the screen and floats ambiguously 
in the space between the screen and himself. Not only does he see 




There is a group of people watching Woody Vasulka’s video 
Artifact (1980).  During the video Vasulka tells these viewers, 
through voiceover, how the images they see are being created. The 
screen is suddenly filled with visual noise. Eventually, viewers 
come to see a series of concentric circles in the noise. It is at this 
point the artist dares his viewers to pause the video. They do and 
 3 
the circles they just saw have disappeared into a sea of black and 
white pixels, generating something new to see.4 
 
Parable Five – Having Seen Nothing  
A couple walks into a gallery in the Philadelphia Museum of Art 
that is displaying one of Robert Irwin’s “Dot” paintings (1964-66). 
As they come upon this white, seemingly monochromatic painting, 
they briefly look at it – a few seconds at the most – and 
immediately dismiss it. A sigh of scornful vexation is made by one 
of them. The other nods, silently approving of this assessment of 






The aesthetic power of feeling…seems on the verge of occupying a privileged position 
within the collective assemblages of enunciation of our era. 
– Félix Guattari, Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm6 
 
To see is to actively participate in the incipiency of images. It is to engage 
in a process with the about to become visible, encountering the not yet seen. The 
incipiency here is conceived as a fluid and generative activity that unceasingly 
shifts and changes, making it impossible for images that are seen to actually 
remain static. This is because images are always in the making. They are 
perpetually emerging as a series of becoming occurrences. Even when a 
particular image appears to be still, incipiency is taking place in the form of 
minute adjustments that are constantly being made during the activity of seeing. 
These subtle modifications, or sensations, may not register perceptually and in 
all likelihood will not actually be seen when encountering a particular “still” 
image. This is because the adjustments to an image may be too quick, too faint, or 
in some cases too abundant to register above the threshold of visibility. 
Although these subtle sensations are for the most part imperceptible, they 
are a key component of the seeing experience and are necessary in order for 
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images to actually be perceived. As sensations are experienced, they begin 
emerging into visibility through the incipiency of images. This incipient process 
occurs prior to the actual seeing of images, yet is experienced as though it takes 
place in the present. By the time images are actually seen, the sensations that 
have been experienced will have changed or dissipated, giving way to new 
sensations that are about to become visible. Because new sensations are 
constantly entering, changing, or disappearing in the midst of experience, 
physicist Ogden Rood states that, “there is always something more to see” (1879: 
277).  
Incipiency enables a seeing in which viewers are constantly encountering 
images that cannot be known prior to their being experienced. “Incipiency opens 
up experience to the unknowable” (Manning 2009b: 7). It is the activity occurring 
among these invisible sensations that drives the coming into themselves of 
images. This seemingly imperceptible, yet active, process of incipiency, which 
generates the images that come to be seen, is the focus of The Elusive Made 
Present: Art and the Incipiency of Images. Always on the edge of seeing, the 
following will explore how images emerge into perception, how the activity 
occurring among the imperceptible sensations is experienced, how this incipient 
activity that occurs below the threshold of visibility is able to generate seen 
images, and how the felt experience of emergent images exceeds actual 
perception in the midst of incipiency. Art is the conduit through which The 
Elusive Made Present explores these inquiries into the incipiency of images. This is 
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because many artworks enable viewers to perceive the incipient process, opening 
their perception momentarily to the plethora of sensations they actually 
experience in the midst of the seeing moment.  
According to Robert Irwin, “we always begin somewhere in the middle of 
everything” (1977: 24; original emphasis). To begin in the middle may seem like a 
paradox because if images are somewhere in the middle, then how can they also 
be beginning? Or for that matter, how do they come to an end? For this reason 
the middle is where The Elusive Made Present, like images themselves, proposes to 
emerge from. For the purposes of this project, the middle should not be 
considered as an equidistant centre between two points, or as an average, but 
rather more akin to Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s notion of the intermezzo.  
For them, the intermezzo does not designate a specific position between two 
“banks”. It is not what lies between two dichotomies. Rather it is a transversal 
movement that sweeps in various directions within nonlocalizable relations 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 25, 293).  The middle is neither a place nor a space, 
but instead is a transversal movement that extends across and between relations.  
It is a movement generated in the excesses of seeing that occurs in the midst of 
relations, which drives the incipiency of images.  
 “Look only at movements,” suggest Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 282). 
This is because it is within movement that perception resides and images 
emerge.  Perception is not found in a specific delimited place between relations 
but rather it emerges within the middling movements of relations. For Brian 
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Massumi, “perception lies between the perceiver and the perceived” (2002: 90). 
Together viewers and the artworks co-generate perception as a perceptual field 
that exceeds both of them. This perceptual field is dynamic and emerges in the 
midst of relations as opposed to being predetermined as a singular static state. 
Images are what arise from within this dynamic perceptual field in the midst of 
this shared viewer-artwork experience. The images viewers see are not simply 
experienced as a transition from one fixed state of experience to another, but as a 
continuous process of incipiency in which both viewers and artworks are 
intimately entangled within their shared encounter.  
Images that viewers encounter are the compositions of sensations that 
emerge in the midst of this shared experience with art within a perceptual field. 
This makes images more than just the material on the canvas, the projections of 
celluloid, or the flutter of pixels on a digital monitor. Images dynamically exceed 
what viewers actual perceive, going beyond the impressions and representations 
viewers think they see. Viewers come to realize that the dynamism, or 
compositional forces, that they feel flowing within the perceptual field and 
relentless incipiency of the images that they experience are both always in the 
making. As William James reminds us: “Our fields of experience have no more 
definite boundaries than have our fields of view.  Both are fringed by a more that 
continuously develops, and that continuously supersedes them as life proceeds” 
(2003: 37; original emphasis). 
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Regardless of the specific medium employed, the works of art discussed 
throughout The Elusive Made Present all have a tendency to foreground the 
compositional forces felt in seeing, making the fleeting sensations that exceed 
visibility momentarily perceptible. As viewers engage with these artworks, they 
experience a seeing in which the forceful dynamism of the incorporeal and the 
ephemeral is felt through the incipient actions occurring within the work as such. 
All of these discussed artworks generate a seeing in which “the elusive is made 
present” (Riley 2009: 273; emphasis added). 
Chapter One examines how John F. Simon Jr.’s internet artwork Every Icon 
(1997) proposes to create every icon within a black and white thirty-two by 
thirty-two grid. In order to generate the seemingly uncountable number of 
images that his proposition puts forward, he uses techniques that are usually 
intended for a scientific practice for the purposes of art. As these scientific 
techniques are deployed for an artistic outcome, they undergo a process of 
transduction that enables them to exceed themselves scientifically. Rather than 
producing scientific results that necessitate a closure to the process the 
techniques initiate, the scientific techniques Simon employs in Every Icon are 
transformed in order to remain open to change, thus allowing the techniques to 
go beyond their intended scientific use. It is through this process of transduction 
occurring in the overlap between what Deleuze and Guattari call the scientific 
plane of reference and the artistic plane of composition that enables the 
mathematically arranged black and white squares of Every Icon to transform into 
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what Whitehead calls “lures for feelings”, which are sensational attractors that 
draw the attention of viewers. As lures for feeling, the black and white grid in 
Every Icon enables the incipiency of images to occur. 
Chapter Two begins by stating that the paintings of Piet Mondrian are not 
the static gridded images that many believe them to be. Instead, Mondrian’s 
paintings co-generate a dynamism with those viewers who encounter them, 
which is felt in through the activity of seeing.  Focusing on two paintings that 
were produced at the end of his career, Composition No. 12 with Blue (1936-42) and 
Broadway Boogie Woogie (1942-43), this chapter shows how these works enable a 
seeing in which the grids they display exceed themselves by generating two 
conflicting compositional forces that are felt in the midst of their encounter. The 
first compositional force spirals centrifugally outward, going beyond the form of 
the grid that these works depict. The second compositional force moves 
centripetally inward, drawing the attention of viewers towards the work. 
Working with Mondrian’s own conception of movement, dynamism and relation 
and Gins and Arakawa’s notions of landing sites and critical holders, this chapter 
shows how Mondrian’s works emerge from their seemingly motionlessness into 
dynamic images that exceed themselves in the seeing. 
Centered around Paul Sharits’ flicker film N:O:T:H:I:N:G (1968), Chapter 
Three investigates how the rapidly changing colour-fields in this film generates a 
seeing that emerges from below the threshold of visibility. Building on Benjamin 
Libet’s research into how sensations are experiences that occur too quickly to 
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actually be perceived, this chapter looks into how this discrepancy between 
sensations and perception impacts the incipiency of images.  This discrepancy is 
of particular importance in Paul Sharits’ film because the majority of the colour-
fields appear for only one film frame, or one twenty-fourth of a second, which is 
too quick to actually be seen.  Because the colour-fields change so rapidly, there 
is the potential for thousands of colours to be felt in experience but not 
necessarily perceived when encountering N:O:T:H:I:N:G. Arguing that these 
imperceptible, or “unseen”, colours in Sharits’ film play a significant role in the 
incipiency of images by elaborating on Deleuze’s notions of microperceptions 
and folding, this chapter shows that unseen colours are sensations that can only 
be felt through their relations and that also have the potential to emerge into 
perception. As new colour-fields are experienced, the images viewers see when 
watching Sharits’ film undergo a process of constant formation.  
Chapter Four focuses on Woody Vasulka’s pioneering video works from 
the 1970s and early 1980s. Using various analog and digital video signal 
processors, the images that emerged from Vasulka’s videos were constantly 
being altered and manipulated. When viewers would encounter works such as 
C-Trend (1974) or Artifacts (1980), they would experience images that were never 
static but instead were always in a state of continual metamorphosis. Because the 
images emerging from these video works were endlessly changing, Vasulka felt 
that they could not be understood by the two dominant imaging model of the 
time – linear perspective and the cinematic paradigm. As this chapter shows, 
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Vasulka then proceeded to conceive of a new vocabulary for his work that 
centered around his notion of time/energy objects. This concept of time/energy 
objects is then further developed through Massumi’s understanding of 
topological figures and Greg Lynn’s spline model used in topological 
architecture design in order to demonstrate, first, how compositional forces 
emerge in both analog and digital video and, second, how these forces then 
generate the ever-changing incipiency of images viewers encounter. 
The fifth and final chapter of The Elusive Made Present explores the 
paintings of Robert Irwin, focusing on the period of the 1960s in which he 
produced three radically different series of works – the “Lines” series (1960-64), 
the “Dot” series (1964-66), and the “Disc” Series (1966-69). With each of these 
series Irwin had one specific problem that motivated their production; he wanted 
to develop a set of condition that would enable viewers to not focus on the 
depictions a painting offers for the seeing, but rather point their attention 
towards perceiving the intensive forces a painting’s marks and gestures generate 
in the seeing as they act upon and affect each other. He wanted viewers to only 
experience the incipient action the paintings generated in the shared viewer-
artwork encounter, rather than focus on any sort of representational imagery or 
psychological meaning. As this chapter shows, in order for Irwin to find the set 
of conditions he needed to solve his problem he proceeded through a process 
that saw him, first, remove anything that could be easily identified by viewers 
(the “Lines” series), then take away any visible gestures (the “Dot” series), and 
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finally eliminate the frame from painting (the “Disc” series). Through these three 
series of paintings, Irwin slowly dismantled all the conditions that commonly 
activate painting. With the removal of the frame in the final “Disc” series, he 
ultimately produced works that transformed the entire gallery environment into 
a resonating field of colour, making the incipiency of image not only perceptible 







Perhaps the peculiarity of art is to pass through the finite in order to rediscover, to restore 
the infinite.  
- Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy?7 
 
Science and Art 
When encountering John F. Simon Jr.’s software artwork Every Icon (1997) 
on his website, it can be difficult for viewers to know whether they are seeing the 
visual execution of a mathematical theorem or experiencing a work of artistic 
expression.8 This is because they are presented with a stark white and black 
thirty-two by thirty-two square grid on the right side of the website and three 
statements that read like a mathematical theorem on the left side. They state: 
 Given: An icon described by a 32 X 32 grid. 
 Allowed: Any element of the grid to be coloured black or white. 
 Shown: Every icon (Simon 1997b).9 
But before viewers even take notices of these three statements, their attention is 
immediately drawn towards the upper left corner of the grid where a rapid 
flicker is occurring.  
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Figure 1.1. John F. Simon Jr., Every Icon (1997). Website screen shot. URL: 
http://www.numeral.com/appletsoftware/eicon.html. 
Once the grid’s flickering corner has captured the viewers’ gaze, they 
notice that a series of black squares emerge from this flicker, moving across the 
top row of the grid towards its right side. These black squares continue shifting 
to the right, column by column, away from the flicker until the leading black 
square stops moving. Then all the squares in between this now static black 
square and the flicker gradually change from white to black. Once all of the 
squares from the static black square to the flicker are black, the static black 
square then moves to the right, occupying the square in the next column and all 
the squares to its left suddenly change to white. At this point, another series of 
black squares emerges from the flickering left corner, which move towards the 
static black square. 
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If viewers continue watching Every Icon for a few more minutes, they will 
notice that the flicker occupies only the first five squares on the left side of the 
top row. Although these five squares seem quite chaotic, the orderly change of 
the squares from white to black is generated from this intense flickering. Viewers 
also experience a movement that seems to only be taking place in the top row of 
the grid. Change appears to not be occurring elsewhere in Every Icon. The 
squares in the lower thirty rows, which are all white, look to be completely static. 
The second row from the top has a few black squares on the left side, while the 
other squares in the row are white.10 Like the lower thirty rows, the second row 
from the top also appear to be motionless.  
Despite the fact that the top row of the grid tends to draw much of the 
viewers’ attention because of the flickering that is generated by squares 
oscillating between white and black in the left corner, it is not the only thing 
presented on the website for Every Icon. There are also the three statements on 
the left side. When viewers read these statements, the actions occurring on grid 
begin to make some sense. The first two statements set out the parameters for 
what is taking place on the right side of the website. The first statement 
mathematically describes the size of the grid as measuring thirty-two by thirty-
two.11 The second statement establishes which colours will be found within each 
square on this grid: white and black. The final statement is a proposition that 
states this grid will present every possible every icon using the parameters set 
out in the first two statements.   
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These three statements complicate how the grid is to be understood and 
perceived because these statements can be interpreted both mathematically and 
aesthetically. It becomes difficult to know whether viewers are looking at the 
visual execution of a mathematical theorem or the emergence of a work of art. 
Are viewers watching a sophisticated abacus as it slowly and successively counts 
out every permutation available to it? Or are viewers watching a rapidly 
changing abstract animation? Does Every Icon propose to visually represent a 
demonstration of a numeric theorem? Or does it propose an aesthetic 
experience? Simply put, when viewers encounter Every Icon, are they perceiving 
images that emerge from the work of science or, as Simon presents it, the work of 
art? 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari state that when one discipline begins to 
interfere within the realm of another, the methods and techniques of that 
interfering discipline need to be followed. For them, “the rule is that the 
interfering discipline must proceed with its own methods” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1994: 217). The methods and techniques that are used in one realm 
cannot be transposed onto the other. Accordingly, when art begins edging into 
the realm of science, it must proceed aesthetically. Deleuze and Guattari give an 
example stating that when discussing the beauty of a geometrical figure, like a 
square or a triangle, “so long as this beauty is defined by criteria taken from 
science, like proportion, symmetry, dissymmetry, projection, or transformation, 
then there is nothing aesthetic about it” (1994: 217). Any scientific operation or 
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technique used in or for the production of an artwork must be approached from 
the purview of art. “There are indeed technical problems in art, and science may 
contribute toward their solution, but they are posed only as a function of 
aesthetic problems of composition that concern compounds of sensations” 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 196). If a particular work of art tries to proceed by 
scientific analysis, then the artwork risks being disregarded as art and instead 
could be deemed the work of science. Conversely, if an artwork is the object of 
scientific study or experiment, then it cannot be analyzed aesthetically. Science 
must operate under its own standards and with its own methods and techniques, 
otherwise it could potentially be condemned as art.  
There is a potential risk that the images viewers experience in the 
encounter with artworks that use or incorporate cutting edge technologies and 
work with scientific theories will be dismissed as the visual results of a scientific 
experiment, rather than producing something of artistic merit. Yet, without 
science, many innovative works of art may not have been able to generate the 
images that viewers experience today. Consider painter and architect Leon 
Battista Alberti’s development of linear perspective in painting during the early 
Renaissance, which used geometry as its foundation; the pointillist painting 
technique developed by George Seurat during the 1880s, which was influenced 
by the optical and colour theories of chemist Michel Eugène Chevreul and 
physicist Ogden Rood; or finally, Woody Vasulka’s metamorphic video works 
from the 1970s and 1980s, which used some of the earliest digital imaging 
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technologies (some of which Vasulka invented himself).12 When viewers 
encounter these past works or more contemporary artworks categorized as 
digital, internet, software, or under the ubiquitous rubric “new media art,” such 
as Simon’s Every Icon, it is often the case that the images that are perceived 




  In order to make any possible differentiations between science and art in 
artworks like Every Icon, the techniques of these two realms need to be further 
addressed. This is because what constitutes a scientific experiment or an artistic 
practice is a question of technique. According to Erin Manning, techniques “are 
processes that work with the relational potential of that which is already 
underway” (2009a: 99). Techniques enable latent relations to arise for the 
experiencing as that experience is taking place. They do not create relations out 
of or from nothing. Rather, techniques are compositional processes that utilize the 
potential immediately available to them for the gathering and emergence of 
relations. For Bruno Latour, what is interesting about composition is “that it 
underlies that things have to be put together (Latin componere) while retaining 
their heterogeneity” (2010: 473-474). Techniques enable that which is available 
for experiencing to generate relations and compositionally emerge into a novel 
encounter in the midst of that experiencing moment. 
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For science, there is a need for techniques to become tools for the 
production of reliable and repeatable results. A scientific experiment is 
circumscribed to a definitive outcome that judges its consistency by the 
repeatability of the very outcome it generates. The particular techniques it uses 
manifest themselves through their reliability to produce the same relational 
compositions every time they are called upon. The techniques science uses 
become specific scientific tools when there is a sense of predictability attributed 
to them as they repetitively generate dependable outcomes. Science would not 
use a particular technique if the outcomes did not have some form of anticipated 
accuracy to an intended outcome.  
For instance, the technique of addition is scientific because when two or 
more quantities are combined, their relational composition generates the sum of 
these quantities, producing a result that can be repeatedly obtained. The 
repeatability of the technique then creates an expectation that the outcome will 
always be the same. If two plus two did not consistently generate a sum that 
equals four, but some other value like five, ten, or a billion, then the technique of 
addition would be deemed too unreliable for scientific use because of its inability 
to reliably repeat the same result. Without this consistency, the technique of 
addition would be of no use for science. Similarly, in optical colour theory, when 
two complementary colours, such as green and magenta, are either combined or 
come within close proximity, they produce the colour white.13 This technique of 
combining complementary colours would not hold scientifically if they did not 
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repeatedly produce the same outcome. The ability of a technique to reproduce 
the same results every time it is used gives it the consistency that science 
necessitates.  
Science’s need to focus on repeatable outcomes requires that some form of 
closure occurs in order to limit the activity of the techniques it uses. If these 
limitations were not put in place, then the process these techniques activate 
could potentially never end, making it difficult for science to assess a particular 
technique’s ability to generate a repeated outcome. For Brian Massumi: “Science 
generates results by imposing controls designed to close its contents as much as 
possible” (2002: 235). The technique of addition, for example, could continue 
adding more quantities together, infinitely creating ever-larger sums. Likewise, 
the technique of combining optical colours could proceed to engage in an endless 
practice of colour fusion, infinitely generating every possible hue available to 
vision. At some point science requires that the process of activation must either 
be momentarily paused or completely stopped so that an evaluation of the 
results a particular technique has yielded can be conducted. Science needs to set 
restrictions to a technique’s process of activation because stopping or limiting the 
process a specific technique activates enables science to assess a technique’s 
consistency and repeatability. Without this closure, there would be no possible 
way for science to repeat a particular technique’s process of activation in order to 
verify its consistency.  
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The techniques that activate art differ from those used in science. The aim 
of art is not to follow science in producing repeatable, consistent results drawn 
from the relations these techniques enable; instead, art focuses on generating an 
experience that leaves the outcomes it manifests open to ongoing relational 
encounters. The specific techniques that art uses draw relations to the forefront of 
attention by composing a novel experience for perception, while leaving this 
novel experience open to allow further relational encounters to emerge. This is 
why it is not unusual to experience a new flicker of colour when gazing at a 
painting or a digital image, or another layer of sound when listening to a musical 
composition. Encounters with art tend to generate new experiences for 
perception because the techniques it utilizes allow for changes to emerge in the 
midst of that encounter. A technique’s compositional process of gathering 
relations in art continues after the work emerges, enabling the potential for new 
relations to emerge and affecting how the emergent artwork is experienced and 
ultimately perceived. 
In art, different techniques can potentially yield similar experiences. For 
example, in order for viewers to perceive a particular colour when they 
encounter an artwork, such as blue or red, artists do not need to use the same 
technique to generate these colours. There are several different techniques 
available that can activate a particular colour perception. Heinrich Wölfflin 
points to two techniques for activating colour that have been used throughout 
painting’s history, which he calls the linear and painterly styles. The linear 
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technique renders depictions through the use of lines, which distinguish and 
separate each depicted object and their details. The perceived colour is then filled 
between these lines. In contrast, a painting composed in the painterly style is 
only constituted by colour itself. There are no lines bounding colour to a specific 
detail or object that is depicted. Instead, the relations that occur among the 
colours within a painting activate it as such. 
When using the linear style of painting, each of the depicted objects is 
coloured using a mixture of pigments based on the local colour of that specific 
object. Wölfflin gives an example stating that a “painted blue cloak obtains its 
effect by means of the same material colour as the cloak had or might have in 
reality” (1950: 51). If there are areas of the blue cloak that appear lighter or 
darker, possibly from casts of either sunlight or shadows, then the painter will 
mix the blue pigment chosen to represent the cloak with either a brighter colour 
like white or a darker colour like black. It is from these distinctly rendered and 
locally coloured objects that the linear technique activates the painting. The fine, 
clearly rendered details of this technique further enable the potential for new 
relations to emerge with each encounter, generating something new to see. 
Painters who use the painterly technique emphasize the relations among 
the colours, blurring the distinctions between any fine details. This is because the 
painterly technique “aims at that movement which passes over the sum of 
things” (Wölfflin 1950: 19). By using relations of colour, the painterly technique 
attempts to capture an overall impression of the depicted scene, instead of 
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activating a painting from clearly rendered details found in the linear style. 
Wölfflin gives an example, stating that when a red cloak is painted using the 
painterly style, “the essential thing is not the red of the natural colour, but the 
way in which the colour, as it were, changes under the eye of the spectator” 
(1950: 52). Brighter and darker areas of the red cloak in the painterly style may 
contain a variety of other colours that are not actually found locally, such as blue 
or yellow. This is because, when using the painterly technique, pigments do not 
need to be blended to imitate the local colour of the objects being depicted. 
Rather, pigments are mixed together in order to give the appearance of a 
particular colour. As long as the painting activates a seeing in which the colours 
emerging from it parallel those of the actual things being depicted, it does not 
necessarily matter what coloured pigments are used to achieve this. As well, 
because emergent colours activated by the painterly technique can use a variety 
of coloured pigments to achieve the visible outcome, there is the potential for 
other unintended colours to emerge from the same use of this technique. There is 
no definitive result that this technique activates.   
Both the linear and painterly techniques used in painting are capable of 
activating experiences of colour that appear to be similar. Although these two 
techniques go about generating this experiential activity differently, they both 
can achieve similar outcomes that are open to further relational encounters. 
Examples of more contemporary techniques used in art, which are more closely 
aligned to Simon’s Every Icon, are the vector imaging technique and the raster or 
 24 
bitmapping technique, which activate digital artworks. Like the linear and 
painterly techniques in painting, both the raster and vector techniques in digital 
art are capable of generating an encounter that yields similar outcomes, while 
simultaneously remaining open for new relations to gather as an encounter is 
occurring.  
The vector imaging technique activates a digital artwork through the 
relations that gather from data that “is recorded mathematically in terms of 
geometric shapes, points and lines called primitives” (Reed 2006). The relations 
occurring among these mathematically generated points and lines activated by 
this vector technique enable images to emerge by differentiating and dividing a 
particular space. Similar to the linear technique in painting, objects and their 
details are rendered with a series of lines that produce shapes, which are then 
coloured to the intended hue. Because the vector technique is based within a 
mathematical structure of lines and points, the encountered images that emerge 
from this technique have the ability to be activated at a variety of sizes without 
any visible degradation. A digital image activated by the vector technique can 
easily be made ten times as large without any perceptible loss of detail by 
making a proportional calculation among the points and lines. If a red rectangle 
is rendered measuring four centimeters wide and three millimeters high, then 
when this rectangle is made ten times larger, it will still be proportionally the 
same. The width to length ratio will still be four to three. The red rectangle will 
simply be forty centimeters long and thirty centimeters high.  This means that 
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there is no particular outcome that is generated when a digital artwork is 
activated by the vector technique, leaving the work open to potential new 
relations.  
The other technique used in digital artworks, raster imaging, activates 
relations with a grid comprised of squares, or pixels,14 and “assigns data to all of 
the squares in the grid based on their color and location” (Reed: 2006).15 
Encountered images emerge from this technique through the relations that occur 
among the pixels, unlike the vector technique that activates artworks through a 
series of lines and points. The data that is assigned to each pixel activates a 
specific colour within it. This data is based on a sampling of the primary additive 
colours red, green and blue. The colour of each pixel is always comprised of a 
proportion of these three colours.16 Once the colours of the pixels is established, 
they then begin to gather into relations, affecting each other like the colours of 
the pigments used in paintings activated by the painterly technique. As these 
coloured pixels interact, there is the potential for new colours to emerge from 
their activity. These new emergent colours are what viewers come to see as the 
images generated in the encounter with the digital artwork. The relations among 
the coloured pixels continue affecting each other as the image continues to be 
encountered, enabling minute fluctuations to emerge in the seeing. The seen 
image persists in remaining open to the emergence of subtle nuances of colour 
activated by the raster technique.  
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A Composite Practice 
The raster and vector techniques are particularly interesting because the 
data that these two techniques use to activate digital artworks comes from the 
realm of science. These two techniques use scientific methods for artistic 
outcomes. On the one hand, the vector technique enables relations to gather 
among the measurements of points and lines that the scientific techniques of 
mathematics and geometry activate. On the other hand, the raster technique 
gives the means for relations to come together among colours in each pixel of its 
grid. Precise proportions of red, green and blue that the scientific technique of 
primary additive colours determines generate these colours encountered within 
the pixels. These precisely measured colours are then positioned within a set of 
mathematical coordinates that is the grid. These two techniques used in digital 
artworks produce an overlap that slides between the realms of art and science 
because the artworks emerge from the relations occurring among data, which in 
turn is produced by scientific techniques. 
The overlap of art and science that emerges when encountering many 
digital artworks such as photographs, videos and websites also occurs with Every 
Icon. This is because Simon’s work is activated by the raster technique. Viewers 
can easily discern the grid and black and white square pixels that the raster 
technique uses in order to activate this artwork, generating the images they come 
to see. As well, Simon proclaims his use of the raster technique in the first two 
statements presented on the left side of Every Icon’s website, stating the actual 
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size of the grid and the colours to be found within that grid. The use of the raster 
technique in digital art is not particularly unique. It is the most widely used 
imaging technique in digital image. This is because, according to Stacy Reed, this 
technique is “easier to manipulate, and can record data of photos [as well as 
videos and websites] with more accuracy than vector can, capturing subtle shifts 
in hues and values” (Reed 2006). But what specifically differentiates Every Icon 
from the many artworks that use the raster technique is that it directly engages in 
the overlap of science and art. The scientific techniques informing Every Icon’s 
raster technique appear to be the content of the work itself. This overlap of 
science and art in Every Icon is so subtle, Deleuze and Guattari would state “that 
we find ourselves on complex planes that are difficult to qualify” (1994: 217).  
When looking more closely at how science is involved in the activation of 
Every Icon, it is clear that this work’s use of the raster technique as well as new 
technologies (for its time), such as java applet software to generate the seen 
imagery and the internet as a distribution and exhibition platform,17 are not what 
solely generate it as such. Rather, Every Icon is activated by a composite of 
scientific and artistic techniques, which is in keeping with how most of the world 
is actually encountered. Deleuze explains that, “things are mixed together in 
reality; in fact, experience itself offers us nothing but composites” (1988a: 22; 
emphasis added). Simon’s very method for activating Every Icon is to take 
scientific and artistic techniques as composites that enable the images that 
viewers encounter to emerge. As Guattari notes: 
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I don’t think that scientific and technological progress must 
necessarily bring about a ‘schiz’ in relation to desire and creativity. 
On the contrary, I think that machines must be used – and all kinds 
of machines, whether concrete or abstract, technical scientific or 
artistic. Machines do more than revolutionize the world: they 
completely recreate it (2009: 74). 
Simon’s artistic practice involves the creation of a machine that interfolds the 
techniques and technologies of science with art for the activation of an artwork. 
This machine is Every Icon itself. As soon as science and its activating techniques 
become the composites for Every Icon, science is no longer strictly scientific; 
instead, it becomes a contributing composite for activating Simon’s artwork. Yet 
as a composite for the activation of Every Icon, scientific techniques do not 
transform into artistic ones. Rather, science co-activates Simon’s artwork with 
other artistic techniques.  
What Simon is doing with scientific techniques and data is not what 
science does with them. It is not Simon’s goal to become a scientist or to produce 
a strictly scientific work. Rather with Every Icon, he is making science do the 
work of art by tuning science towards generating an artistic outcome, rather than 
a scientific one. He has an interest in scientific techniques but it is strictly for a 
singular artistic purpose, to activate Every Icon. If Every Icon strictly did the work 
of science, it would generate a specific and repeatable result that would stop 
relations from continually gathering. Remember that science will stop or halt 
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new relations from emerging in order to test the accuracy and consistency of its 
techniques to generate repeatable outcomes. However, the data that the scientific 
techniques produce for Every Icon – the size of the grid and the black and white 
colours within that grid – is not being used to generate a result that is closed to 
new relational encounters. Though Every Icon’s use of scientific techniques, the 
work demonstrates how impossible it is for science to actually stop relations 
from emerging. According to Massumi, “the results of [science’s] own methods, 
the very effects its closures enables it to produce, flow back around to create a 
qualitative global situation that makes reopening ingress into, and interferes 
with, its every contextual exercise” (2002: 235). No matter how consistent a 
scientific technique is in producing repeatable results, there will always be the 
potential for new relations to gather. These relations then begin affecting the very 
consistency that a scientific technique is supposed to produce because they 
enable the intended repeatable outcome to transform into a singular event. This 
inability of science to completely prevent new relations from emerging is what 




When viewers encounter the overlapping composite of science and art in 
Every Icon, they do not actually see a series of techniques from these two realms 
activating the work. What viewers experience is the work as a whole, not the 
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techniques as such. Viewers come to see what the confluence of science and art is 
working towards, which for Every Icon is the emergence of flickering black and 
white images 
The images that emerge from the overlapping of science and art in Every 
Icon might be understood as a set of representations because the third statement 
on the left side of Simon’s website explicitly proposes that every icon will be 
shown within the black and white grid. Yet despite this unequivocal proposition 
to show all the icons within the confines of a thirty-two by thirty-two grid, Every 
Icon actually generates something much more dynamic. Simon explains that his 
work “posits a representational system where computational promise is 
intricately linked to extraordinary duration and momentary sensation” (Simon 
1996). Viewers do not actually see a series of visual results in the form of fixed 
representations activated by scientific techniques; rather, they perceive images 
emerging from the dynamism that is generated by the overlapping of science and 
art. The black and white squares on the grid exceed their mathematical 
coordinates and optical colour combinations, producing a movement that can 
only be felt in the seeing.  
The overlap of science and art in Every Icon generates a dynamic 
movement that exceeds both realms as such, while still being intrinsically 
connected to them both. This dynamism for Latour is compositional. Recall that 
Latour’s understanding of composition involves elements that enter into 
relations in order to produce something new, while simultaneously retaining 
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their singularity in the midst of the act of composing. The techniques that 
activate the black and white squares within Every Icon’s grid come together and 
begin composing an experience that enables the emergence of seen images and 
felt dynamism. The black and white squares and the grid itself are not only 
singular pieces of data generated by scientific techniques but should also be 
considered as compositional elements. They become compositional as they proceed 
to enter into relations that overlap into the realm of art, activating what viewers 
come to see when encountering Every Icon.  
Because the grid and the black and white squares are compositional 
elements that gather into relations, the experience viewers have in their 
encounter with Every Icon cannot be predetermined by data the scientific 
techniques produce. As compositional elements, the grid and black and white 
squares become more than just data that take the form of fixed repeatable 
scientific results. The scientific data is transformed into compositional elements 
through a process of transduction that generates a dynamism viewers feel as they 
encounter Every Icon. According to Manning, transduction “is a shifting between 
planes that requires a simultaneous shift in process” (2008a: 330). In Every Icon, 
transduction is not a process of translating scientific techniques into artistic ones, 
but instead is a transformation that produces movement felt as the compositional 
elements proceed to overlap between science and art. The process of 
transduction alters how the scientific data that activates Every Icon is encountered 
by enabling it to remain compositionally open to new relational encounters, 
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breaking with the scientific procedure of closure. This openness gives each of 
black and white squares within the grid the means to begin entering into 
relations, making them elements that compositionally participate in the 
encounter with viewers. 
 Despite the fact that there is a dynamic movement that is felt as the black 
and white squares within Every Icon’s grid are transduced in the composite 
overlap between science and art, this process of transduction is not actually 
visible. Viewers who encounter Simon’s work do not see the transductive 
process in action. They do not perceive the compositional elements entering into 
new relations. Instead, they see the effects that emerge from the dynamism this 
process generates as it moves through the interval between the realms of science 
and art. These effects are perceived by viewers as the images they experience in 
their encounter with Simon’s work. Manning explains: 
The image we see is the activation of an incipient movement 
transducing an interval into form—a transduction of movement 
into mattering-form. Movement becomes matter in the taking hold 
of the now that is the event of perception. This is a taking hold not 
of the image as such, but of its relational coming into appearance 
(2008a: 337). 
The transduction of movement across the science and art overlap in Every Icon is 
what enables the incipiency of images to occur. In this transductive moment of 
movement, the emergent effects become the images viewers come to see on the 
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right side of Simon’s website in the form of the grid with it flickering left corner. 
These images viewers perceive emerging in their encounter with Every Icon 
display more than just the results produced by the commingled techniques of 
science and art. They are not a series of representations. Rather, these images are 
a dynamic effect that emerges from the process of transduction and have no 
existence outside of the encountering moment shared between viewer and 
Simon’s work.  
By proposing to show every icon, as Simon’s third statement expresses, an 
inextricable relationship between science and art is forged. Through the process 
of transduction a dynamic movement is generated that enables a complex system 
of scientific coordinates to emerge into an aesthetic composition. From the 
perspective of science, Every Icon’s proposition only puts forward a mathematical 
system of coordinates that visually represents the calculations of all the possible 
permutations found on the grid. Yet according to Manning: “Propositions never 
attend solely to the datum” (2009b: 226). Every Icon’s proposition activates more 
than just a variable display of black and white squares on a grid. It generates 
“enabling constraints for the opening of a relational process” (Manning 2009b: 
227).18 These enabling constraints in Every Icon are the grid and the two colours – 
black and white - within the grid. As will be explained towards the end of this 
chapter, these enabling constraints lure the viewers’ attention by gathering 
potential sensations into sets of relations, which then proceed through a process 
of transduction that drives the incipiency of images.  
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In order to follow Every Icon’s transductive movement from a scientific 
representational system to the incipiency of flickering images, the work’s 
scientific foundation needs to be examined. For the remainder of the chapter, a 
journey shall be taken that starts on the scientific plane of reference and ends at 
the artistic plane of composition.19 The primary guides for this adventure in 
transduction will be Deleuze and Guattari. The journey will begin on the plane of 
reference, which resides within the realm of science and is populated by 
“functives” and “functions.” These functives and functions assist in demarcating 
the limits and boundaries and set up a system that coordinates scientific data on 
the plane of reference. The journey will end by reaching the plane of 
composition, which is within the realm of art and is populated by sensations.  
Although this journey begins on the plane of reference and ends on the 
plane of composition, like the realms of science and art, these two planes overlap 
in Every Icon. They do not generate strict dichotomies in any absolute sense 
because there is no clear boundary between these two planes. The plane of 
reference is not in opposition to the plane of composition. Rather, these two 
planes generate a complex continuum that enables transduction to occur. The 
move from the realm of science to the realm of art inconspicuously occurs 
through a zone of indiscernibility. When in this zone, it is impossible to know 
whether the plane of reference has been completely left behind or whether the 
plane of composition has even been entered. It is a space “between two forms, 
one of which is no longer, and the other, not yet” (Deleuze 2003: 126-7). This 
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indiscernible zone is where the shaping of materials and the creation of 
techniques occurs. It is where the process of transduction occurs. This place is 
called the “plane of technical composition” and it is a territory that edges into 
both the realm of science and the realm of art.  
The plane of technical composition should not to be confused with the 
plane of composition as such. Despite sharing the word “composition,” they are 
not the same plane. Deleuze and Guattari differentiate between the plane of 
technical composition, which straddles both science and art, and the plane of 
composition, which is the exclusive concern of art.   
[C]omposition is the sole definition of art. Composition is aesthetic, 
and what is not composed is not a work of art. However, technical 
composition, the work of the material that often calls on science 
(mathematics, physics, chemistry, anatomy), is not to be confused 
with aesthetic composition, which is the work of sensation. Only 
the latter fully deserves the name composition (Deleuze and Guattari 
1994: 191-2; original emphasis).  
The plane of technical composition involves science but it is not scientific; it is 
also not art because it is not yet doing the work of sensation. It is concerned with 
the materials that allow for these sensations to occur. On Every Icon’s plane of 
technical composition the techniques of science are activated so that art can 
emerge.   
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The transductive path Simon lays out with his proposition of showing 
every icon will be followed, beginning with the conditions that have been stated 
in advance, which are the first two statements stated on Simon’s webpage.  The 
description of the size of the grid (32 x 32) and the colours (black and white) that 
occupy this grid set the conditions that enable a plane of reference to be 
developed. Once the place of reference for Every Icon is established, the process 
of transduction takes flight through the indiscernible zone of the plane of 
technical composition. From this transductive line of flight, the plane of 
composition can emerge, activating the incipiency of images viewers experience 
when encountering Every Icon.  
 
The Plane of Reference 
In Every Icon’s first statement, Simon asserts that an icon will be a grid 
measuring thirty-two by thirty-two. This is both a description and a demarcation 
of a space. It not only delimits a territory on which all subsequent statements and 
operations will play out, but it also works to slow down the actions of chaos in 
order to make these actions perceptible. The grid seeks to order experience. It is 
the form the order takes. Chaos should not be understood as pure disorder, but 
rather as a force of infinite speed within a field of infinite size. Deleuze and 
Guattari state that chaos “is not a void that is not a nothingness but a virtual, 
containing all possible particles and drawing out all possible forms, which spring 
up only to disappear immediately, without consistency or reference, without 
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consequence” (1994: 118; original emphasis). Chaos is a virtual field that cannot 
be perceived but it can potentially be experienced through the effects it 
generates. The virtual, according to Brian Massumi, “appears only in the 
potentials it drives and the possibilities that unfold from their driving” (2002: 
136). Viewers cannot directly experience the virtual through their senses but they 
can encounter its incipiency in the effects that emerge from its actualization. 
Take gravity for example. When an apple famously hit Newton on the 
head, he did not perceive gravity directly. “Newton did not see gravity. He felt 
its effect: a pain in the head” (Massumi 2002: 160). Newton’s perceived pain is 
the effect that gravity had on the apple’s potential to fall, as gravity emerged 
from the virtual field of chaos. If someone witnessed the apple hitting Newton’s 
head, then the perception they had in seeing the apple fall towards Newton is the 
visible effect of gravity’s actualization. This witness did not see gravity as such; 
rather, in seeing the apple fall, they experienced an effect generated in gravity’s 
emergence from the potential of the virtual. The virtual can only be perceived 
through the effects that arise from its actualization. These actualized effects are 
what is visible or painful, not the virtual itself.  
Because chaos is a virtual field of potential and contains all possible 
particles and forms moving at an infinite speed, as Deleuze and Guattari noted 
above, what is actually perceived through the grid’s ordering principles is 
always a subtraction and a deceleration from this field. There is always more to 
see, smell, taste, touch, or hear because perception can never completely grasp 
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everything that is made available to it. And once something is actually grasped 
by perception, it slips back into the virtual field of potential just as quickly as it 
emerged. This makes the moment of actualization quite ephemeral. What is 
actually perceived is a less-than that is always rapidly exceeded by the more-
than of the virtual. In order to limit the potential for perception to exceed itself, 
and thus quickly return to the virtual field, science proceeds to establish a plane 
of reference.  According to Deleuze and Guattari, the plane of reference is 
“constituted by all the limits or borders through which it confronts chaos” (1994: 
119). It is where thresholds are determined and matter obtains position within a 
scientific system. It is where potential from the virtual field is actualized into 
referential configurations.  
The delimiting and territorializing actions of the grid in Every Icon assist in 
establishing the plane of reference. This is because the grid emerges as a mode of 
activity that touches on compositional processes even while it is committed to 
constructing the plane of reference. Every Icon’s grid generates a controlled space 
that assists in the slowing of the infinitely fast movements of the virtual 
occurring within the field of potential. It is a space that encourages perception to 
emerge from the virtual field of potential, while simultaneously trying to prevent 
its return to that same field. The grid acts like a net that is cast into the virtual 
field in order to capture and position the potential that resides within it into 
actualized configurations and forms. Once caught, these newly actualized forms 
gain a reference within the grid’s system of coordinates.  
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These referential configurations and forms that shape the plane of 
reference are what Deleuze and Guattari call functives (1994: 118). They explain 
that there are two types of functives.  The first type, which are called 
“endoreferential” functives, comprise of limits or variables that pervade science, 
which establish a threshold that cannot be surpassed. Examples of some of these 
unsurpassable limits are the speed of light (299,796 kilometers per second), 
which is the fastest speed matter can move; absolute zero (273.15 degrees 
Centigrade), which is the temperature at which matter stops moving; or the Big 
Bang, which is the beginning of time for the present universe. As well, thresholds 
considered to be endoreferential functives can be established by creating a set of 
variables, such as all rational numbers between one and nine. The 
endoreferential functive in Every Icon is based on a set of variables, the two 
colours black and white that are mentioned in the second statement. 
Both limits and variables carry out a form of counting. Deleuze and 
Guattari state that it is these “limits that constitute slowing down in the chaos of 
the threshold of suspension of the infinite, which serve as endoreference and 
carry out a counting” (1994: 119). Limits are the point where counting begins or 
ends. Variables are countable things found within a set. When a limit or a set of 
variables is determined, the process of counting begins. Having to count either 
each step as a limit is approached or every variable within a set slows an 
actualized configuration’s return to the virtual field of chaos. What cannot be 
counted thus remains as potential within the virtual field of chaos and outside 
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the purview of the plane of reference. This means that in Every Icon any colour 
that falls outside the set of black and white colours will not be actualized in this 
work, persisting within the virtual field of chaos as potential. 
The second type of functive, which is called “exoreferential”, demarcates 
the space where the variables or limits are placed. It is an external framing 
device, such as a mathematical system of coordinates. Anything that is slowed by 
the limits and variables is also caught within the web of a coordinate system. 
Deleuze and Guattari give an example: “A particle will have a position, an 
energy, a mass, and a spin value but on the condition that is receives a physical 
existence or actuality, or that it ‘touches down’ in trajectories that can be grasped 
by systems of coordinates” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 119).  Simply put, the 
grid as described in the first statement of Every Icon is an exoreferential functive. 
The grid can track or place with some exactitude where a limit is demarcated or 
where variables are positioned. It situates and differentiates on the plane of 
reference what has been actualized from the virtual field of chaos. 
When an endoreferential functive and an exoreferential functive are 
established and situated on a plane of reference, they enter into a relationship 
from which a third variable is determined. This new variable is called a function 
and it cannot exist without two or more functives connecting in some manner. 
According to Deleuze and Guattari, a function “is a complex variable that 
depends on a relation between at least two independent variables” (1994: 122). 
For a function to be established one or more limits or sets of variables must be 
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situated within a delimited space or system of coordinates. Once established, a 
function becomes an object of science that accounts for the state of affairs on the 
plane of reference. This state of affairs is presented as a scientific proposition 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 122). In other words, when at least two functives 
enter into a relationship, a function is produced. This function constitutes a state 
of affairs situated on the plane of reference, which is expressed as a scientific 
proposition. 
From the three statements that appear on Every Icon’s website, it can be 
established that there are two functives, a function, and a scientific proposition 
presented. The two functives are presented in the first and second statements. As 
stated above, the first statement presents an exoreferential functive that indicates 
the size of the grid, which measures thirty-two by thirty-two. The second 
statement presents an endoreferential functive that indicates a set containing two 
coloured variables will be allowed within the grid, which are black and white. 
With these two functives, Every Icon generates a plane of reference that clearly 
demarcates a territory and declares what will be found within that territory. By 
establishing this plane of reference, Every Icon is able to capture the colours white 
and black in the netting of the grid, wrestling them away from the virtual field of 
chaos. 
These two functives not only establish a plane of reference for Every Icon 
but they also enter into a relationship and produce a function. This function is 
the result of a mathematical state of affairs in which all the combinations of the 
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two variables are allowed to occur in every element found within the designated 
space. These elements, according to Massumi, “can be used as the basis for 
comparative judgment in any context, independent of situation” (2002: 165). 
They are general abstract entities that can be “seen anytime in principle, but 
nowhere in particular” (Massumi 2002: 165). This is because elements that are 
found on the plane of reference are relative to the standards or limits established 
by functives. Since the grid in Every Icon measures thirty-two by thirty-two, the 
number of elements can be determined simply by multiplying these two 
numbers. This results in one thousand twenty-four distinct elements established 
on the plane of reference. From here, each of these elements can be one of two 
possible colours, either white or black. Specifically, Every Icon’s functives 
establish one thousand twenty-four black and one thousand twenty-four white 
elements. Each element found within the grid is only differentiated by the colour 
that it keeps. 
This means that in order to determine that number of possible 
combinations of elements on the grid, and thus Every Icon’s function, a 
multiplication of the number two must be repeated one thousand twenty-four 
times. The result is two to the one thousand twenty-fourth power. This can be 
expressed mathematically as 21024, or it can be expressed by the power of ten as 
the approximate numeric value of 1.8 x 10308, which is Simon’s preferred way of 
expressing this function (Simon 1996; Mirapual 1997; Baumgärtel 1999).20 In 
order to comprehend this number, imagine a one then an eight followed by 
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three-hundred and seven zeros. If pressed to describe the number of 
combinations possible in Every Icon with only words, it could be said that there 
are approximately three googol images generated in this work, with a googol 
being ten to the one-hundredth power (10100).   
 
Things  
Every Icon’s function, 1.8 x 10308, appears to present a well-defined system 
of coordinates and offers a state of affairs that reflects Simon’s proposition to 
show every icon, as stated in the work’s third statement. The function clearly 
indicates the number of icons that are to be shown. As well, the excessive 
potential of the chaos seems to be captured by the limitations of the two 
variables, white and black, and contained by the grid’s system of coordinates on 
the plane of reference. Chaos has been slowed down enough for forms to be 
actualized from the potential that resides within the virtual field by a process of 
counting that is generated by the combined efforts of the endoreferential functive 
(the colours) and the exoreferential functive (the grid).  
However, Deleuze and Guattari point out that “the most closed system 
still has a thread that rises towards the virtual” (1994: 122). Even with the 
soundest function on the plane of reference, there is the potential for any 
actualizations created on this plane to exceed themselves.  Like a dam holding a 
large amount of water, there is always the prospect of leaks appearing within the 
plane of reference, which exceed its capacity to limit potentiality. When 
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actualized forms begin exceeding the limits established by the function on the 
plane of reference, it is because these actualizations are applying pressure to 
these limits, causing cracks to develop in the plane’s construction. This pressure 
that is being applied to the plane of reference is not physical pressure. Rather, it 
is the actualized forms becoming more than what the limits can actually handle. 
In order to plug the leaks generated by the ability of actualized forms to exceed 
themselves, either new functions must be added to supplement those already 
present or the present function must be completely changed.  If any actualized 
forms completely surpass the limits established by Every Icon’s function, then the 
plane of reference constructed for Every Icon, like a faulty dam, will be need to be 
dismantled and rebuilt. 
Any function that has been laid out on the plane of reference will 
eventually form cracks or bifurcations, which introduce the potential for 
different variables not originally included to alter the forms that have been 
actualized. These new variables can affect the operation of the established system 
by causing it to branch out into different directions, generating openings into 
what appears to be a unified whole. “Science does not carry out any unification 
of the Referent but produces all kinds of bifurcations on a plane of reference that 
do not preexist its detours or its layout” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 123). 
Bifurcations will always appear on the plane of reference, enabling actualized 
forms to exceed their own actualization. This shows that any system produced 
on the plane of reference is never fully closed or completely unified. When 
 45 
bifurcations surface on the plane of reference, in order to recapture and re-
actualize forms, either new functions are added to the system or the system is 
altered. These additions to the system create a more complex entity on the plane 
of reference.   
As a function’s state of affairs bifurcates and can no longer contain the 
excesses particular actualized forms generate, the addition of another function 
can curb an actualized form’s ability to go beyond its own actualization. This 
new function is formed when the older function acts in concert with one or more 
new functives. The older function becomes a variable used in this new function. 
It is transformed into one of the functives for the new function. Because there are 
two functions working together on the plane of reference, according to Deleuze 
and Guattari, a thing forms. “When we go from a state of affairs to the thing itself, 
we see that a thing is always related to several axes at once according to variables 
that are functions of each other, even if the internal unity remains undetermined” 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 122; original emphasis). A “thing” comes into being 
when one function is reliant on a new function to stop it from bifurcating and 
conversely when a new function is dependant on an older function for its 
inception. This new “thing” works with the registers of both functions, meaning 
that it interacts with the state of affairs of both functions on the plane of 
reference. For example, a “thing” may be comprised of a function that calculates 
space and another that calculates time. Both functions work on different 
registers, one with space and the other with time, but when they interact with 
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each other a “thing” appears. When a new function is added and a “thing” 
emerges on the plane of reference, the bifurcation that appeared in the older 
function is then stopped and the exceeding actualized forms are re-contained 
and re-actualized once again. 
Simon’s proposition indirectly reveals how actualized forms exceed the 
limits established by the function in Every Icon by specifically indicating that all 
icons are to be shown. To display all of these icons and demonstrate every 
possible permutation on the grid, it requires more than just a single 
mathematical function. Time is needed to show all the icons, which is something 
Every Icon’s function, 1.8 x 10308, does not take into consideration. This single 
mathematical function presents a state of affairs that can only express how many 
possible black and white icons can be presented on the thirty-two by thirty-two 
grid. Yet, in order for this function to fully express itself and show every possible 
icon, it needs to proceed with a process of counting. This counting process takes 
time, which is something that exceeds the limits of this particular function. It is 
unable to calculate how long it will take to show and count all of Every Icon’s 
icons. 
 It appears that the new variable of time has emerged as the bifurcation 
that exceeds the limits the state of affairs of Every Icon’s function can express, 
which starts to unravel the present system on the plane of reference. As soon as 
the grid is laid out on the plane of reference and Every Icon’s first icon is 
accounted for, some amount of time must pass before the second icon is counted. 
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Simon chose to begin Every Icon with all the one thousand twenty-four elements 
in the grid coloured white, forming a completely white icon. The second icon is 
all white except for the element that is in the upper left corner, which is black. 
The third icon is all white except for the square in the second column to the left 
in the first row. The process of counting all the icons can only continue if the 
bifurcation opened up by time can be plugged. If the system is to be sustained on 
the plane of reference, this new variable needs to be captured before it unfolds 
with infinite speed into the depths of chaos. This requires the addition of a new 
function, which will prevent time from enabling the already established 
actualizations from exceeding the function that is currently on the plane of 
reference. 
 
Figure 1.2. John F. Simon Jr., Every Icon (1997) (detail). Three different icons presented 
within the span of approximately thirty seconds. Website screen shot. URL: 
http://www.numeral.com/appletsoftware/eicon.html. 
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In order to calculate how long it will take for Every Icon to count all of the 
icons on the thirty-two by thirty-two grid, new endoreferential and exoreferential 
functives need to be revealed to determine Every Icon’s function for time. The 
new endoreferential functive – the limit or set of variables – is the number of 
icons that will be made visible. The already determined function, 1.8 x 10308, 
becomes this new function’s endoreferential functive. The new exoreferential 
functive is the rate at which these icons are shown. This functive will state how 
fast the icons are to be counted. Simon explains that this rate of change depends 
on the speed of the computer’s processor that runs the software for Every Icon. 
He states that, “at a rate of one hundred icons per second (on a typical desktop 
computer) [in 1997], it will take only 1.36 years to display all variations of the 
first line of the grid” (Simon 1996). Simon did not arbitrarily choose this rate of 
one hundred icons per second. It is the actual rate of change that Every Icon is 
displayed at on his website.21 The rate of one hundred icons per second becomes 
the new exoreferential functive. 
It should be noted that at this rate of one hundred icons per second, it will 
take approximately six billion years for Every Icon to show all the possible 
combinations of white and black in just the first two lines (Simon 1996; 
Baumgärtel 1999). Nearly six billion years will be required for all the squares in 
the top two rows to go from displaying the colour white to all of them displaying 
the colour black. In order to situate how long the six billion years it will take for 
the first two lines to appear completely black actually is, consider that the Earth 
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is estimated to be a little more than four and a half billion years old.22 It will take 
longer than the present age of the Earth for just the first two lines to show all the 
possible permutations! This means that by the time the first two lines in Every 
Icon appear completely black, all the species of life presently on Earth will likely 
either be extinct or will have evolved into other species many times over, 
including humans.   
When this new exoreferential functive of one hundred icons per second 
enters into a relationship with the new endoreferential functive, which is the 
older function of 1.8 x 10308 icons, a new function is determined. This new 
function establishes the time it will take for Every Icon to show all of its icons.  It 
will also determine when the final icon will be reached. When this new function 
is expressed mathematically, it indicates that it will take 1.8 x 10306 seconds, or 
approximate 5.7 x 10298 years, for Every Icon to display every icon. This equation, 
5.7 x 10298, becomes the new function that gives Every Icon its reference in time. 
This means that there are now two functions on the plane of reference, one 
function that establishes the number of icons and the space the icons occupy, and 
a second function that determines the rate at which these icons are counted and 
the total time it will take to count them all. As was discussed above, the new 
function depends on the older function for its existence and, conversely, the 
older function relies on the new function to stop bifurcations that appear. In 
Every Icon, the new function that expresses time is dependant on the older 
function, which expresses space, for its existence. Simultaneously, the older 
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function needs the new one to close the bifurcation that appeared on the plane of 
reference. This bifurcation surfaced when it is revealed that the older function 
did not take into consideration the variable of time in Every Icon.  
Because the relationship between the two functions is mutually 
dependent, it creates an internal unity on the plane of reference that enables a 
“thing” to be actualized. From the correlation between the two functions’ state of 
affairs, space and time, the “thing” emerges as Every Icon’s many icon. As a 
“thing”, the icon expresses a more complex system than any one function can 
alone.  This is because the “thing” coordinates both space and time, whereas a 
function can only coordinate one of these systems. Neither space nor time can 
now be easily removed from the plane of reference without destroying the icon 
or the plane of reference itself. To do so would impinge on Every Icon’s ability to 
fulfill its proposition of showing every icon and return any actualizations this 
work creates to the virtual field of chaos.  
  
Bodies 
Despite the fact that all of Every Icon’s variables and limits have been 
clearly delineated and the icon in Every Icon can now be defined as a “thing,” 
Simon’s proposition is not yet completely expressed. So far this chapter has 
outlined how much space the icon occupies, how many combinations of white 
and black Every Icon can produce, how much time it will take to show all of these 
combinations, and how all of these limits and variables are coordinated within a 
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unified “thing.” The problem now is that the icon, as a “thing”, cannot express 
the manifestation of every combination available to it on the plane of reference. 
This means that a new variable, difference, needs to be addressed.  Since the icon 
itself cannot express difference, a new bifurcation opens up on the plane of 
reference, again allowing established actualized forms to begin exceeding the 
system’s capacity to keep them from returning to the virtual field of chaos. 
Unlike a “thing”, the addition of a new function cannot mitigate this new 
bifurcation. If the difference between each distinct permutation of the icon can be 
demonstrated, then the bifurcation can be sealed and the proposition of having 
every icon shown can be fulfilled. But this requires the formation of yet another 
more complex system, one that builds from the foundation of the icon itself. 
Deleuze and Guattari call this new system a “body.” They explain that a 
“body” appears on the plane of reference “when the thing itself undergoes 
changes in coordinates…and instead of the function taking the limit and the 
variable as reference, it takes an invariant and a group of transformations” 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 122). A “body” is a “thing”, but a “thing” that is 
subject to difference. It is a “thing” that is capable of changing itself. A “body” 
“proceeds by a cascade of actualizations” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 123). In 
order for change to occur, one element on the plane of reference must remain 
unaltered. This element is an invariant, which becomes the foundation of the 
“body” within the plane of reference. No matter how many permutations a body 
undergoes, the invariant persists. Because of the enduring nature of this 
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invariant, a “body” can manifest a number of transformations on the plane of 
reference without creating bifurcations that that would otherwise enable this 
actualized “body” to exceed its own actualization. 
In order to show all the permutations that the icon can undergo in Every 
Icon, an invariant must be chosen so that a “body” can to take shape on the plane 
of reference. The invariant will allow the “thing” – the icon – to undergo the 
enormous number of changes that was originally calculated as the first function, 
1.8 x 10308. This invariant is the grid itself and not the measurement of it, as 
expressed by the equation 32 x 32. This is because no matter how the colours 
white and black are arranged within the elements of the grid, the grid itself 
remains constant. The lines of the grid are like steel lattices that hold firm, while 
the numerous combinations of white and black manifest in the spaces in 
between. The invariance of the grid enables changes to occur within the space 
and over the time, which is all coordinated on the plane of reference 
By establishing the invariant, a stream of difference can manifest in Every 
Icon. The invariant produces an opening to difference because it enables the 
elements within the grid to fluctuate between the colours white and black. The 
gird remains constant in contrast to the cascade of actualized icons occurring one 
hundred times per second. Recall that Simon starts this stream of actualization 
with all the elements in the grid coloured white. Changes in the grid begin one-
hundredth of a second later when the element in the upper left corner 
immediately turns black. Following this, that upper left element returns to white 
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and the element to its immediate right turns black.  Every Icon continues in this 
manner moving through every possible combination of white and black in the 
first row of elements. After all the elements in the first row become black, they all 
return to being white and the first element on the left in the second row changes 
from white to black. As Simon mentioned above, for the elements in the first row 
to become entirely black takes 1.36 years. The first element in the second row will 
not become white again until all the elements in the first row become black for a 
second time. This process will continue until all the elements appear black and 
the last icon is shown. 
The grid and all of the possible combinations of white and black, from the 
all-white icon to the all-black icon, constitute the “body” of Every Icon. The 
invariant grid’s stable presence provides the skeleton that enables the elements 
within it to take on the unimaginable number of differentiated forms actualized 
on the plane of reference. Without the different combinations of white and black 
successively manifesting themselves within the invariant grid, there would not 
be a “body” on Every Icon’s plane of reference. Without this “body” to stop the 
bifurcation that was created when the variable of difference appeared, the 
potential extracted from the virtual field would not be actualized into a cascade 
of differentiated icons and Every Icon would have proceeded to unravel with 
infinite speed. 
With a constituted “body” on the plane of reference, Every Icon can now be 
represented graphically. Simon’s proposition can now be demonstrated. It is 
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possible to show every icon, as illustrated on the right side of Every Icon’s 
website. This is because the infinite speed of chaos has been slowed down 
enough by the plane of reference so that forms can be actualized from the virtual 
field of chaos. The plane of reference restricts the movements of chaos within the 
lattice of the invariant grid so that it can be shaped by limits and variables, by the 
functives and functions, in order to actualize the icons of Every Icon. As each icon 
is successively actualized (at a rate of one hundred per second) on the plane of 
reference, viewers see the fulfillment of Simon’s proposition. By proposing to 
show every icon, Every Icon constructs a series of functives, functions, “things,” 
and a “body” in order to actualize potential from the virtual field. Each 
actualized icon displayed on the invariant grid with its unique configuration of 
white and black is one step towards Every Icon’s return to the virtual field of 
chaos. Recall that the virtual field of chaos can never be directly experienced as 
such but can only be felt the effects that are actualized. Simon’s proposition, from 
the perspective of science, lays a path that at every turn – from functions to 
“things” to “bodies” – that attempts to restrain chaos’ infinite speed and prevent 




If viewers look at all the elements that comprise Every Icon’s plane of 
reference, they will notice that these elements appear to be quite similar to those 
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situated on the plane of technical composition.  The plane of reference and the 
plane of technical composition can seem somewhat indiscernible because the 
plane of technical composition involves the arrangement of elements – which can 
be both material and immaterial – in a particular manner using a specific set of 
techniques. Deleuze and Guattari indicate that the plane of technical composition 
is populated by a variety of techniques that, “include many things that are 
individualized according to each artist and work: words and syntax in literature; 
not only the canvas but its preparation in painting, pigments, their mixtures, and 
methods of perspective; or the twelve tones of Western music, instruments, 
scales, and pitch” (1994: 192). In digital art, the plane of technical composition 
involves both hardware and software, which can include computers, processors, 
monitors, digital cameras, and the internet, and also encompasses spatial and 
tonal resolution, algorithms, systems of coordinates, and binary code. Many of 
these materials and techniques found in digital art are also found in Every Icon; 
but Every Icon’s plane of technical composition also contains the functives and 
functions that constitute the “body” produced on the plane of reference, which 
include the thirty-two by thirty-two grid, the colours white and black, the one 
hundred icons per second display rate, and the displaying of each icon 
successively beginning with the all-white icon. The mutual use of the functives 
and functions is what makes the indiscernibility between the plane of reference 
and the plane of technical composition possible. These planes overlap because 
they share the same compositional elements in Every Icon. 
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These shared elements between the plane of reference and the plane of 
technical composition also makes it difficult for viewers to clearly determine 
whether Every Icon is a scientific representation or an aesthetic composition.  As 
Deleuze and Guattari would say, “we find ourselves on complex planes that are 
difficult to qualify” (1994: 217). Nevertheless, if Every Icon is to transductively 
make the leap from scientific representation to aesthetic composition, then 
distinctions needs to be made between the plane of reference and the plane of 
technical composition. Sensations need to be foregrounded. “We paint, sculpt, 
compose, and write with sensations” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 166). The 
viewers’ attention cannot solely be focused on the workings of Every Icon’s 
“body” found on the plane of reference.  Focus needs to shift towards the 
emergence of sensations in order for Simon’s work to pass from the plane of 
reference to the plane of technical composition and then onto to the plane of 
aesthetic composition, or, as noted above, what Deleuze and Guattari simply call 
the plane of composition. 
 If the functives and functions laid out as a “body” on Every Icon’s plane of 
reference are to be understood from the perspective of art, then they can no 
longer be viewed as that which changes within an invariant system of 
coordinates, representing the calculations of all the possible permutations found 
within the icon. As the elements and techniques for the plane of technical 
composition, the functives and functions can no longer act as variables that 
impede the emerging excesses of that which is actualized. Instead, they need to 
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be understood as activating parameters, or what Manning and Massumi call 
“enabling constraints,” which incite potential sensations to gather together in 
order to grab the viewers’ attention. “Enabling constraints are not rules as much 
as active parameters carving out an atmosphere for the event’s potential 
realization” (Manning 2008b: 9). Recall the first two statements on Every Icon’s 
website, which state that the grid is to measure thirty-two by thirty-two and that 
all the elements on that grid are to be white or black. When approached from the 
perspective of art, these two statements do not use the grid and the colours to 
establish limits and variables in order to calculate and count the number of 
possible permutations. Rather, as enabling constraints, the grid and the colours 
activate a perceptual field for white and black sensations to metamorphosize into 
visible images.  
When the functives and functions of Every Icon are transduced into 
compositional elements and techniques for the plane of technical composition, 
the plane of reference can no longer continue to prevent the actualizations it 
generates from exceeding themselves, opening themselves up to the virtual field. 
Instead, the compositional elements and techniques, as enabling constraints, 
modulate Every Icon’s ability to go beyond its own actualization so that it can 
emerge from the plane of technical composition as the sensations viewers feel on 
the plane of composition. What viewers encounter in their experience with Every 
Icon is not able to fully exceed its own actualization on either of these planes, but 
it is allowed to flow at an accelerated pace. More importantly, viewers can 
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literally feel this acceleration as they watch the movement of the squares in Every 
Icon changing from white to black that emerge from the intense flickering in the 
upper left corner on the top row of the grid displayed on Simon’s website. The 
moment viewers feel this acceleration in the grid and perceive the movement of 
the squares in Every Icon, they have moved from the plane of technical 
composition to the plane of composition itself. It is at that point that the elements 
and techniques pass into sensation (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 193).  
Once sensations begin emerging for Every Icon, the “body” coordinated by 
the invariant grid on the plane of reference is transformed into a perceptual field 
where these felt sensations generate the flickering image viewers see emerging 
from the plane of composition. For Anna Munster: “It is as if images can no 
longer be located as distinct sets of coordinates upon a grid providing them with 
place and context in a system. They are now laid out on a plane, to be organized 
principally by directions and speeds in time” (2006: 174). When viewers watch 
Every Icon, they do not actually see the succession of clear and distinct 
representational icons that the invariant grid organizes on the plane of reference; 
instead, they feel the accelerations of black and white sensations that generate the 
visible metamorphosis of a seen flickering image within a perceptual field on the 
plane of composition. Steven Shaviro explains: “In metamorphosis, it is not the 
thing itself that attracts [viewers], over and above its qualities; it is rather the 
very unsteadiness of the thing that draws [viewers] onward, as it ripples and 
shifts in a kind of protean wavering” (2010b: 8). Neither the invariant grid nor 
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the icons themselves lure the viewers’ attention; rather, it is the felt black and 
white sensations that generate the flickering image that draws the viewers’ gaze. 
The invariant grid and the innumerable icons are backgrounded from perception 
in favour of the image generated by the oscillations of black and white. By 
proposing to show every icon, Simon’s work has taken mathematical functives 
and functions and transduced them into what Alfred North Whitehead calls 
“lures for feelings” (1929/1978: 25, 184). The functives and functions become 
Whitehead’s lures, or sensational attractors, that instigate the incipiency of 
images.  
Simon’s proposition to show viewers every icon begins on the plane of 
reference. As stated above, Every Icon posited a ‘computational promise,’ which 
creates a “body” capable of counting all the permutations of black and white 
icons on an invariant thirty-two by thirty-two grid. Once this system of 
mathematical representations is displayed – as seen on the right side of Every 
Icon’s website – this “body” can no longer be contained within the plane of 
reference. As the process of counting gives way to “momentary sensation,” as 
Simon stated, the functives and functions of the referential “body” undergo a 
process of transduction in which they become “lures for feeling” or sensational 
attractors. These functives and functions, which were represented on the 
mathematical system as the variable set of two colours, the size of the grid, and 
the rate the permutations of icons change, become sensational attractors. As 
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sensational attractors, these transduced functives and functions then become the 
enabling constraints for the incipiency of images.   
Once this transduction takes place, the functives and functions change 
into the compositional elements and techniques for the plane of technical 
composition. It is at this point that Every Icon transversally moves from the plane 
of reference, through the plane of technical composition, and emerges 
aesthetically on the plane of composition. Deleuze and Guattari explain: 
There is only a single plane in the sense that art includes no other 
plane than aesthetic composition: in fact, the technical plane is 
necessarily covered up or absorbed by the aesthetic plane of 
composition. It is on this condition that matter becomes expressive: 
either the compound of sensations is realized in the material, or the 
material passes into the compound, but always in such a way as to 
be situated on a specifically aesthetic plane of composition 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 195-6). 
Every Icon begins as a work that generates scientific representations but 
ultimately is able to present itself as an aesthetic composition of sensations. It 
generates a seeing that exceeds the limits established on the plane of reference. 
According to Manning, “to see is to feel-with, to participate in the intensive 
passage from the virtual to actualization” (2009b: 95). Viewers experience this 
passage from the virtual to actualization transductively as the incipiency of 
images. As long as there is a computer to run the program and a monitor to 
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display Every Icon, it will endure well beyond anything that is present today or 
that can easily be imagined for the future. This is because, according to Simon, 
Every Icon’s “theoretical possibilities outdistance the time scales of both evolution 






Relations must come first. 
– Piet Mondrian, Letter to László Moholy-Nagy (June 6, 1939)  
 
Grids and Matrices 
Grids can appear to present space and time statically. For some people the 
sight of grids can immediately conjure up notions of fixity, timelessness, and 
imposed order. According to Lutz Koepnick, grids are “not a product of the 
unpredictable temporality of the viewers’ physical movement and sensory 
perception but a prearranged logic of compilation and construction, a 
mechanism seemingly engineering uniformity, universality and unwavering 
stability” (2006: 53-54). Images such as algebraic graphs, geographic maps and 
architectural blueprints come to mind. Through their use of Cartesian x/y 
coordinates, these images produce gridded spaces that establish a methodical, 
inanimate, and invariant order upon all that is contained within them.23 
Koepnick and Sabine Eckmann suggest that the grids found in the modernist 
paintings of the early twentieth century particularly display this inclination 
towards immutability and predictability. For them, “the grid enabled art’s 
 63 
capacity to distance itself from language, figuration, and representation and 
provided visual experiences favouring simultaneity over the sequential, the 
spatial over the temporal, the abstract over the representational, and the 
universal over the particular” (Eckmann and Koepnick 2006: 8). One clear 
example they give is the paintings of Piet Mondrian.24 
When looking at Mondrian’s Composition No. 12 with Blue (1936-42), 
viewers will see that it is an almost square painting (62 x 60.3 cm) comprising a 
complex black and white grid with a snippet of blue near the bottom. The canvas 
is filled with a series of black horizontal and vertical lines that cross one another 
perpendicularly, forming the grid structure. There are several intersections 
resulting from the six horizontal and the seven vertical lines. These crisscrossing 
black lines give the appearance of slicing the white background into 
quadrilateral sections. Near the bottom right corner, caught between two of the 
black vertical lines and enclosed by black lines along the top and the bottom, is 
the only coloured section, a square of blue. The black lines along the blue 
square’s top and bottom edges extend to the right. The bottom line stops after 
intersecting with the next vertical line. Like the line at the bottom, the top line 
intersects the next vertical line but instead of stopping, it leaps to the next 
vertical line to continue to the edge of the canvas. 
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Figure 2.1. Piet Mondrian, Composition No. 12 with Blue (1936-42).  
Eckmann and Koepnick contend that modernist works consisting of grids, 
like Mondrian’s Composition No. 12 with Blue, are not only static, but also 
constitute the image viewers see. For them the painted grid and the seen image 
appear to be one and the same, approaching viewers “as immediately 
recognizable and hence devoid of unwanted surprises” (Eckmann and Koepnick 
2006: 8). Following the assertion that modernist grids are static, if the images 
viewers see when looking at Mondrian’s painting consist only of the grid 
composed on the canvas, then the seen images are as immutable as the grids that 
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generate it. As viewers look at Composition No. 12 with Blue with its black 
perpendicular lines dividing the white background into quadrilaterals of varying 
sizes and shapes, the generated image is the static grid.  
Eckmann and Koepnick believe that modernist grids, like Mondrian’s 
Composition No. 12 with Blue, were freed from their methodical immutability and 
were reworked into what they call “matrices” with the rise of digital imaging in 
the late twentieth century. According to Eckmann:  
The digital matrix, consisting of pixilated visual bits created by a 
binary code of numbers, transforms the static modernist grid into a 
moving configuration, one that is nevertheless still informed by the 
basic structure of the grid. Yet, in contrast to the modernist grid, 
the digital matrix may remain invisible and is capable of forming 
images independent from its own structure (2006: 16).25  
Matrices are bodies generated on the plane of reference, as discussed in the 
previous chapter. They transform grids from static configurations into bodies 
that are capable of change. They enable difference to occur across the invariant 
structure of grids. Because matrices open grids to change, for Eckmann and 
Koepnick, they “emancipate the grid from its confinement to two dimensions; 
they displace the grid’s tendency towards the static and unchangeable” (2006: 9). 
Matrices enable grids to extend beyond their own invariance through the 
displacement of “pixilated visual bits” that change within the grid itself.  
 66 
Although grids form the underlying invariant structure for matrices, 
matrices are not grids. The grids that constitute matrices are backgrounded from 
the viewers’ attention. By taking the viewers’ focus away from the grids as such, 
matrices bring the elements that change within grids to the forefront of the 
viewers’ perceptual awareness. A good example of this can be seen in John F. 
Simon Jr.’s internet artwork Every Icon (1997).26 As Eckmann explains, the grid in 
this work cannot generate the images viewers see as such; rather, it “remains one 
and the same while the matrix, independent from a fixed form, is shown as the 
tool that creates these new images” (2006: 17). When looking at Every Icon, the 
viewers’ attention is not on the grid that structures the unfathomable number of 
images that are generated in this work. Instead, as the previous chapter explains, 
their attention is focused on the frantic oscillation of black and white squares that 
generated movement across the grid. Viewers do not perceive an invariant grid 
that happens to contain elements that change; rather, they see black and white 
moving images that primarily flicker in the upper left corner of the work.  
According to Eckmann, the invisibility of the grids that structure matrices 
gives the images that are generated the ability to independently produce 
themselves. “The capability of the matrix to generate images different than itself 
allows artists to use digital imaging technologies and their underlying grids of 
mathematical codes without being confined to an abstract and rigid structure” 
(Eckmann 2006: 17). When compared to the gridded images of modernist 
painting, like Mondrian’s, the ability for matrices to produce images that are 
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different from their underlying gridded structure can easily be understood. This 
is because movement generated within matrices results from the displacement of 
the compositional elements across the underlying and imperceptible gridded 
structure. When viewers look at Mondrian’s Composition No. 12 with Blue, the 
compositional elements – the perpendicular lines, the white background, and the 
blue square – appear to not physically move or change. For Eckmann and 
Koepnick, this work can only be seen as a static gridded image. In the absence of 
any visible displacement, the grid is thrust to the forefront of the viewers’ 
attention and is statically seen as both the image as such and that which 
generates this image.  
 
Excesses in the Seeing 
 When Eckmann and Koepnick distinguish those features that comprise 
gridded images, like Mondrian’s Composition No. 12 with Blue, from those images 
generated by matrices, like Simon’s Every Icon, they produce a series of 
dichotomies.27 Upon closer inspection, the opposition between the visibly stable 
images of modernist grids and the imperceptible moving matrices of digital 
images begins to unravel. The line that demarcates gridded images from those 
images generated by matrices is not solid at all.  Despite Eckmann and 
Koepnick’s conceptualization of grids stated above, Koepnick reveals that, 
“whatever appears to be a product of the grid’s unyielding structure 
surreptitiously speaks of that which may exceed the grid’s rational order and 
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control” (2006: 55). This means that the gridded images of modernist painting, 
like Composition No. 12 with Blue, have the potential to reach beyond the 
structures that compose and contain them.28 These works generate a movement 
that viewers experience through the activity of seeing, which is in excess of their 
compositional structure. There are excesses in the seeing that go beyond the 
limits of what is actually painted on the canvas.   
When viewers look at Composition No. 12 with Blue, the grid that they see is 
capable of motion but not in the same manner as matrices. Unlike the black and 
white colours that move across the squares found within the matrix of Simon’s 
Every Icon, the compositional elements in Mondrian’s painting – such as black 
perpendicular black lines and planes of solid colour – do not change. The lines 
do not change places or angles. The solidly coloured quadrilateral planes of 
white and blue do not change colour, increase or diminish in size, or move across 
the black lines of the grid. None of the compositional elements in Composition No. 
12 with Blue generate any spatial displacement. This does not mean that 
movement does not occur in this painting. According to Mondrian: 
The vitality of living organisms as well as their physical 
characteristics is manifested not only through their appearance but 
through their movement. Vitality is more difficult to discern in 
inorganic things. Nevertheless we feel the vitality of reality in 
everything that exists. In plastic art this feeling of vitality is created 
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through the dynamic rhythm of forms and colours (1986/1993: 
387). 
Many viewers will experience a motion that is not actually painted on the 
canvas, but one that is felt through the activity of seeing. Susanne K. Langer 
states: “What we call ‘motion’ in art is not necessarily change of place, but is 
change made perceivable” (1953: 66; original emphasis). This movement in 
Mondrian’s work generates a dynamism that is beyond vision itself. It exceeds 
both the compositional elements that comprise the painting and the viewers’ 
ability to see. “To exceed vision is to displace contours of thought to engage with 
the ephemeral” (Manning 2003: 11). Viewers can sense that there is something at 
work in Mondrian’s painting, yet at the same time there is nothing tangible to 
verify that anything has actually occurred. As viewers look at Composition No. 12 
with Blue, they will see a grid but feel a movement that leaves absolutely no 
indication that it occurred. According to Henri Bergson: “There are changes, but 
there are underneath the changes no things which change: change has no need of 
a support.  There are movements, but there is no inert or invariable object which 
moves: Movement does not imply a mobile” (2007: 122). This felt dynamic 
movement leave no trace because there is nothing that actually supports it. 
Dynamism needs no foundation to activate changes felt in the seeing.  
Before viewers experience this dynamism, they will tend to notice two 
things when initially looking at Composition No. 12 with Blue: it presents a grid 
and it appears to be static. The painting’s black perpendicular lines seem to place 
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a geometric order onto the white background, removing the potential for any 
movement to occur. The web of intersecting black lines grabs the viewers’ 
attention and stops them in their tracks. Yet, in that brief moment as Mondrian’s 
web holds the viewers’ attention, movement begins to emerge. It is not a free-
flowing continuous movement but rather one that feels jittery, provoking the 
viewers’ gaze to jump all over the canvas. This is because flashes of whitish-grey 
begin to appear at the intersections of the black lines. The more the viewers’ gaze 
jump from one intersection to another, the more the flickering appears. This in 
turn incites the viewers’ vision to continue jumping. If viewers try to hold their 
gaze on one intersection, the fluttering of whitish-grey appears to diminish 
momentarily. However, within a couple of seconds the flickering resumes in the 
other surrounding intersections, which eventually provokes the viewers’ gaze to 
move again. What viewers discover is that there is a restless rhythm generated in 
Mondrian’s painting, which can be felt emerging from the flickering 
intersections. “Thus rhythm runs through a painting just as it runs through a 
piece of music” (Deleuze 2003: 37).  
Composition No. 12 with Blue holds the viewers’ attention just long enough 
to generate visually resonant images: images that emerge from the jittery rhythm 
of the flickering intersections. The painting does not produce a singular static 
image but rather generates what Erin Manning would describe as “a felt rhythm 
that invents itself in the watching” (2009b: 188). The images viewers see 
emerging from Composition No. 12 with Blue, as a frenetically felt rhythm, only 
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occur in the encounter with the painting. This experienced rhythm is a dynamic 
movement felt in the seeing. Neither the viewers nor the painting produce these 
rhythmic images alone. This is because, as Mondrian states: “Everything is 
expressed through relationships” (1986/1993: 86; original emphasis). 
Understanding images in this light means that no one thing can produce them. It 
is neither the painting nor the viewers that generate the seen images. Rather, 
images emerge in the relations occurring between Mondrian’s painting and 
viewers as a shared experience.  
When viewers and Composition No. 12 with Blue enter into relations, both 
the viewers and the painting actively participate in generating the images that 
are seen through the experience that they mutually share. Images are only visible 
when viewers experience the painting and, as odd as it may seem, when the 
painting experiences viewers. This means that the ability to have an experience is 
not something that is exclusively human. Viewers are not the only entities that 
have experiences. Mondrian’s painting experiences something too, even if it is on 
some rudimentary level. Even a rock experiences something. “A falling rock 
‘feels,’ or ‘perceives,’ the gravitational field of the earth. The rock isn’t conscious, 
of course; but it is affected by the earth, and this being affected is its experience” 
(Shaviro 2009: 12-13).29 A falling rock experiences the gravitational field of the 
earth because the earth has an impact on it by way of physical attraction. 
Conversely, as a rock falls, the earth also experiences the gravitational field. This 
is because the gravitational field emerges from the relations that occur between 
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the falling rock and the earth. The gravitational field is the shared experience that 
arises from these relations, similar to the images that emerge from the shared 
experience between viewers and Mondrian’s painting. So, like a falling rock, 
Composition No. 12 with Blue “experiences”: it is constantly being affected 
somehow, whether it is the nails holding it to the wall, the contact it has with the 




The felt relations between Composition No. 12 with Blue and viewers, as a 
shared experience, does not only include the set of relations from which images 
emerge. According to Mondrian, this is because the painting “must be viewed as 
a duality or multiplicity – as a complex” (1986/1993: 86; original emphasis). This 
“complex” involves the relations among the plastic, or compositional, elements 
of the painting – such as lines, colours, and the planes they compose. For 
Mondrian: “If purely plastic expression is created by ‘the relationships’ of line, 
planes surface, and colour in their purely plastic values, then these means exist 
only through their relationships. Therefore, relationships are just as important as 
the plastic means” (1986/1993: 246). The relations that occur between the 
compositional elements are just as vital to the emergence of images for Mondrian 
as the compositional elements themselves.  
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Mondrian takes a radically empirical approach to his painting practice, in 
which “the relations that connect experiences must themselves be experienced 
relations, and any kind of relation experienced must be accounted as ‘real’ as 
anything else in the system” (James 2003: 22-23). Because the “complex” 
Mondrian composes for his painting cannot be experienced without the relations 
that gather among the compositional elements, these relations must be 
considered as much a part of the experience viewers encounter with the work as 
the lines, colours, and planes seen on the canvas. Since relations are key to the 
generation of Mondrian’s “complex,” it can thus be called a relational complex.30 It 
is important to note that these relations occurring among the compositional 
elements are not just vital to the shared experience viewers and Mondrian’s work 
generate. The relational complex that emerges from the compositional elements 
and their relations is in fact crucial to the experience viewers have with any 
artwork. 
It is from this relational complex that images begin to incipiently form as a 
rhythm felt in the seeing. Mondrian testifies to this stating: “Rhythm arises 
through the relationship of plastic means” (1986/1993: 313). As the relational 
complex comes together, the rhythm that viewers feel when looking at the 
painting does not generate fully formed images. Rather, the relational complex, 
along with the shared experience occurring between viewers and the painting, 
initiates a process out of which images emerge. This process is felt as the 
incipiency of images. It is the compositional elements in Composition No. 12 with 
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Blue – the black perpendicular lines, the planes of white, and the blue square – 
that gather and begin forming a relational complex, making it possible for 
images to begin emerging.  
The emergent images that arise from the shared experience between the 
relational complex of Composition No. 12 with Blue and the viewers are more 
dynamic than Eckmann and Koepnick’s notion of either grids or matrices. Recall 
that Eckmann and Koepnick’s understanding of gridded images assumes that the 
relationship between viewers and artworks is based on a notion of stability. For 
them, viewers see immutable images when looking at gridded images. Brian 
Massumi points out that if artworks are assumed to be static, this affects how 
vision is understood. 
The idea that there is such a thing as fixed form is actually as much 
an assumption about perception as it is an assumption about art. It 
assumes that vision is not dynamic – that it is a passive, transparent 
registering of something that is just there, simply and inertly. If 
vision is stable, then to make art dynamic you have to add 
movement (Massumi 2008: 3).  
In this light, grids are immutable because both the seen artwork and the viewers’ 
ability to see are believed to be stable, whereas matrices are full of motion 
because movement is added to compositional elements that are contained within 
its underlying static gridded structure. This means that Composition No. 12 with 
Blue cannot be considered a grid, as defined by Eckmann and Koepnick, because 
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viewers actually see movement occurring in the form of the jittery rhythm that 
emerges from the flickering intersections of the black perpendicular lines.  
Viewers experience a seeing that exceeds what is painted on Mondrian’s 
canvas. Alternately, this also means that grids are not stable as such. They are 
never as immutable as they seem. The fluctuation of grayish-white in the 
intersections of the grid provokes viewers to constantly shift their focus from one 
section of the painting to another. Their gaze is not fixed upon the painting as a 
whole but instead is endlessly darting about the canvas. For Mondrian, “vision 
does not start from a single given point, but takes its viewpoint everywhere, 
from no fixed place” (1986/1993: 197). The instability of the viewers’ vision is 
instrumental to the dynamism that is generated with the work.  
 Composition No. 12 with Blue cannot be classified as a matrix either. This is 
because, first, the movement that takes place in the painting does not result from 
the addition of motion to the compositional elements; second, the black lines 
make the grid visible; and third, it is not a digital artwork. The moving images 
viewers see in Mondrian’s painting are not caused by changes that are 
exclusively generated from the work itself. There is no underlying binary code 
that was programmed to move or change the compositional elements within the 
visible grid, unlike Simon’s Every Icon. Rather, when viewers look at Composition 
No. 12 with Blue, the moving images they see are co-generated through dynamic 
relationship between the relational complex of compositional elements and the 
shared experience that the viewers and the painting mutually encounter 
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together. It is the excesses in the seeing that generate the dynamism that is felt as 
the incipiency of images of Mondrian’s work.  
 
Landing Sites 
 Composition No. 12 with Blue shows that the line that demarcates grids 
from matrices is not solid because the dynamic movement generated from the 
jittery rhythm felt in the seeing blurs this boundary.  In Mondrian’s last 
completed painting, Broadway Boogie Woogie (1942-43), the criteria that separate 
grids from matrices become even more tenuous. This is because Broadway Boogie 
Woogie generates a dynamism felt in the seeing without any black perpendicular 
lines. There is no grid that is immediately visible, unlike Composition No. 12 with 
Blue. Rather than composing this painting with black perpendicular lines, 
Mondrian fills Broadway Boogie Woogie with an array of rectangular and square 
planes of varying sizes. The larger planes are primarily white and are 
surrounded by smaller, mostly square, planes that are composed of four different 
colours: red, yellow, blue, and grey. What is striking about this square painting 
(127 x 127 cm) is that as viewers look at it, they begin to notice that the smaller 
planes that border the larger white planes actually form a series of perpendicular 
lines. These colourfully composed lines, in turn, generate a gridded pattern that 
echoes Mondrian’s previous work, such as Composition No. 12 with Blue.31 
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Figure 1.2. Piet Mondrian, Broadway Boogie Woogie (1942-43). 
In Broadway Boogie Woogie, the perpendicular lines and the grid can 
actually be difficult for viewers to see as a cohesive whole because these 
compositional elements are not a uniform colour. This is because the lines and 
the grid are generated in the seeing. Discussing Broadway Boogie Woogie, 
Mondrian explains that the perpendicular lines composed of the small planes are 
not the only things that are produced through the activity of seeing, but that the 
planes themselves are as well. He states that, “the lines are absorbed by the 
colour planes; but the limitation of the planes shows themselves as lines and 
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conserve their great value” (Mondrian 1986/1993: 356). The perpendicular lines 
viewers see, which form the grid, are composed of the small coloured planes. 
The coloured planes themselves are composed of contour lines that surround 
their edges. These contour lines, which delineate the planes’ shape, emerge in the 
relations between the coloured planes. The contour lines and coloured planes 
mutually compose each other and together generate the painting’s relational 
complex. It is the mutual composition of and relations between the coloured 
planes and the contour lines that enable the emergence of the perpendicular lines 
and the grid.   
Viewers initially encounter the emergence of the relational complex in 
Broadway Boogie Woogie through the dazzling display of colours found in the 
planes. It is the array of coloured planes that grab the viewers’ attention, as 
opposed to the perpendicular lines they generate. This is because, according to 
painter Bridget Riley, Mondrian “paints the sensation that his own work 
generates: the little tiny squares in Broadway Boogie Woogie originate in the after 
images of the linear intersections that were the beginning to crop up in his 
paintings” (2009: 318). Instead of the perpendicular lines generating a jittery 
rhythm of whitish-grey flickers, like in Composition No. 12 with Blue, Mondrian 
reverses the roles of the flickers and the perpendicular lines in Broadway Boogie 
Woogie. It is the flashes of colour, now made corporeal and embodied as the 
coloured planes painted on the canvas, which generate the dynamism that is felt 
in the seeing. As the colours of the planes take hold of the viewers’ attention, a 
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dynamic movement begins to appear that follows the sequences of the small 
coloured planes. This dynamic movement is discontinuous, but not like the 
jittery flickers of Composition No. 12 with Blue. It flows through the sequences of 
reds, yellows, blues, and greys around the larger white planes as an irregular 
rhythm. From this flowing irregular rhythm, the perpendicular lines and the grid 
are made visible as the images that viewers see.   
The array of coloured and white planes that compose Broadway Boogie 
Woogie, as well as the perpendicular lines, the grid, and the irregular rhythm that 
viewers experience in the seeing, might be considered what Madeline Gins and 
Arakawa call landing sites. According to Gins and Arakawa, landing sites 
designate “the ‘coming alive’… of anything whatsoever, including even the most 
fleeting sensations” (2002: 6). As new encounters are experienced between 
Broadway Boogie Woogie’s compositional elements, the gathering relations among 
the elements and viewers, more landing sites are felt in the seeing. These felt 
landing sites cannot be specifically located. They are not stable places that can be 
mapped with any sort of precision. They do not occur in or on Mondrian’s 
painting. Rather, landing sites are what constitute the composition of the 
experienced encounter, as they are being experienced. Landing sites generate a 
space for experience to be felt, enabling viewers to “feel the vitality of reality in 
everything that exists” (Mondrian 1986/1993: 387). 
As landing sites, the array of coloured and white planes tease out an 
intensity that is experientially felt between viewers and the relational complex of 
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Mondrian’s painting. While these planes are being experienced, they become 
“the landings of sites for future cueing and aligning” (Manning 2010: 6-7). They 
are what mobilize potential into the felt dynamism that flows throughout 
Mondrian’s painting, generating the irregular rhythm and enabling the 
incipiency of images. This means that what is generated in the midst of the 
viewer-artwork experience is composed of landing sites, including all the 
relations that occur between landing sites and the experiences themselves. This is 
because, according to Gins and Arakawa, what is actualized into perception is 
composed of configurations of landing sites. As well, each landing site that is 
experienced is always composed of more landing sites. “Anything perceived can 
count as both a landing site in and of itself and as a larger landing site” (Gins and 
Arakawa 2002: 9). Because there are landing sites within landing sites that 
constitute even bigger landing sites, Gins and Arakawa further refine the 
conception of landing sites and specify that there are three distinct types: 
perceptual landing sites, imaging landing sites and dimensional landing sites. 
The composition of anything that emerges into experience involves all three of 
these types of landing sites simultaneously. This is because, as Gins and 
Arakawa state: “Landing sites dissolve into each other, or abut, or overlap, or 
nest within each other” (2002: 8). It is through the overlapping of the three types 
of landing sites that experience emerges, changes, and is made perceptible. As 
the three types of landing sites constantly shift their configurations, the 
experience that they compose and recompose is always in the making. 
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The first of these landing sites that compose experience are called 
perceptual landing sites. They can be understood as the “building blocks” of all 
landing sites. This is because these sites, as Gins and Arakawa state, “serve up 
the initiating sites of all sites” (2002: 11). Perceptual landing sites consist of what 
is actually perceived as it is being perceived. “All points or areas of focus, that is, 
all designated areas of specified activity, count as perceptual landing sites 
(visual, aural, tactile, olfactory, proprioceptive, kinesthetic, somaesthetic [pain])” 
(Gins and Arakawa 2002: 10). Perceptual landing sites are the compositional 
elements that are actually seen in Mondrian’s paintings, such as the colours and 
shapes of the planes in Broadway Boogie Woogie. They are also the assemblages of 
these compositional elements, like the grouping of colored planes that generate a 
particular horizontal line or a set of these perpendicular lines, which then forms 
the grid that viewers eventually come to see. Perceptual landing sites, according 
to Manning, “are singular and multiple at once” (2009b: 211). Each individual 
perceptual landing site is a singular site onto itself, like the coloured planes, but 
they also make up other perceptual landing sites that are experienced through 
their multiplicity, such as the perpendicular lines and grid that are composed of 
many coloured planes.   
 Imaging landing sites are the second type of landing sites. These landing 
sites extend beyond the experiential limits of the perceptual landing sites. As 
Gins and Arakawa explain: “Taking off from perceptual landing sites (actual 
points of focus), imaging landing sites (generalizing factors) extend and diffuse 
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surfaces and volumes. Imaging landing sites enlarge the areas over which 
qualities hold sway” (2002: 12). Imaging landing sites are the incipient actions 
that generate the about to become perceptible of experiences.32 They constitute 
the dynamism that is felt gathering throughout any composition that is 
experienced. They are the excesses in the seeing that are felt when viewers look 
at Broadway Boogie Woogie. The dynamic movement that viewers feel as the 
irregular rhythm that compose the perpendicular lines and the grid visible are 
the imagining landing sites, which flow throughout Mondrian’s painting. 
 Finally, dimensional landing sites are the sites that occur between 
perceptual landing sites and imaginary landing sites. Gins and Arakawa state 
that dimensional landing sites combine “the qualities of a perceptual landing site 
with those of an imaging landing one, coupling and coordinating direct 
responses with indirect ones, the formed with the formless” (2002: 8). 
Dimensional landing sites are the sites of relation that arrange the spacing and 
the placing of all landing sites. They generate the depth and emphasis necessary 
to any experience. In Broadway Boogie Woogie, dimensional landing sites are what 
enable viewers to take the composition of planes on the canvas and 
simultaneously feel the emergence of the dynamic irregular rhythm, while seeing 
the perpendicular lines and the grid that this rhythm generates. Dimensional 
landing sites connect the composition of planes to the irregular rhythm they 
generate in the seeing and bring them both to the forefront of the viewers’ 
experience in order to make the perpendicular lines and the grid visible. Without 
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these dimensional landing sites to coordinate the felt excesses of imaging landing 
sites and the perceived compositional elements of perceptual landing sites, the 
act of experiencing the world would be made completely chaotic. 
 All three landing sites are necessary in order for any visual experience to 
occur. The images that viewers see when looking at Broadway Boogie Woogie all 
arise from the ever-changing configurations of these three types of landing sites. 
The perpendicular lines and the grid are made visible not only from the 
configuration of perceptual landing sites that are immediately seen as the 
composition of planes, but also from the imaging landing sites that generate the 
dynamism felt in the seeing and the dimensional landing sites that constitute the 
relations that occur between all landing sites. As these landing sites compose and 
recompose what viewers experience, they also coordinate the emergence of the 
relational complex and the shared experience between Mondrian’s painting and 
viewers. The relations among landing sites bring forth the notion that the 
viewers’ experience is in constant negotiation between the overlapping of 
landing sites, forever composing, in which there is no distinct division between 
the viewers’ body, Mondrian’s painting, or the experiences that both share. It is 
from the constantly changing configurations of landing sites that the incipiency 
of images is made possible.  
 Landing sites are not only constantly configuring what viewers visually 
experience when looking at Broadway Boogie Woogie, they also are perpetually 
composing all the visual experiences viewers have of anything they see, whether 
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they are gridded images, like Mondrian’s paintings, or images generated by 
matrices found in digital imaging, like Simon’s Every Icon. The encounter viewers 
have with a single white square in Every Icon generates a landing site that is 
experienced in and of itself.  This same encountered white square is also a part of 
a larger composition of squares that generates different landing sites for the 
experiencing. All of these landing sites that are felt in Every Icon, like those in 
Mondrian’s paintings, continually shift about configuring an experience for 
viewers, as that experience is itself emerging into existence. Whether images 
emerge from digital means or with paint, everything that viewers see is 
constituted in the shared experience generated through the encounter with 
landing sites that are felt as “a depositing of sited awareness everywhere” (Gins 
and Arakawa 2002: 7). Images actively emerge in midst of a shared encounter 
with the world that is infinitely populated with landing sites. 
 
Tentatively Constructing Images 
Because landing sites are active within every shared experience with and 
within the world, rather than attempting to classify the images as either being 
gridded or generated by matrices, all images – digital, modernist or otherwise – 
should be considered to be what Gins and Arakawa call “a tentative constructing 
towards a holding into place” (2002: 23ff.; original emphasis). The images emerging 
from the shared experience between an artwork and its viewers arise from the 
constantly shifting configurations of landing sites. Because everything that is 
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experienced changes as the landing sites rearrange themselves, any images that 
are made visible never last as such for very long. As Gins and Arakawa explain: 
“Everything is tentative” (2002: 49). It is important to be mindful of the nuanced 
manner in which Gins and Arakawa use the term “tentative”, which is defined 
by them in both its provisional and hesitant sense (2002: 82). Specifically, 
tentativeness should be understood provisionally as an arrangement that lacks 
fixity and hesitantly as a momentary pause. This means that the images that 
viewers see when looking at Mondrian’s Composition No. 12 with Blue or Broadway 
Boogie Woogie emerge as “a tentative constructing towards a holding into place” 
that are provisionally “constructed” but also are hesitantly “held.”   
The experiences that are shared between Mondrian’s paintings and the 
viewers are provisionally tentative because at any moment these particular 
experiences can change or even vanish. When Gins and Arakawa discuss the 
tentativeness of the biosphere, or what they call the “bioscleave”, they assert that 
if any single element fails to hold, then this could potentially create disastrous 
effects for the entire planet.33 Although the consequences are not as cataclysmic 
when a shared viewer-artwork experience does not take hold, emergent images 
and shared experiences are nonetheless tentative in this provisional way. For 
example, when viewers walk away from Composition No. 12 with Blue or Broadway 
Boogie Woogie, the shared experience between the viewers and the painting 
ceases, while the developing relational complex and the incipiency of images 
continue to persist by taking new and different forms. This is what makes the 
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“constructing” of images so provisionally tentative. Even minor changes to the 
experience shared between Mondrian’s paintings and its viewers can affect the 
incipiency of images. A blink of the eye, a stomach gurgling with hunger, a 
gentle breeze flowing through the gallery space, a cough made by another 
viewer, or even an appearance of crack in the paint that is just beyond 
perceptibility can all tentatively impact the shared experience.  
The key is that these provisionally tentative, shared experiences need to be 
held long enough to enable the coming together of relations and allow for the 
incipiency of images to occur. In order for this holding to happen a hesitation 
must occur. Neither Mondrian’s paintings nor the viewers are capable of 
provoking this hesitation. Rather, according to Gins and Arakawa, critical holders 
enable this hesitation. Critical holders emerge to help the viewers detect and 
piece together incipient images while they are “activated and held and holding 
and activating” (Gins and Arakawa 2002: 82). Recall that when viewers first 
encounter Composition No. 12 with Blue, the web of perpendicular black lines 
holds their attention for a brief moment just before the whitish-grey flickers 
begin to emerge from the intersections. The moment viewers encounter the 
painting, the black perpendicular lines initiate a composing of an about-to-
become image. This causes a hesitation to occur in the seeing. It is important to 
understand that the composing black lines are not yet an image as such.  This 
composing or incipient action should be viewed as the initial coming together of 
the relational complex. When viewers look at Composition No. 12 with Blue, as the 
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black lines begin composing, a hesitation is generated in the seeing. When 
looking at Broadway Boogie Woogie, the critical holder is the array of colours that 
dazzle the viewer into hesitation. As the viewers begin looking at the colours 
found in the painting, the colours start to compose the coloured planes, which 
then generate the irregular rhythm that takes the viewers on a journey around 
the various white planes throughout the canvas.   
It is the critical holder that enables this hesitant moment to take place so 
that the relational complex can continue coming together enabling the incipiency 
of images to occur. This is because the critical holder exists in a relationally 
emergent field that includes Mondrian’s paintings, but also extends beyond 
them. It invites viewers to engage with these paintings through its ability to 
attract and hold the viewers’ gaze. The initial configuration that begins to 
become visible in Mondrian’s paintings is the critical holder, which takes form as 
the composing black lines in Composition No. 12 with Blue or the coloured planes 
in Broadway Boogie Woogie. In that hesitant moment when the critical holder 
emerges, several actions occur almost simultaneously, enabling the incipiency of 
images. To begin with, the viewers’ attention is held. Then the shared experience 
is activated between Mondrian’s paintings and the viewers. Finally, the relational 
complex continues to come together after viewers see the initial configuration of 
the black lines, in the case of Composition No. 12 with Blue or the composition of 
coloured planes in Broadway Boogie Woogie. From these three nearly simultaneous 
occurring actions a rhythm becomes active in the seeing. Images then emerge 
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from the jittery and irregular rhythms of these paintings, holding the viewers’ 
attention even longer.   
In that brief pause between experiencing a composition of visual elements 
and a dynamic rhythm that incites the viewers’ gaze to move about the canvas, 
the critical holder, to paraphrase Gins and Arakawa, enables viewers to hold the 
images that hold them.34 “Everything stops dead for a moment, everything 
freezes in place – and then the whole process will begin all over again” (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1983: 7). The perpendicular lines in Composition No. 12 with Blue or 
the coloured planes in Broadway Boogie Woogie emerge as the critical holder that 
hesitantly facilitates the “construction” or incipiency of images, while 
simultaneously holding the shared experience between the painting and viewers 
in place. The critical holder enables viewers to feel the emergence of a dynamism 
that can only be felt in the seeing during the shared experience. 
 
Forces Felt in the Seeing 
As the jittery flickers of whitish-grey in Composition No. 12 with Blue or the 
flowing irregular rhythms that emerge from the coloured planes in Broadway 
Boogie Woogie are encountered in the shared experience between Mondrian’s 
paintings and viewers, these ephemeral occurrences could be easily dismissed as 
having no bearing on the viewers’ actual perception. For Evan Thompson, these 
ephemeral occurrences do not have a place in his understanding of visual 
perception because they are not stable and distinct entities. This is because, for 
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him, the jittery flickers and irregular rhythms viewers experience when looking 
at Mondrian’s paintings are not solidly grounded in something like the paint on 
a canvas or something rational like the structure of grids.  Thompson believes 
that: “In perception, one is aware of things as stable and distinct entities in 
relation to an indeterminate background” (1995: 247). This would mean that in 
order for viewers to encounter the images generated in the shared experience 
with Mondrian’s paintings, they would have to background the dynamic 
movement that is actually experienced as the flickers and the irregular rhythms 
felt in the seeing. Viewers would have to encounter the compositional elements 
in these works, and the paintings themselves, as a set of stable entities that 
constitute the images they see.  They would have to concentrate solely on the 
perceptual landing sites, paying absolutely no attention to either the imaging and 
dimensional landing sites that occur in the seeing, which enable the activation of 
the dynamism that is felt in the midst of the shared experience.  
If perception unfolds how Thompson believes, then, according to Bergson, 
it would “be inextensible; it would consist of the assembling of certain specific 
materials, in a given quantity, and we should never find anything more in it than 
what had been put there in the first place” (2007: 113). Mondrian’s paintings 
would be no more than the paint on the canvas and the grid pattern it presents. 
Viewers would not experience any movement when they encounter either 
Composition No. 12 with Blue or Broadway Boogie Woogie. Yet the excesses in the 
seeing present in the experience shared with Mondrian’s paintings in the form of 
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the jittery and irregular rhythms extend beyond Thompson’s stable 
understanding of perception. This is because there is always more that is 
experienced than is directly perceived. As painter Bridget Riley notes: “We feel 
with our eyes more that we see” (2009: 69; emphasis added). When viewers gaze 
upon Mondrian’s paintings they are experiencing a seeing that exceeds what is 
actually visible.  
The dynamism felt in the encounter between viewers and Mondrian’s 
paintings enables both to surpass the rational and stable order that grids tend to 
impose. Neither viewers nor Mondrian’s paintings can generate the dynamism 
that is experienced on their own. It is the felt intensity of dynamic movement 
generated through the activity of seeing that draws viewers into a shared 
experience, rather than the depictions of grids or the sense of stability the grid 
may offer. This means the dynamism that is experienced exceeds both what 
Mondrian’s paintings offer to be seen, as the emergent relational complex, and 
the viewers’ actual vision. What is experienced is co-generated through the 
relations that occur between the viewers and Mondrian’s paintings through the 
activity of seeing. The jittery flickers of Composition No. 12 with Blue and irregular 
rhythms of Broadway Boogie Woogie felt in the seeing are compositional forces that 
compose the images that come to be seen. These compositional forces are co-
generated though the relations that occur within the shared experience because, 
according to Gilles Deleuze, “any force is already a relation” (1988b: 70). These 
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felt compositional forces are the relations viewers encounter with Mondrian’s 
paintings. They are what thrust the incipiency of images into action. 
When looking at Composition No. 12 with Blue or Broadway Boogie Woogie, 
viewers simultaneously experience two conflicting compositional forces that 
constitute the dynamism felt in the seeing. This is because, according to 
Mondrian, “the opposition of two forces creates dynamic movement” 
(1986/1993: 384). One force centrifugally spirals outward, while a second force 
moves in the opposite direction, centripetally spiraling inward. The centrifugal 
force both exceeds the confines of the surface of Mondrian’s paintings, spilling 
out beyond the works’ relational complex and into the world. It also surpasses 
the perceptual limits of the viewers’ vision, lavishing viewers with more than they 
can actually perceive. This centrifugal force is the conduit that enables viewers to 
feel the emergent excesses in the seeing. 
The other compositional force felt in the seeing draws viewers towards 
Mondrian’s paintings by luring their attention with the potential of experiencing 
a novel perception. This centripetal force pulls the viewers’ attention to the visual 
offerings of Composition No. 12 with Blue or Broadway Boogie Woogie by subtracting 
much of the excess that viewers encounter through the centrifugal force. The 
centripetal force generates a seeing in which viewers perceive less than what they 
actually experience. Deleuze asserts that “perception is not the object plus 
something, but the object minus something, minus everything that does not 
interest us” (1988a: 24-525; original emphasis). This does not mean that the 
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centripetal force removes these felt excesses from the shared experience viewers 
have with Mondrian’s paintings. Rather, this inwardly turning force enables 
particular excessive sites of attention felt in the seeing to potentially become 
something that viewers actually perceive.  
When the centrifugal and centripetal forces encounter each other within 
the shared experience between Mondrian’s paintings and viewers, they 
eventually reach a state of equilibrium. This equilibrium for Mondrian “is not a 
static state without action, as generally thought but, on the contrary, [it is] a 
continuous and mutually annihilating opposition of equivalent but unequal 
elements” (Mondrian 1986/1993: 252). Just because a state of equilibrium is 
reached between the centrifugal and centripetal forces within the shared viewer-
artwork experience, it does not mean that these forces stop being active. The 
centrifugal force continues to generate the more-than of experience, while at the 
same time the centripetal force persists in producing the less-than of perception. 
As one force enables more to be actually experienced, the other constantly lures 
the viewers’ attention towards particular occurrences felt in the seeing. Because 
of the continued activity these opposing compositional forces produce, the 
equilibrium they co-generate constantly shifts and reconfigures itself, which in 
turn creates the dynamism that is felt in the seeing. Together these vertiginous 
compositional forces felt in the shared experience between viewers and 
Mondrian’s paintings generate a dynamism that, according to Koepnick “at once 
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point our attention inward and outward, suspend our perception and stir our 
appetite for more” (2006: 55).  
The difference between what viewers encounter when looking at 
Mondrian’s work and what is visibly painted on these canvases creates a 
disparity that Gins and Arakawa believe is “between the world as it happens… 
and the world, reduced and distorted, made to appear as other than what it 
happens as” (2002: 51). If viewers truly believe that the images they see are 
exclusively the grids painted on the canvas, then they will not visually encounter 
images as “a tentative constructing towards a holding into place.” Viewers who 
see Mondrian’s paintings as merely static grids potentially miss the dynamism 
that the activity of seeing has to offer. “Instead of visualizing a complete triumph 
of modern rationality over any remaining trace of uncertainty, Mondrian’s grids 
simultaneously invite centrifugal and centripetal readings” (Koepnick 2006: 54-
55). Works such as Composition No. 12 with Blue and Broadway Boogie Woogie 
enable a seeing in which dynamic movement is felt in the seeing experience. 
Disregarding the jittery flickers and the irregular rhythms felt in the seeing goes 
against one of Mondrian’s most important beliefs, “that reality is in constant 
movement” (1986/1993: 351; original emphasis). Mondrian held movement in 
such high regard because, as he states, “it evokes the sensation of life” 







In the comings and goings of our mind between the without and the within, there is a 
point, at equal distance from both, in which it seems to us that we no longer perceive the 
one, and that we do not yet perceive the other: it is there that the image of “Nothing” is 
formed. 
– Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution35 
 
Paul Sharits’ film N:O:T:H:I:N:G (1968) consists primarily of colour-fields 
that fill the entire screen.36 Following the title sequence, the film begins with the 
passage of several colours that are seen changing at a rate of one half to two 
seconds per shot. The colours red, yellow, green, blue, white and black are 
clearly discernible.37 After about a minute the colours begin to change more 
quickly. Eventually, these changes become so rapid that it becomes nearly 
impossible for viewers to discern the colours and the order in which they appear. 
In fact, the colours become so volatile that it is difficult to say with confidence 
that they are actually seen at all. At this point in the film viewers begin to 
perceive something other than a series of easily identifiable colours – they begin 
to see an emerging flicker.  
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When viewers start to see the flicker, many of them begin to mistrust their 
visual capabilities because what they see is truly bizarre. The flicker appears 
simultaneously to throb at its edges, rise from the screen, and float in some 
ambiguous space between themselves and the screen. William C. Wees contends 
that in many of Sharits’ works, “the whole image may seem to expand and 
contract and even lift itself off the surface of the screen and hover disconcertingly 
in some ambiguous plane that is impossible to fix in space” (1992: 147).38 It can be 
difficult for viewers to comprehend exactly what it is they are actually seeing. 
When they see these strange occurrences taking place in N:O:T:H:I:N:G, it is not 
clear to them whether they are seeing features of the film itself or something 
fabricated by their minds. Sharits himself does not claim to know what viewers 
will experience when watching his films. He states that many of his films “brings 
us to the limits of our perceptual abilities so often one cannot tell whether or not 
what one is experiencing is in the work or in oneself” (Sharits and Cathcart 1976: 
unpaginated). By pushing viewers to their perceptual limits up to the point 
where they doubt their own visual abilities, N:O:T:H:I:N:G incites them to 
question not only their ability to discern what the images they see actually are, 
but also their understanding of how the images they see come into being.   
At the time when viewers begin to see the throbbing flicker in 
N:O:T:H:I:N:G, the colour-fields of which the film is composed are no longer 
visible. This is not to say that they have disappeared. Rather, these colour-fields 
continue to fill the entire screen but they change at such a rapid pace that they 
 96 
simply cannot be seen as such. In fact, by the time viewers begin to see the 
flicker, the length of time that each colour is projected has decreased from the 
two seconds at the beginning of the film to a twenty-fourth of a second. At this 
rapid rate of projection it is nearly impossible to distinctly see each colour. 
According to Jimena Canales, “most events occurring in this short period of time 
cannot be perceived” (2009: ix). The colour-fields in N:O:T:H:I:N:G effectively 
become imperceptible.  
Some viewers may be capable of recognizing an occasional colour 
presented. However, according to Alva Noë, “the moment you stop and try to 
make a specific feature the sole object of your consideration – this shade of red, 
for example – it slips away from you in the sense that it exceeds what you can 
take in, in completeness, at an instant” (2004: 135). Because the colours at this 
point of the film are changing so quickly, any particular colour that viewers can 
grasp – such as the colour red – seems to evaporate upon recognition. This is not 
a criticism of the viewers’ abilities to discern these rapidly changing colours; it 
merely shows the limits of their visual capabilities. They experience a seeing that 
is, in Rosalind Krauss’ words, “below the threshold of actual visibility” (1976: 
unpaginated; emphasis added). 
 
The Seen and the Unseen 
As the film continues, the flicker comes to dominate what viewers feel 
they see.  However, several times throughout N:O:T:H:I:N:G the flicker is broken 
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by brief interludes of what can best be described as a foggy evanescence of 
colour. There is no abrupt jump from the flicker to these evanescent colours; 
viewers see the flicker fluidly phase into, and eventually out from, these 
evanescent colours. For example, at one point in the film the flicker recedes into a 
pinkish-orange colour.39 During the viewers’ encounter with this pinkish-orange 
colour, it looks volatile, as though it is on the cusp of transforming into a 
completely different colour. This evanescent colour is constantly and minutely 
shifting in brightness and in hue, veering towards several different colours, such 
as white, green, and red, all the while maintaining its pinkish-orange quality. In 
the persistence of this evanescent colour, the small adjustments in brightness and 
in hue become more significant. The modifications that take place within the 
pinkish-orange colour eventually become so substantial that the evanescent 
colour disappears and the flicker seamlessly reveals itself again, becoming what 
is dominantly seen. As N:O:T:H:I:N:G nears its conclusion, the oscillation 
between the flicker and the evanescent colours passes and the film returns to the 
slower pace found at its beginning. Viewers are once again able to distinctly 
recognize several colours as they are projected on the screen for longer periods of 
time.  
What is interesting about the evanescent colours in N:O:T:H:I:N:G is that 
the colours as seen by the viewers do not correspond to the colours that are 
actually projected. An example of the difference between what the viewers see 
and what is actually shown is apparent in the evanescent pinkish-orange colour-
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field described above. If viewers were able to see the film projected at a much 
slower speed or have the opportunity to see the filmstrip directly, they would 
realize that neither the colour orange nor the colour pink are found. Instead, the 
colours on the filmstrip that make up the evanescent pinkish-orange are red, 
yellow and white. When this segment of the film is shown at its proper speed, 
the viewers do not see the colours that are actually being displayed; rather, they 
tend to see something completely different. What becomes visible is a field of 
colour that is not the colour itself – red, yellow, white – but an evanescent 
feeling. 
This perplexing disjunct between the colours that are actually seen and 
those that are projected is not the only point in this film when there is a disparity 
between what is projected and what viewers feel they see. The same situation 
occurs when viewers are watching the flicker. As noted earlier, when viewers see 
the flicker, it is difficult for them to discern any particular projected colour. If 
viewers were able to see a segment of the flicker slowed down or see it directly 
on the filmstrip, they would notice that the colours that are actually projected 
change dramatically in brightness or hue, and sometimes even both. For instance, 
a segment of the flicker might begin with the projection of the colour black, and 
be followed by a bright yellow, then a dark green, then light blue, then white, 
then back to black, and so on. Like the evanescent colours, the rapidly changing 
projected colours are not actually seen by viewers when watching the flicker. 
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Because the projected colours appear to not be visible when either the flicker or 
the evanescent colours are seen, they could be called unseen colours.  
The term “unseen” was chosen with specific reference to Steve 
Goodman’s concept of “unsound”.40 In Sonic Warfare: Sound, Affect, and the 
Ecology of Fear, Goodman uses the notion of unsound to describe “both the 
peripheries of auditory perception and the unactualized nexus of rhythms and 
frequencies within audible bandwidths” (2010: xx). The notion of unsound is 
concerned with two imperceptible facets of sound. The first involves those 
sounds that fall outside the range of acoustic perceptibility. Two examples of this 
for humans are low frequency sounds like those made by large motor engines or 
high frequency sounds such as those made by blowing a dog whistle.41 If there is 
sound that is beyond a creature’s perceptual capability then it simply cannot be 
heard and is therefore an inaudible sound, or an unsound.   
The second facet of unsound involves the imperceptible sonic vibrations 
that constitute audible sounds. These sonic vibrations cannot be heard because, 
as Goodman states, they’re the “not yet audible” of sound (2010: xviii, 48). They 
are not yet audible because they are merely the compositional elements that have 
the potential to come together and form a sonic perception. These imperceptible 
sonic vibrations constitute that which is about to become audible. Together they 
generate a “relational complex” that potentially emerges into something that is 
actually heard when encountered.42 
 100 
Gilles Deleuze gives an example of this second facet of unsound when he 
states: “I apprehend the sound of the sea, or of an assembly of people, but not the 
murmur of each wave or person who nonetheless is part of each whole” (1993: 
87).43 When listening to the sea or the roar of a crowd at a football game, the 
sound made by one wave in the sea or one person in a crowded football stadium 
cannot be differentiated from the other sounds that are made in close proximity. 
The specific sound made by each wave or person is imperceptible and nearly 
impossible to locate or isolate. However, when several of these imperceptible 
unsounds act together, they provide the potential for an audible sound “as such” 
to emerge. The imperceptible sonic vibrations generated by the waves or people 
are the about-to-become audible elements that compose the sound of the sea or 
stadium crowd. 
These two facets of unsound have corresponding characteristics that are 
paralleled in vision. The first facet of unsound, those sounds outside the range of 
sonic perceptibility, are analogous to colours beyond the range of visibility.  For 
humans this includes ultraviolet and infrared colours.44 Although pursuing an 
exploration into those unseen colours that are beyond the limits of human 
visibility would be fascinating, especially if this investigation were to look into 
the question of how these unseen colours may potentially affect those colours 
found within the visible spectrum, it is beyond the scope of this present 
discussion. Instead, it is the second facet of unsound that is of interest. This is 
because the imperceptible sonic vibrations, which are the about-to-become 
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audible elements that constitute what is actually heard, can be paralleled in 
vision as imperceptible unseen colours, or what Deleuze calls microperceptions.  
 
Seeing with Microperceptions 
Microperceptions are both the elements that compose perceptions as well 
as the relations that occur between a work’s compositional elements. According 
to Deleuze, microperceptions are “as much the passage from one perception to 
another as they are the components of each perception” (1993: 87).45 The reason 
that microperceptions are both the elements of perceptions and the relations 
between those elements is because they cannot be experienced independently. 
No one particular microperception can be experienced in isolation from other 
microperceptions. There are no discrete and individual microperceptions. 
Microperceptions can only be experienced relationally. This means that all 
microperceptions are relational entities.46  
The same holds true for perceptions themselves. Perceptions cannot be 
experienced in isolation from other perceptions or the microperceptions that 
compose them. Perceptions can only be experienced in relation to other 
perceptions and microperceptions. But unlike microperceptions, which occur 
below the threshold of visibility, perceptions comprise what viewers actually see. 
Yet despite the fact that perceptions are what rise above the threshold of 
visibility, they continue to have relations with that which is unseen. 
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From this Deleuzian perspective, the unseen colours in N:O:T:H:I:N:G 
cannot be understood simply as a rapid succession of discrete projections. This is 
because, as microperceptions, unseen colours can only be experienced through 
their relations. For example, if the unseen colour “red” is projected, then it 
cannot be experienced in isolation from the unseen colour that preceded it and 
the unseen colour that will follow. When viewers experience the unseen red, they 
will also experience the relations it has with the preceding and following unseen 
colours. If the unseen red is preceded by an unseen yellow and followed by an 
unseen white, then the moment viewers experience the unseen red they will also 
experience a yellow-red relation, a red-white relation, and a yellow-red-white 
relation.   
As microperceptions, the unseen colours are relational entities that 
imperceptibly come together to produce something perceptibly more 
extraordinary than any one of them alone could. It is important to emphasize 
that the unseen colours and their relations are not just components that make up 
the seen flicker and evanescent colours in Sharits’ film. They are not parts that go 
on to make a whole.  Deleuze states: “We are not dealing with relations of parts-
to-wholes because the totality can be as imperceptible as the parts, as also when I 
do not sense the grinding noise of the water mill to which I am overly 
accustomed. And a buzzing or deadening effect are wholes without necessarily 
being perceptions” (1993: 87). Microperceptions do not stand out enough to be 
actually perceived. Even when they enter into relations, they may not generate 
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something that is actually seen.  It is only that which is truly remarkable that 
becomes perceptible. When viewers watch N:O:T:H:I:N:G, the flicker and 
evanescent colours that they see need to be understood as remarkable singular 
events generated by a multiplicity of ordinary unseen colours that come into 
relation with each other. Deleuze provides an example that uses colour, which is 
very relevant to the present discussion. He states that the colour green emerges 
from the differential relations between the colours blue and yellow (1993: 88). 
This means that both the colours blue and yellow are active in the perceptual 
field that is the colour green. This perceptual field is filled with 
microperceptions. The colours blue and yellow are these microperceptions that 
are the about-to-become visible elements that compose the colour green. It is 
their incipiency that enables the colour green to become visible. 
The perceived flickering and evanescent colours in N:O:T:H:I:N:G thus 
emerge out of the potential provided by both the unseen colours and the 
relations occurring between them.  Recall that when viewers see the pinkish-
orange evanescent colour, the unseen colours that are actually projected consist 
primarily of red, white, and yellow. When the unseen colours red and white are 
displayed more frequently than yellow, the pinkish-orange evanescent colour 
tends to appear pinker. When the unseen colours red and yellow are presented 
more frequently than white, the pinkish-orange evanescent colour verges closer 
to orange.47 When understood through the notion of microperceptions, the 
evanescent pinkish-orange colour becomes visible as the unseen colours red, 
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white, and yellow enter into relations. This shows that during particular 
sequences in N:O:T:H:I:N:G in which the projected unseen colours rapidly 
change between a small set of differentiated colours, viewers see an evanescent 
colour that is a mixture of that particular set. Wees notes similar occurrences 
when watching Sharits’ work and other flicker films stating: “Alternating frames 
of black and white, for instance, will evoke perceptions of an ephemeral and 
slightly pulsating gray. Alternating red and blue frames produce a comparably 
vivid, yet insubstantial, violet” (1992: 147).  
Recall that when viewers see the flicker, the unseen colours are changing 
radically in brightness and in hue. As the flicker is seen, the changes that take 
place among the unseen colours are often extreme. They can jump between 
lighter and darker colours or between complementary colours. According to 
physicist Ogden Rood: “Colours which are complementary are already as far 
apart on the chromatic circle as possible; hence they are not changed in hue, but 
merely appear more brilliant and saturated” (1879: 246). Because complementary 
colours appear brighter and more saturated, he asserts that they “furnish the 
strongest contrasts” (Rood 1879: 161). This means that in works using coloured 
light, like Sharits’ film N:O:T:H:I:N:G, if viewers were to be presented the colour 
blue followed by it complementary colour yellow, they would feel that the 
yellow they saw appears brighter and more saturated than had been preceded by 
any other colour. When these drastic shifts in brightness and hue occur among 
the unseen colours, they do not blend like the evanescent colours; instead, they 
 105 
produce what can best be described as an indiscernible pulsation of light. This 
shows that the flicker, which appears throughout the film, also emerges from the 
series of differentiated unseen colours. The images that are visible in 
N:O:T:H:I:N:G emerge from the relations that the microperceptual unseen colours 
enter into amongst themselves. 
As viewers watch Sharits’ film and see the flicker and the evanescent 
colours, they are continually being bombarded by hundreds of different unseen 
colours. A new unseen colour is encountered by viewers every twenty-fourth of 
a second.  Deleuze states that as new microperceptions are encountered, 
perception changes (1993: 86). The relations that microperceptions enter into, 
which enable something to emerge into visibility, are tentative and can alter their 
configurations in order to accommodate for those new microperceptions that are 
encountered. Adjustments to the relations among the unseen colours are 
occurring every second, which then alter what is actually seen.  
Despite the fact that viewers are constantly encountering new unseen 
colours, seeing is not just a process of accommodating and adjusting for the new. 
This is because, as Deleuze states, “we perceive the thing, minus that which does 
not interest us as a function of our needs” (1986: 63). The activity of seeing 
involves a process of subtracting from the perceptual field of microperceptions. 
“To see is to subtract form from a relational field of potential” (Manning 2008a: 
327). This relational field of potential is the perceptual field where 
microperceptions reside. Viewers will always encounter large numbers of 
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microperceptions and all of them have the potential to emerge into something 
visible. As microperceptions enter into relations and begin emerging from below 
the threshold of visibility, only those microperceptions remarkable enough to 
grab the viewers’ attention will continue to become the actual images viewers 
see. Those microperceptions that are subtracted from the perceptual field remain 
below the threshold of visibility.  
There is always a process of addition and subtraction within every 
perceiving moment.48 The flicker and evanescent colours that viewers see when 
watching N:O:T:H:I:N:G become visible through this seemingly contradictory 
dual process. As Sharits’ film is projected, new unseen colours are constantly 
being added to the perceptual field. When these unseen colours begin entering 
into relations and start emerging from below the threshold of visibility, it is only 
those relations of unseen colours that are able to lure the viewers’ attention that 
continue on to become the seen flicker and evanescent colours. Those unseen 
colours that do not attract the viewers’ gaze are subtracted from the incipiency of 
images. Those subtracted microperceptions that are not remarkable enough to 
emerge above the threshold of visibility do not vanish or cease to exist. Instead, 
they remain within the perceptual field, prepared to engage in new potential 
relations.49 This is how perceptions and microperceptions interact. This process 
of adding and subtracting will continue provided that the newly emerging 
unseen colour relations can persist in holding the viewers’ attention.  Because 
new unseen colours are constantly being introduced and removed as viewers 
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watch N:O:T:H:I:N:G, what is actually visible is never stable or completely whole. 
This means that the images viewers encounter when watching Sharits’ film are 
always in the making.  
 
Future Folds Presently Unfolding 
Although adding and subtracting are usually structured in opposition to 
each other, the additive-subtractive process of seeing does not operate as a 
dichotomy.  Rather, these two activities involved in the incipiency of images 
function together. A better way to state this is to say that microperceptions 
perpetually fold and unfold. The folding-unfolding process operates in concert, 
similar to that of a contraction-dilation pair, like the bicep and tricep muscles. As 
the bicep muscles contract, they fold in. At the same time, the tricep muscles 
dilate and unfold. The bicep muscles cannot contract alone.  They need the 
dilation of the tricep muscles in order to carry out this function. For a folding to 
occur, an unfolding must simultaneously take place. This is why Deleuze 
explicitly states, “folding is not opposed to unfolding” (1993: 7). 
This process of folding and unfolding can be said to be a double-folding 
process that takes place through the coming together and emergence of 
microperceptual relations in the incipiency of images. The first fold occurs when 
microperceptions gather into relations within the perceptual field. The 
microperceptual relations will then unfold as they emerge from the perceptual 
field and attempt to lure the perceptual interest of viewers.50 The second fold 
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takes place during the incipiency of images coming into themselves as such. As 
these microperceptual relations attract the viewers’ interest, those “interesting” 
microperceptual relations fold together and generate what will become visible. 
Any remaining, or “uninteresting,” relations will continue to unfold but return to 
the perceptual field to potentially be folded again.   
This double-folding process is the activity of seeing. Deleuze states: “I am 
forever unfolding between two folds, and if to perceive means to unfold, then I 
am forever perceiving within the folds” (1993: 93). To see is to be caught within 
the vertiginous spiraling action of the double-folding process. The constant 
movement of folding and unfolding that occurs within this process generates 
forces that compose the images that viewers see. These compositional forces are 
what travel between the folds. These forces are what connect the folds, enabling 
viewers to see a continuity of images. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
compositional forces are comprised of two seemingly opposed vertiginous forces 
that are felt in the seeing. One force spirals centripetally inward, emerging from 
the folding process, while a second force unwinds centrifugally outward, as an 
unfolding occurs. When these two forces encounter each other, a dynamism is 
generated that exceeds these two forces as such. Viewers feel this dynamic excess 
as the incipiency of images. 
This vertiginous double-folding process in action is seen during the 
pinkish-orange sequence in N:O:T:H:I:N:G. Sharits’ film effortlessly slips from the 
flicker to the pinkish-orange evanescent colour and just as effortlessly back to the 
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flicker. The transition from one to the other is executed seamlessly. Viewers do 
not see sudden jump cuts, wipes, fades to black or other familiar transitions 
found in most films. Rather, they see fluid metamorphoses between the flicker 
and the evanescent colours. Enabling this transmutation is the constant folding 
and unfolding of unseen colours below the threshold of visibility. Recall that the 
pinkish-orange evanescent colour is primarily composed of the unseen colours 
red, yellow, and white. As viewers see the flicker, these three unseen colours are 
gradually introduced into the perceptual field and begin to fold into relations. 
Once folded, these initial relations then proceed to unfold and emerge from the 
perceptual field. All the while more red, yellow, and white unseen colours 
continue to appear and fold. Eventually, the unfolding red-yellow-white 
relations start to lure the viewers’ attention away from those unfolding relations 
that have been generating the flicker. This gradual shift in the viewers’ attention 
then enables this set of unfolding red-yellow-white relations to be folded a 
second time. As more red-yellow-white relations are double-folded, the 
compositional forces that are generated by this process change and viewers see 
the flicker transmute into the pinkish-orange evanescent colour.   
What this example of the double-folding process shows is that the unseen 
colours in N:O:T:H:I:N:G and the relations between them occur prior to the 
emergence of the seen images they generate. Before the pinkish-orange 
evanescent colour is seen, the unseen colours that it is composed of are entering 
into relations while the flicker is still visible. According to Erin Manning, 
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relations operate “in the future anterior (the tense of the ‘will have’ and of the 
‘not yet’)” (2006: 103). Remember that the unseen colours are the about-to-
become or the not-yet of the visible. This means that the images viewers 
presently see are brought about in the future by the coming together of relations 
among the unseen colours. By the time viewers see the flicker or the evanescent 
colours, the unseen colours and their relations that generated those visible 
images will have already become. If what viewers see takes place in the present, 
then the incipiency of those images takes place just before those images are seen. 
According to professor of physiology Benjamin Libet, the incipiency of 
images occurs during the half-second before viewers actually see the images that 
are generated.  In experiments conducted from the 1960s to the 1980s, he 
demonstrated that the imperceptibility of sensations persists for up to half a 
second.51 The subjects of these experiments were administered a variety of 
electrical and visual stimulations. Libet then measured and compared the length 
of time the stimulations lasted and the time it took for the subjects to 
acknowledge the sensations. What he discovered was, first, that the subjects 
experienced sensations prior to their actual perception and, second, that if 
sensations lasted for less than half a second, the subjects reported that nothing 
was perceived. Sensations occur below the threshold of perception and can only 
emerge above this threshold if they last for longer than a half-second. 
Libet was able to calculate this half-second gap between the initial 
experience of sensations and their actual perception based on two results from 
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his experiments. First, by recording subjects’ brain activity using an 
electroencephalograph (EEG) monitor, Libet found that the intention to actually 
perceive sensations that are being experienced appears ahead of the actual 
perception by approximately 150 to 200 microseconds (Libet 1985: 537). Second, 
again recorded by the EEG monitor, Libet noted that there is “a slow negative 
shift in electrical potential by the brain” (1985: 529). This “slow negative shift” 
precedes the actual intention to perceive by about 345 microseconds (Libet 1985: 
532). This “slow negative shift” demonstrates that for approximately 0.3 seconds 
the subject is unknowingly experiencing sensations before they are perceived. As 
these sensations continue to persist, the intention to perceive them occurs for 
about 0.2 seconds before the actual perception. This entire process, from the 
initial experience of sensations to their actual perception, takes a half-second. If 
the sensations were to cease prior to the completion of this half-second process, 
they would not actually be perceived. 
In light of Libet’s research, we can understand that when viewers watch 
N:O:T:H:I:N:G, they experience the unseen colours as sensations. Because 
sensations cannot be perceived as such unless they persist for at least a half-
second, this means that for viewers to actually see the unseen colours, they need 
to endure beyond this short time frame. But remember that they are projected for 
only a twenty-fourth of a second, which means that they occur too fast to 
actually be perceived. Despite this fact, the unseen colours are able to relationally 
persist in the before and after of their unseenness and participate in the double-
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folding process. It is therefore possible for the unseen colours to be experienced 
as though they had lasted for a half-second. This means that, as a result of the 
compositional forces created by the vertiginous double-folding process, the 
unseen colours are able to rise above the threshold of visibility and become the 
flicker and evanescent colours that viewers actually perceive. As Sharits’ film 
progresses, additional unseen colours are encountered, which alter the existing 
relations among the unseen colours. This changes the form the compositional 
forces take and generates the perceptible transmuting images viewers see. In 
N:O:T:H:I:N:G, the images are always in the making because the compositional 
forces that are generated below the threshold of visibility are constantly affecting 
what viewers see.  
 
The Cinematic Paradigm  
The idea that the flicker and the evanescent colours viewers see when 
watching N:O:T:H:I:N:G are constituted by compositional forces generated by the 
folding and unfolding of the unseen colours does not follow the traditional 
understanding of images in film. Throughout the history of film there has been 
one dominant paradigm that, in its very definition of film, has attempted to 
explain how viewers are able to see moving images through the rapid 
displacement of displayed images on the filmstrip, which are themselves moved 
by the film projector. This cinematic paradigm makes no mention of sensations, 
microperceptions, compositional forces, or half-second gaps. Instead, it defines 
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film as “a sequence of still images, photographed or created in rapid succession, 
[that] will, when projected or otherwise mechanically displayed in equally rapid 
succession, be perceived by the human brain as a continuously moving image” 
(Enticknap 2005: 6).52 Film is ordinarily projected at a rate of twenty-four images 
per second. Viewers don’t actually see the rapid sequence of projected images; 
rather, they see moving images. According to the cinematic paradigm, this is 
because as viewers watch a film, their minds synthesize the succession of 
projected images and render them as one continuous flow.53   
 According to the cinematic paradigm’s definition, a film consists of two 
disparate and homogenous systems that function independently of each other. 
One system involves such things as the projector, the filmstrip, the screen, and 
the images on the filmstrip, or as Sharits calls it – “the work.” The other system 
involves a viewers’ ability to see, or what will also be called a viewers’ visual 
system. This system includes all the psychological and physical mechanisms 
necessary for sight, such as the rods and cones in the retina, the ability of the 
optic nerve to transfer electrical impulses to the brain, and the ability of the brain 
to interpret the information imbedded in these electrical impulses. Both systems 
operate independently of each other and one system cannot affect the 
constitution of the other. The work’s system can show a quick succession of 
projected images without the need for viewers to see them, and conversely, the 
viewers’ visual system does not need a film to be playing in order to see. When 
these two disparate systems interact, the outcome is a moving image.54 
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As a film is displayed, according to the cinematic paradigm mentioned 
above, the projected images occur independently from a viewers’ ability to see 
them. Everything involved in making the work’s system operate is 
preconstituted before viewers actually see anything that it has to visually offer. 
Because of this, the viewers’ visual system cannot change the film itself in any 
manner. When viewers see a particular film, the cinematic paradigm stipulates 
that they will always see the same composition of projected images no matter 
how many times they revisit that particular film. The only way the film itself can 
possibly change is if something within the work’s system is altered, such as the 
filmstrip being cut in order to either add or subtract images to be projected. Any 
changes that occur within the film itself remain outside of the realm of the 
viewers’ visual system. The functioning of the viewers’ visual system cannot 
change the work’s system. 
This cinematic paradigm also claims that the viewers’ ability to see is also 
fully constituted prior to any encounter viewers have with a film. When viewers 
watch a film, the work’s system cannot alter the functionality of their visual 
systems. For example, proponents of the cinematic paradigm would assert that 
the manner in which the rods and cones convert particular wavelengths of light 
into electrical impulses – which will subsequently be sent to the brain via the 
optic nerve – cannot be made to function differently by the film itself.55 If a 
particular set of cones in the retina is sensitive to the frequencies of light 
considered to be the colour red, then the film itself cannot suddenly make that 
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set of cones sensitive to the frequencies light associated with the colour blue. 
Proponents of this cinematic paradigm take the position that the work’s system 
cannot alter how the cones, or any other component of the viewers’ system of 
vision, operate.   
Under this cinematic paradigm, the only way the viewers’ visual system 
can be altered is if damage is sustained to any of the components that constitute 
this system. If, for instance, a particular viewer sustained a severe head injury 
and began to suffer from achromatopsia, the inability to see colours, then her 
visual system would be altered.56 Any film that this particular viewer who 
suffers from achromatopsia sees would be in shades of grey, even if this film 
itself displayed coloured images. According to this cinematic paradigm, this 
chromatic change has nothing to do with the functionality of the work’s system 
and does not affect that particular system in any way. Thus, in this cinematic 
paradigm any changes that occur to the viewers’ visual system take place 
independent of the work’s system. 
Considered from the point of view of the cinematic paradigm, the unseen 
colours in Sharits’ film N:O:T:H:I:N:G would need to be understood as being 
within the exclusive domain of the work’s system. According to this position, the 
unseen colours would not need the viewers’ visual system in order to be 
displayed and viewers cannot alter the composition of the unseen colours. 
Furthermore, the viewers’ visual system functions independently from the 
encounter with the unseen colours, which cannot alter the viewers’ ability to see. 
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However, the separation of the unseen colours and the viewers’ ability to see 
does not explain how the flicker and the evanescent colours are actually seen. It 
only explains how the two systems differ and what specific functions they each 
possess. According to this cinematic paradigm, the viewers’ mind synthesizes the 
projected images into a seen moving image. This means that the viewers’ visual 
system is responsible for generating a seen moving image. It is responsible for 
taking what is given below the threshold of visibility and transforming it into 
what viewers see. The flicker and the evanescent colours in N:O:T:H:I:N:G, when 
understood through this cinematic paradigm, are produced solely by the 
viewers’ visual system and its ability to synthesize the projected unseen colours 
into a seen moving image.  
 
Problems with the Cinematic Paradigm 
The cinematic paradigm structures film as consisting of two 
heterogeneous systems that are in a dichotomous opposition to each other. This 
means that when the viewers’ visual system and the work’s system are 
compared in any way, one of these systems will be given priority over the other. 
For example, if the projected images of the work’s system and the seen moving 
image of the viewers’ visual system are compared, it follows that either the 
projected images or the seen moving image will be prioritized to the detriment of 
the other. If the seen moving image is prioritized, as will be discussed below, 
then the projected images will be deemphasized. However, because of the 
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dualistic nature of dichotomies, it is possible to take the opposite position.57 If the 
projected images are emphasized, then the seen moving image will be 
deprioritized. Both positions are problematic in their own unique ways for an 
analysis of Sharits’ film N:O:T:H:I:N:G. As a dichotomy, the cinematic paradigm 
cannot properly account for both the unseen colours and the seen flicker and 
evanescent colours because the unseen and the seen are components of opposing 
systems.   
The notion under the cinematic paradigm that the viewers’ visual system 
is responsible for generating a seen moving image in film is cause for concern. 
This is not only because this stipulates what a film can do prior to it being 
encountered by viewers, but also because, according to Sharits, this would allow 
viewers to place a higher value on the seen moving image that their visual 
systems synthesizes while deemphasizing all other aspects of film. Sharits 
asserts: “Those who acknowledge only the projected ‘movie’ as a source of their 
metaphysics tend to impose a value hierarchy that recognizes the frame and the 
strip of film only as potential distractions to the flow of the ‘higher’ process, that 
temporal abstraction, ‘the shot’” (1972: unpaginated). By placing what is seen 
(the movie) on a different and more valued level, there is a risk that the role the 
projected images (the frames on the filmstrip) play in the incipiency of the seen 
moving image will not be accounted for. Because the projected images are below 
the threshold of visibility, it is easy to forget or purposely ignore the fact that the 
projected images perform a key role in the making of the seen moving image – 
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that is, without the projected images there would be no moving image for the 
viewers to see. 
When any element in one of the systems within this cinematic paradigm is 
prioritized, it is possible for the particular system of which the prioritized 
element is a part to be more highly valued. If the seen moving image is 
emphasized above all else in film, then it can follow that the viewers’ visual 
system will also be emphasized to the detriment of the film itself. When the focus 
is solely on what the viewers think they see, more value is placed on the seen 
moving image and the viewers’ visual system, and subsequently the projected 
images and the work’s system are devalued. This means that when viewers 
watch Sharits’ film, their attention will be primarily directed toward the flicker 
and the evanescent colours. Very little consideration, if any, will be given to the 
unseen colours that make the flicker and evanescent colours possible, 
backgrounding the work’s system. 
However, when viewers watch N:O:T:H:I:N:G, it is difficult for their 
attention to be entirely focused on this film’s seen moving image. Recall that as 
viewers watch Sharits’ film, the moving image they see – the flicker and the 
evanescent colours – pulses beyond the edges of the screen and floats in an 
ambiguous space between themselves and the screen. Unlike most films, the seen 
moving image in N:O:T:H:I:N:G is a highly unstable image, which makes 
focusing on it nearly impossible. These strange occurrences constantly tug the 
viewers’ attention away from the seen moving image, making them question 
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their ability to see. Because viewers are unable to continue attending to the 
experience of watching the film, it becomes difficult for them to only prioritize 
the seen moving image. This activity of questioning stops viewers from 
emphasizing the seen moving image and compels them to acknowledge that a 
film is more than just what they think they see.   
Because this cinematic paradigm is structured as a dichotomy, when the 
viewers’ visual system is no longer prioritized, then the film itself must therefore 
be thrust into the forefront of the viewers’ attention. Several filmmakers, such as 
Peter Kubelka and those who P. Adams Sitney has identified as being a part of a 
movement referred to as “Structural Film,”58 have been known to prioritize the 
work’s system to such an extent that they do not believe that viewers truly see an 
moving image. They claim that viewers are deceiving themselves if they think 
they are seeing movement in a film.  “Cinema is nothing but a rapid slide 
projection,” states Kubelka. “When you see something on the screen which you 
accept as movement, it is an illusion, a magician’s trick” (Kubelka 1978: 149). 
These filmmakers consider the seen moving image to be a false image that that 
takes the viewers’ attention away from the rapid display of the projected images, 
which compose what they see. If viewers truly believe they are seeing a moving 
image, then they are being distracted from the operation of the film itself and the 
elements that comprise it, such as the projector’s lens,59 the filmstrip,60 as well as 
the projected images.61   
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By placing the work’s system in the forefront of the viewers attention, the 
unseen colours of N:O:T:H:I:N:G become the focus, rather than the flicker and the 
evanescent colours. But what still needs to be accounted for when prioritizing the 
work’s system is the fact that when watching N:O:T:H:I:N:G. viewers see a 
moving image that throbs out from the edges of the screen and that also levitates 
from the screen’s surface. Those who prioritize the work’s system would claim 
that the strange occurrences are a part of the illusion of a seen moving image that 
is evoked by the film itself. This means that the strange occurrences are a part of 
the viewers’ actual visual system. This is because there is nothing within the film 
itself that produces a seen moving image. In the case of N:O:T:H:I:N:G, the film 
itself can only rapidly project sequences of apparently static unseen colours that 
are below the threshold of visibility.  Anything that is identified as being visible 
has to be a part of the illusion of a seen moving image. The strange occurrences 
therefore cannot be a part of the work’s system and are to be placed within the 
viewers’ visual system.   
 
Images in Formation 
The strange occurrences in N:O:T:H:I:N:G cannot be solely situated within 
either of the two disparate systems of the dominant cinematic paradigm. But as 
the cinematic paradigm stipulates, the throbbing and floating image seen in 
Sharits’ film must be placed within either the viewers’ visual system or the 
work’s system. Because these bizarre events in Sharits’ film cannot be situated in 
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either one of the two disparate systems, an inconsistency emerges that 
undermines the oppositional structure of the cinematic paradigm.   
Rather than prioritizing either the viewers’ visual system or the work’s 
system, Sharits proposes an alternative that sidesteps the dichotomy offered by 
the dominant cinematic paradigm and irons out the inconsistencies it produces. 
He believes that “it would be valuable to regard cinema as an informational system 
rather than starting with a priori metaphysical theories or with a fully developed 
aesthetic” (Sharits 1972: unpaginated; emphasis added). For Sharits, it is 
problematic to assert what any particular film can do before it is actually 
encountered by viewers. This means that he does not adhere to the dichotomy of 
the dominant cinematic paradigm and sees no value in prioritizing either the 
viewers’ visual system or the work’s system. Prioritizing either system found 
within this cinematic paradigm establishes what viewers will see and how it will 
see it in advance of their encounter with a film. However, Sharits’ proposition 
that film is an informational system puts forward the notion that what viewers 
see and how they see it cannot be configured before their encounter with a 
particular film. It is only during the shared encounter between the work’s system 
and the viewer’s system that something visible emerges. 
It is important to note that when Sharits uses the term “information,” he is 
not discussing the display or transmission of a prearranged set of data. That 
would only lead him back to the cinematic paradigm. Instead, he is using the 
term in a manner akin to Gilbert Simondon’s conception. For Simondon, 
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information “is never available in a form that could be given; it is the tension 
between two disparate realities, it is the signification that will emerge when an 
operation of individuation will discover the dimension according to which two 
disparate realities may become a system” (2009: 9-10). Simondon conceives of 
information not as a collection of facts, data, or, in the case of film, images that 
are preconfigured and available for ready analysis. Rather, information is to be 
understood as that which is constantly in the process of formation. It is what is 
constantly emerging in the midst of two disparities coming together in relations 
with one another.    
This means that images, as information, are constantly in a process of 
taking form.  They cannot be preconceived. According to Simondon, 
“information can be said to always be in the present” (2009: 10). Understood in 
this manner, images cannot take shape prior to the viewers’ visual system and 
the work’s system engaging with each other. The two disparities must come 
together and enter into relations before any image is seen. If the relations 
between the viewers’ visual system and the film itself are disrupted and cease to 
hold, then the images viewers see stop taking shape and will disappear. As long 
as two disparities continue to actively engage each other, then images, as 
information, will continue to be generated and an informational system will 
persist. 
Furthermore, Sharits suggests that this informational system should be 
understood as a dialogue. When viewers watch a film, according to Sharits, there 
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is “a dialogue between the viewer and the work in the sense that there’s a 
perception that’s a kind of outcome of both of them interacting” (Sharits and 
Cathcart 1976: unpaginated).  Film as an informational system consists of a set of 
relations that take place between the viewers’ visual system and the film itself. 
As these two disparate systems come together into relations with each other, 
images emerge, as information. These images involve not only the viewers’ 
ability to see something but also the work’s capacity to offer something to be 
seen. What viewers actually see emerges when both systems operate in concert, as 
a singular informational system.  
As the viewers’ visual system and the work’s system come together to 
form an informational system, they compositional forces felt in the seeing are 
encountered. It is the relation between the disparities that opens viewers to these 
compositional forces generated by the double-folding process. Viewers can only 
experience the double-folding process as they participate within the 
informational system.  What this then shows is that the compositional forces not 
only generate the images that viewers see but also the system that makes seeing 
them possible. It is the compositional forces that induce an engagement with 
viewers that enable the incipiency of images to be felt. “We don’t actually see an 
image – the image composes itself through the force of a relational dynamic” 
(Manning 2009b: 145). 
N:O:T:H:I:N:G demonstrates that what is made visible is activated and 
continually modified below the threshold of visibility. The flicker and the 
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evanescent colours are only visible while viewers are engaged in an activity of 
seeing with the unseen colours, which are constantly entering into new relations 
with each other.  Sharits’ film shows how the unseen colours, as sensations that 
are too quick to be actually seen, play a significant role in the incipiency of 
images. This incipiency can only occur as the relations between the unseen 
colours generate the compositional forces that are felt by viewers in the activity 
of seeing. By bringing viewers to the edge of their perceptual capabilities, Sharits 
reveals through his film N:O:T:H:I:N:G that images are unstable, always in the 







We thought the world was still material, even though we were handling metaphysical 
material – Time and Energy.  
 – Woody Vasulka, “Curatorial Statement”62 
 
The Need for a New Vocabulary 
 Woody Vasulka’s video C-Trend (1974) begins with a screen filled with 
visual noise, which resembles the snow-like pattern seen when there is no signal 
coming into a television. After a few seconds, a sphere-like formation emerges in 
the centre of the screen in front of the visual noise, rotating in a counter-
clockwise direction. This sphere-like formation is comprised of very fine 
horizontal lines that bend within it, which give it the appearance of a rotating 
contoured globe. As well, there is a gap that breaks the continuity of the fine 
horizontal contoured lines and divides the sphere-like formation into two 
distinct halves. This gap follows the rotation of the sphere and repeats at a 
regular interval. As the sphere-like formation continues to rotate, it repeats the 
same pattern of fine horizontal contoured lines. But on occasion there is a sudden 
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shift in the pattern that causes the contoured lines that lie around the center of 
the sphere-like formation to rise up and race around it. 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Woody Vasulka, C-Trend (1974). Image captured from video. 
There is then a sudden cut from the rotating sphere-like formation and its 
snowy background to a floating contoured plane that is positioned at an oblique 
angle on a black background. This begins the second part of C-Trend. The 
contoured lines that compose the floating plane, which move from left to right, 
are broken at regular intervals by a gap similar to the one found on the sphere-
like formation in the first part. In this second section the differences between the 
horizontal contour lines on either side of the vertical break become more 
apparent. As the horizontal contoured lines move from left to right within the 
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floating plane, several of the lines in the centre of the plane bend into small 
plateaus and dash across the plane from left to right more rapidly than the 
overall movement of the plane. These small plateaus disappear when they reach 
the gap, and do not continue on to the other side. Unlike the first part of the 
video, in which the same contoured pattern of horizontal lines seems to repeat, in 
the second part of the video the contoured pattern is constantly changing. In fact, 
as this section continues, the contoured plane’s shape begins to change, first by 




Figure 4.2. Woody Vasulka, C-Trend (1974). Image captured from video. 
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The unusual images that viewers experience while watching C-Trend are 
based on a very mundane source material, a local city street. Vasulka set up a 
stationary analog video camera to record the street outside his window, 
capturing images of the cars as they drove by. The electronic signal from the 
analog camera was then immediately fed into a Rutt/Etra Scan Processor, which 
transformed this common street scene into the contoured lines that formed the 
images seen in C-Trend. The Rutt/Etra Scan Processor “is a real time system 
which electronically alters the deflection signals that generate a television raster” 
(Etra and Rutt 1992: 138).63 It manipulates the electronic signals that are inputted 
live from an analog video camera by altering the horizontal lines of resolution, 
otherwise known as raster lines, which compose the seen video image. When 
watching C-Trend, viewers see an effect that is produced by the Scan Processor in 
which the bright areas of the image cause the raster lines to bend as the electronic 
signal coming from the analog video camera is inputted. Bill Etra and Steve Rutt, 
the inventors of the Scan Processor, explain that this effect “causes the brighter 
parts of the video to ‘pull’ the raster lines upward. When combined with other 
synthetic waveforms, the raster forms a three dimensional contour map where 
video brightness determines elevation” (1992: 139).64 In C-Trend, the more 
luminescent areas of the street scene inputted by the analog video camera cause 
the raster lines to the bend and curve. Viewers see these altered raster lines as the 
contours that comprise the sphere in the first part of C-Trend and the plane in the 
second part. When anything moves into the view of the camera, the bright areas 
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of these objects appear as the lifting sections found on the contoured shapes. This 
is particularly evident in the second part of the video. As cars drive by and pass 
in front of the camera, the associated raster lines bend, causing the contours of 
the sphere or plane to lift up and form the small plateaus that dash across these 
formations from left to right.   
As Vasulka continued to work with the Rutt/Etra Scan Processor and 
other tools that manipulated electronic video signals, such as George Brown’s 
Video Sequencer and Dan Sandin’s Analog Image Processor,65 he felt that the 
images his videos generated did not fit within the two dominant paradigms that 
shaped much of the discussion surrounding images at the time – linear 
perspective and the cinematic paradigm. These two paradigms attempt to 
generate images that appear as realistic to viewers as possible. Yet the images 
emerging from Vasulka’s videos have been manipulated with these new 
electronic signal processors and synthesizers to such a degree that, according to 
Maureen Turim and Scott Nygren, they “do not appear natural” (1996: 50). For 
them: “Even camera images that are processed by synthesizers depart from 
traditional concepts of realist or expressive representation” (Turim and Nygren 
1996: 50). Because the images viewers encounter when watching videos like C-
Trend are unlike anything that had been seen prior, Vasulka recognized that a 
new vocabulary surrounding the notion of the image was necessary in order to 
discuss the innovations that he and other artists were pioneering with video 
during the 1970s and early 1980s.66 This new vocabulary had to reflect a new 
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understanding of images that departed from long-standing models provided by 
linear perspective and the cinematic paradigm. 
 
Linear Perspective 
The first dominant paradigm Vasulka felt images generated with video 
could not adhere to was the camera obscura model of depicting three-
dimensional space on a two-dimensional plane, otherwise known as linear 
perspective. Vasulka believed that the majority of images, including those 
produced by video cameras, “are based on their capture from the visible world 
with the help of the camera obscura principle” (Vasulka and Nygren 1975: 9). But 
before discussing Vasulka’s contentions with linear perspective, it is important to 
outline how this paradigm operates in terms of generating images. During the 
fifteenth century, Leon Battista Alberti wrote De pictura (On Painting), presenting 
the founding theory of linear perspective in which light travels in straight lines 
conveying information from the surface of objects that then converge to an apex 
found in the eye. His theory suggests that one’s overall field of vision can be 
conceived as an imaginary visual pyramid, in which the eye is the central point. 
For an artist to reproduce a three-dimensional scene two-dimensionally, it is 
necessary for the visual pyramid of the artist to be intersected somewhere 
between themself and the scene in order to “express whatever outlines and 
colours that intersection presents” (Alberti 1972: 49). A slice must be made at 
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some point between the artist and the scene, otherwise the visual pyramid would 
continue infinitely as far as viewers are able to see.  
To assist in producing a particular depicted scene based on a sliced 
intersection between the scene and the artist, Alberti suggested using a 
transparent veil of loosely woven cloth that is stretched across a frame in which 
thicker threads were laced into a grid of square sections. This gridded veil is then 
placed between the artist and the scene that is being depicted so that “the visual 
pyramid passes through the loose weave of the veil” (Alberti 1972: 69). By using 
this gridded veil of transparent cloth, Alberti found that it provided three 
advantages when attempting to recreate a depicted scene. First, it fixed the 
position of the visual pyramid’s apex, making it easier for the artist to return to 
the exact same scene.  Second, according to Alberti, “the position of the outlines 
and boundaries of the surfaces can easily be established accurately” (1972: 69).  
This is because the squared sections woven into the veil uniformly divide the 
overall scene, breaking down every contour into manageable sections.  Finally, 
the artist is able to see how objects that are either in relief or round would appear 
on a flat surface.  The gridded veil enables the artist to more efficiently and 
accurately render the objects and an overall scene because they can easily return 
to the exact point of view they started from, divide the objects within the scene 
into smaller details, and visualize all the overall depiction in two-dimensions.  
The overall advantage offered by Alberti’s conception of linear 
perspective in depicting three dimensions on a two-dimensional surface is the 
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creation of an unchanging and homogenous space. Linear perspective creates a 
standardized system of vision in order to attain a high degree of perceptual 
accuracy. Yet in order for this visual system to function, according to Erwin 
Panofsky, Alberti had to assume “first, that we see with a single and immobile 
eye, and second, that the planar cross section of the visual pyramid can pass for 
an adequate production of our optical image” (1991: 29).  This “single and 
immobile eye,” otherwise known as the vanishing point, is placed at the cross 
section or apex of the visual pyramid, which standardized the overall visual 
space. This means that when using linear perspective, the sizing and spacing of 
every depicted object with a particular depicted scene is determined based on its 
location in relation to the fixed vanishing point.  
Linear perspective organizes vision into what Deleuze and Guattari call 
striated space.  “In striated space, lines or trajectories tend to be subordinated to 
points: one goes from one point to another” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 478). In 
striated space, lines are subservient to points, the vanishing point in particular. 
Points are foregrounded in the organization of a given space, using lines as 
joiners. Brian Massumi states that the composition of images utilizing linear 
perspective is “guided by a geometry of parallel lines projecting infinitely 
toward the vanishing point in whose virtual distance they appear to converge” 
(2008: 19). Linear perspective subordinates all depicted objects, first, to a central 
vanishing point and, second, to several points generated by the intersection of 
the object’s contours and the grid woven into the cloth veil. The girded veil 
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organizes the overall depicted scene, while the vanishing point arranges the 
space within the scene. Linear perspective striates the visual space through 
standardization in order to present an organized depiction of the world.  
 The striation of space in Alberti’s theory also shapes vision through what 
Deleuze and Guattari call the plane of organization. Linear perspective creates this 
plane through its systematizing of vision. It contains a visual space by 
territorializing every detail though the coordinates of the gridded veil and 
centralizes the trajectories of every line within this territorialized space through 
the vanishing point. According to Deleuze and Guattari: “The plane of 
organization is… always trying to plug lines of flight, stop or interrupt 
movements of deterritorialization, weigh them down, restratisfy them, 
reconstitute forms and subjects in a dimension of depth” (1987: 270). Like the 
plane of reference discussed in Chapter 1, the plane of organization attempts to 
prevent the appearance of any bifurcations or openings that would extend or 
exceed beyond the structure of the constructed system as such.67 Linear 
perspective does this by focusing and coordinating all lines and movement 
within the depicted scene through the centralized vanishing point and the 
intersecting points of the gridded veil.  
The horizontal and vertical cross points of the gridded veil and the 
vanishing point subject all the contours and depicted objects to the formation of 
the abstract visual pyramid. Linear perspective, according to Massumi, 
“spatializes the visual movement it creates in order to produce a perceived order. 
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The harmony and regularity of this perceived spatial order continues infinitely 
into the distance at the virtual center of the vanishing point” (2008: 20). The 
depth viewers perceive as three-dimensional space abstractly emerges through 
the organization of lines that are subject to the centralized vanishing point and 
framed by the squared sections of Alberti’s gridded veil. 
 Alberti’s system of shaping vision through linear perspective can be 
understood as the foundation for analog video’s visual organization with two 
modifications. First, the lens of the analog video camera generates the vanishing 
point, rather than the artist’s single immobile eye. The lens of the camera does 
this by recreating the optics of the eye. Second, the raster lines found in the 
imaging sensor in the analog video camera have replaced Alberti’s gridded veil. 
The raster lines of analog video subdivide the depicted scene into uniform 
sections similar to the gridded veil of cloth with its woven parallel lines. The 
camera lens and the raster lines territorialize vision and striate the depicted space 
providing a contemporary use of the plane of organization, which, according to 
William J. Mitchell, “extends the tradition of mathematically constructed 
perspective that began with Brunelleschi and Alberti” (1992: 6). 
 Despite the connection between linear perspective and analog video, the 
images generated in the majority of Vasulka’s videos are composed without a 
vanishing point or the necessary converging lines that generate the semblance of 
three-dimensional space found in linear perspective. They are either internally 
generated by a test screen pattern created by a Broadcast Signal Generator,68 as 
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seen in Vasulka’s videos The Matter (1974) and Explanation (1974), or they are 
created with images from a camera that are manipulated to such a degree that 
the vanishing point becomes imperceptible, like in C-Trend. The three-
dimensional space that viewers perceive in Vasulka’s videos is not produced by 
a fixed vanishing point; rather, it is generated through the layering of 
compositional elements within the image. This can be seen in C-Trend through 
the use of the horizontal contour lines. For example, in the second section of the 
video, the bends seen in the contour lines of the floating plane look like a 
landscape with rolling hills. The layering of the “hills” within in the image 
generates the semblance of depth for viewers.  
 
 
Figure 4.3. Woody Vasulka, The Matter (1974). Image captured from video. 
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Figure 4.4. Woody Vasulka, Explanation (1974). Image captured from video. 
 
Time/Energy Objects 
The second dominant paradigm that Vasulka felt his video work could not 
adhere to was the cinematic paradigm. Vasulka took this position because 
moving images, according to the cinematic paradigm, are what viewers perceive 
when sequences of discretely framed images are rapidly displayed onto a screen. 
The previous chapter explained that the cinematic paradigm conceived moving 
images as being comprised of two disparate and homogenous systems that 
interact with each other in order to generate what viewers see. The first system 
was the work’s system, which was comprised of such things as the screen, the 
projector, the filmstrip, and the framed images on the filmstrip. The second 
system was the viewers’ visual system, which consisted of all the physical and 
psychological mechanisms necessary for sight, such as the brain, the eyes, and 
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the brain’s ability to interpret incoming visual stimuli. Because Vasulka had prior 
experience working with film, he understood that the cinematic paradigm’s 
conception of the work’s system could not properly explain how images are 
generated with video. He states: “I come from the movies, where the frame was 
extremely rigid, and I understood that electronic material has no limitation 
within its existence.  It only has limitation when it reaches the screen because the 
screen itself is a rigid time structure” (Vasulka in Gill 1992: 84).  
Like Vasulka, Henri Bergson understood the cinematic paradigm to be 
rigid. He thought that film was a series of immobile images that move in 
succession, frame by frame, through a projector. The movement viewers 
experienced was not found in the images themselves; rather, they were 
artificially recomposed in a mechanical apparatus. According to Bergson: “It is 
because the film in the cinematograph unrolls, bringing in turn the different 
photographs of the scene to continue each other, that each actor of the scene 
recovers his mobility; he strings all his successive attitudes on the invisible 
movement of the film” (1998: 305). Movement is thus created through the 
successive displacement of frozen poses within immobile images.69 This step-by-
step progression of film frames is the rigidity Vasulka believes is not found in 
images generated with video. This is because the seen images in video are not 
comprised of preconstituted framed images situated on a celluloid base that is 
then projected onto a screen, as the cinematic paradigm dictates. Rather, they are 
comprised of an electronic signal that constantly fluctuates in a perpetual state of 
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metamorphosis. Even when a particular image appears to be static, it is 
constantly being remade, as an electronic signal continuously scans across the 
television screen or video monitor. This understanding that images generated 
with video never stop changing led Vasulka to believe “that there was no truly 
rigid frame, just particular organizations of time and energy” (Vasulka in Gill 
1992: 84).70 
This concern with time and energy became the basis of Vasulka’s 
vocabulary for discussing analog video. Using various electronic signal 
processors and other manipulation tools, Vasulka was able to organize and alter 
electronic signals and view the results as they were happening live on a video 
monitor. The electronic signal thus became the foundation of the analog video 
image because, according to Sherry Miller Hocking and Richard Brewster, the 
signal “refers to changes in energy and reveals a physical nature by forming and 
influencing images” (1992: 169). This led Vasulka toward theorizing analog video 
in terms of movement, transformation, and metamorphosis, in which a direct 
connection could be conceived between alterations of the electronic signal and 
the incipiency of images. With video he was generating, manipulating, and 
viewing images by controlling time and energy itself. For Vasulka: “Emphasis 
has shifted towards a recognition of a time/energy object and its programmable 
building element – the waveform” (Vasulka and Nygren 1975: 9, original 
emphasis).  
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Vasulka specifically states that the emphasis should be on time/energy 
objects and not on time/energy images because he was interested in uncovering 
the relationships and processes that generate what viewers see and how they see. 
Vasulka states: “Sometimes these relationships border on suggesting an 
understanding of the image as object, because for me creating an electronic 
image is a matter of architectural construction; in fact it’s building an image in 
time” (1978: 21). Time/energy objects are not quite images because they are what 
emerge from the manipulations of the electronic signal. They are what is 
generated as the about-to-become of images. Time/energy objects are the relational 
complexes of video.71 
Because the electronic signal that composes time/energy objects is 
constantly being manipulated and remains in a state of constant metamorphosis, 
they co-generate with viewers’ images that are continually under construction. 
What is seen is not fixed within the static or rigid models of linear perspective 
and the cinematic paradigm. According to Robert Arn: “The video artist controls 
or intervenes strategically in an ongoing process” (1992: 186). This process of 
endlessly manipulating and constructing time/energy objects can be seen in the 
rotating spherical object and bending planes in C-Trend, the bending sheet-like 
form found in Vasulka’s video The Matter (1974), and the resonating cylinder 
form in his video No. 25 (1976). Because time/energy objects are not fixed or 
discrete entities, they are “no longer the image of an object but the image of the 
set of constraints at the intersection of which the object is created” (Cache 1995: 
 140 
97). They are relational complexes that move and change over time as they are 
continually manipulated, providing the potential for images to be seen. 
 
Figure 4.5. Woody Vasulka, No. 25 (1976). Image captured from video. 
Time/energy objects are not only generated by the manipulation of an 
electronic signal, they are also constructed on a television screen or a video 
monitor by a constantly moving electron beam. As various tools alter the 
electronic signal, originating from either an analog video camera or a signal 
generator, these modulations flow as an unbroken electric stream that then 
builds time/energy objects onto the surface of the screen or monitor by a 
constantly moving electron beam. D.N. Rodowick explains in further detail: 
[An] electronic display actively constructs images in time; or, more 
correctly, it displays signals that produce an image through 
sequential scanning. Rather than producing a whole spatial field, in 
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NTSC interlaced scanning, for example, an electron beam traces 
first the odd lines of a 525-line display, exciting light sensitive 
phosphors along the way, and then the even lines. The different 
parts of the display correspond to different phases in time such that 
there is never a moment when the entire image is spatially or 
temporally present to us. We perceive an “image” because the 
sequential phosphors (600 pixels per line) continue to glow in 
overlapping durations and because the scanning process is so rapid 
(one-fifteenth of a second for a field; one thirtieth of a second for a 
frame) (Rodowick 2007: 137).72  
The dual processes of electronic signal manipulation and electron beam 
construction generate the time/energy objects that emerge as the images viewers 
come to see.   
It is important to understand that the electronic signal and the electron 
beam are not completely responsible for producing the images viewers see. 
Although these two processes generate the time/energy objects of Vasulka’s 
videos, they alone cannot produce what viewers are able to see. As was stated in 
Chapter 2, the incipiency of images occurs in the experience that is shared 
between viewers and the artwork. This means that the emergent time/energy 
objects of Vasulka’s videos are made visible only through the relational 




The relational complexes that emerge from the dual process of electronic 
signal manipulation and electron beam construction as Vasulka’s time/energy 
objects can be understood as topological figures because they undergo a process 
of constant change.  “A topological figure is defined as the continuous 
transformation of one geometrical figure into another” (Massumi 2002: 134). 
Topological figures emerge through a process of continuous metamorphosis. The 
classic example of a topological figure is a ring that transforms into a cup.73 
Although the ring’s form is completely altered throughout the entire ring-to-cup 
transformation process, it is still considered to be the same entity. According to 
Massumi: “All of the geometrical figures you can create in this way are versions 
of the same topological figure” (2002: 134). Time/energy objects are topological 
figures because they are capable of changing into a variety of forms through a 
continuous process of metamorphosis, while remaining the same figure under 
this transformation. This can be seen in the continual bending and twisting of the 
contoured shapes in C-Trend. Despite the fact that the contoured shapes can be 
transformed into either a spherical or plane formation, both can be considered 
different iterations of the same figure.   
This conception of the topological figure differs from the long-standing 
Euclidian conception of a geometrical figure, which achieves its form when the 
process of transformation stops. This is not to say that Euclidian figures cannot 
change. The transformation between two Euclidian figures can happen, but only 
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through a serial transition of static poses, similar to the cinematic paradigm. For 
example, for a square to be transformed into a circle, a new side would have to 
be added to change it into a pentagon. Another side would then have to be 
added to the pentagon to change it into a hexagon. New sides would have to 
continue to be added to the figure until the sides themselves were unable to be 
seen. Once this occurred, then the figure could be perceived as a circle.  
However, the perceived roundness of the circle would actually still consist of a 
geometric shape comprising of thousands, if not millions, of sides. This process 
of always adding a side to the geometric figure could continue on to infinity 
without ever producing a truly round circle. This is because a straight side can 
always be added.74  Returning to the topological figure of the ring-to-cup, in 
order for the ring to become a cup following a Euclidian process of change, the 
transformation of the ring to the cup would occur through a progression of static 
changes viewed as a series of unique figures. Each figure would represent one 
step in the change from the ring to the cup.   
Ultimately, a topological figure can take on a multiplicity of forms 
through a process of continuous transformation, whereas a Euclidian figure 
needs a series of discrete forms in order to change shape. A multiplicity, 
according to Alfred North Whitehead, “consists of many entities, and its unity is 
constituted by the fact that all its constituent entities severally satisfy at least one 
condition which no other entity satisfies” (1929/1978: 24). Each form a 
topological figure transforms into can be considered an actualized entity, like the 
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ring or the cup. But unlike a Euclidean figure, these actualized entities are not 
distinct as such. Instead, as a multiplicity, these actualized entities constitute a 
continuum of emergent forms that a topological figure can potentially become. 
The connection between time/energy objects and topological figures 
becomes even more apparent when Vasulka’s work is viewed in relation to Greg 
Lynn’s topological approach to architectural design. In his work, Lynn moves 
away from, as he states, “the abstract space of design [that] is conceived as an 
ideal neutral space of Cartesian coordinates” (1999: 10). Rather than designing 
buildings within a hypothetical Euclidian space that utilizes the Cartesian 
coordinates of the X, Y, and Z-axis, Lynn’s interest lies in producing designs 
within a topological space that is “characterized by flexible surfaces composed of 
splines” (1999: 20).75 Splines are vectors that are strategically placed in order to 
compose the direction and flows of a curve. Lynn states: “The spline curve is 
unlike a line or radius in that its shape is not in reducible to exact coordinates. 
The spline curve flows as a stream between a constellation of weighted control 
vertices and any position along this continuous series can only be defined 
relative to its position in the sequence” (1999: 22). When designing with splines, 
the shape of a curve is not determined by the connections made between a series 
of arcs that emanate from various central radii, as found in Euclidian geometry; 
rather, the shape of a curve is composed by the pulling action of various 
weighted control points. The difference here is that a curve determined by the 
connection of centralized arcs cannot change. It remains frozen. If one were to 
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change the degree of any of the arcs that compose a particular curve, that 
particular curve would break apart and become two different curves. This is 
because as soon as one of the arcs changes, the alignment of the curve is severed. 
Alternatively, the flow of a curve determined by splines will always persist, even 
if one of the weighted controls changes the strength of the pulling action it exerts. 
This will cause the shape of the curve to change but flow will remain. The curve’s 
shape is relative to any change in the pulling action bearing on it. Like the cup-
ring topological figure, a curve composed of splines can transform into any 
curved figure, from the simplest arc to the most exaggerated series of twists.   
Like Lynn’s splined curve, Vasulka’s time/energy objects are able to 
transform themselves into a multiplicity of forms. In C-Trend, the curves that 
shape the contoured plane and spherical figures are determined by the changes 
in brightness coming from a street scene being recorded by an analog video 
camera. Anything that moves in front of the camera, such as cars that drive by, 
alters the curves that shape the contoured figures. The intensity of the brightness 
functions like the weighted control of a spline. As the cars move across the video 
camera’s view, the light reflecting off of the cars determines the weight of the 
pulling actions seen on a particular line on the contoured figure. These pulling 
actions produce the curves seen in the figures. The brighter something in front of 
the camera appears, the more weight the spline will apply to the contour, 
producing a steep curvature in the process. As the brightness changes over the 
course of the scene, the pulling actions of the splines shift, transforming the form 
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of the figure. The plane and spherical figures seen in C-Trend are topological 
figures whose forms are composed with the pulling actions generated by the 
intensity of light. These pulling actions are the compositional forces that shape the 
images that viewers see. 
 
The Virtuality of Compositional Forces 
Compositional forces cannot actually be seen. Only the effects these forces 
generate are perceptible. “No scientist has ever observed a force. Not even 
Newton saw gravity. Only force-effects are observable” (Massumi 2002: 160). 
When viewers watch C-Trend, the contoured figures they see are the effect 
generated by compositional forces. The splines pull at the contoured topological 
figures and alter their shapes below the threshold of visibility. The contoured 
topological figures emerge as time/energy objects because the relational 
movements of compositional forces create a dynamic form. The multiplicity of 
compositional forces acting on the contour lines is what transforms the seen 
time/energy objects.   
 Because compositional forces are imperceptible and can only be felt 
through the effects they generate, they are in fact virtual. As Massumi points out: 
“No one kind of image, let alone any one image, can render the virtual…the only 
way an image can approach it alone is to twist and fold on itself, to multiply 
itself internally” (2002: 132). The virtual is a multiplicity of potential movements 
that cannot be depicted by one singular image. According to Steven Shaviro: 
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“The virtual is like a field of energies that have not yet been expended, or a 
reservoir of potentialities that have not yet been tapped. That is to say, the virtual 
is not composed of atoms; it doesn’t have body or extension. But the potential for 
change that it offers is real in its own way” (2009: 35).76 The virtual is not 
foregrounded in linear perspective, the cinematic paradigm, or the Euclidian 
model space because these paradigms assume movement occurs through 
displacement. These three models of space are connected to what Lynn calls 
“actual movement.” “Actual movement often involves a mechanical paradigm of 
multiple discrete positions, whereas virtual movement allows form to occupy a 
multiplicity of possible positions continuously with the same form” (Lynn 1999: 
10). When viewers watch C-Trend, the metamorphosis of the contoured 
topological figures is not a result of actual movement caused by some form of 
displacement. Rather, the contoured topological figures transform through the 
virtual movements of imperceptible compositional forces that can only be felt in 
the seeing. The virtual compositional forces in relation to the topological figures 
create the time/energy objects that come to be seen in the encounter viewers 
have with Vasulka’s videos. 
The idea that virtual compositional forces generate visible time/energy 
objects in analog video is not totally new. As early as 1970, Gene Youngblood 
discussed this concept through his notion of synaesthetic cinema.77 “The 
fundamental subject of synaesthetic cinema – forces and energies – cannot be 
photographed.  It’s not what we’re seeing so much as the process and effect of 
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seeing” (Youngblood 1970: 97). Like the time/energy objects, synaesthetic 
cinema generates images in which the effects of virtual compositional forces 
manifest themselves as topological figures of transformation. 
It should be noted that Youngblood does not make a distinction between 
cinema and video. “Just as the term ‘man’ is coming to mean 
man/plant/machine, so the definition of cinema must be expanded to include 
videotronics, computer science, atomic light” (Youngblood 1970: 135). His 
interest lay in the notion of an expanded cinema, which included film, video, and 
computers as a means of breaking away from the traditional theatrical screening 
space and image structures found in cinema up to that point, such as the 
cinematic paradigm. This expanded cinema takes shape as synaesthetic cinema. 
“A synaesthetic film is, in effect, one image continually transforming into other 
images: metamorphosis” (Youngblood 1970: 86).   
The key connection between Vasulka’s time/energy objects and 
Youngblood’s synaesthetic cinema is that they are both open to new 
technological innovations and processes. Youngblood was pioneering when he 
conceived of film as “synaesthetic” because it included new technologies such as 
analog video. He was one of the earliest thinkers to advocate for an image 
making practice that was interdisciplinary. Youngblood felt that artists could no 
longer “specialize in a single discipline and hope truthfully to express a clear 
picture of its relationships to the environment” (1970: 41). By pushing analog 
video into more experimental areas, Vasulka’s conception of time/energy-objects 
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echoes Youngblood’s thoughts on image production. Vasulka used, and at times 
invented, new technological tools in order to expand the capabilities of 
manipulating the analog video signal. Many of these machines were constructed 
for particular tasks, such as the Rutt/Etra Scan Processor mentioned earlier. 
According to Yvonne Spielmann, Vasulka would also “connect together as many 
devices as possible in complex arrays, in order to exploit the capacity of the 
particular technology” (2008: 197). This experimentation opened Vasulka to 
using technologies that fell outside the realm of analog video.  
 
The Digital Codification of Time/Energy Objects 
By the mid-1970s, Vasulka was using some of the earliest digital 
computers as a way to continue his innovative experimentation with video. With 
Jeffery Schier, he invented the Digital Image Articulator in 1976, which 
“processes video signals and combines analog functions with digital components 
for programming” (Digital Image Articulator 2004). Vasulka sought to discover 
the relational potential occurring between time/energy objects and new digital 
technologies. What he found was that time/energy objects were not exclusively 
confined to analog video but could also be generated in digital video. Vasulka 
states: 
The dramatic moment of the transformation into a binary code of 
energy events in time, as they may be derived from light, or the 
molecular communication of sound, or from a force field, gravity, 
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or other physical initiation, has to be realized, in order to appreciate 
the power of the organization and transformation of a code. The 
process of analog-to-digital and digital-to-analog conversion 
envelops the internal digital-code operations, the state of the 
world” (Vasulka 1978: 20).   
 One consideration to be kept in mind when thinking about time/energy 
objects digitally is that their conversion into binary code cannot be viewed as a 
process involving the virtual. The conversion of the analog video signal to digital 
binary code is not a virtual process of transformation, even though Vasulka 
describes it as such, but instead is a numerically based process of codification. 
The tools that produce this codification, such as the Digital Image Articulator, 
take the electronic analog video signal and break it down so that it can be 
reshaped “in an environment governed by mathematical laws” (Digital Image 
Articulator 2004). Specifically, these digital tools convert the analog video signal 
into a series of zeros and ones.   
Because virtual compositional forces of time/energy objects are always 
moving and fluctuating, they cannot be articulated by digital binary code. This 
means that the digital has little access to the virtual. According to Massumi: 
“Digital technologies in fact have a remarkably weak connection to the virtual, 
by virtue of the enormous power of systematization of the possible” (2002: 137). 
Time/energy objects emerge from virtual compositional forces and not from 
being converted into a digital binary code. This is because the mathematical 
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governance of digital codification reduces the virtual compositional forces of 
time/energy objects to only two possibilities: zero or one. The digital codification 
process does not generate virtual compositional forces and thus cannot provide 
the potential necessary for time/energy objects to emerge.   
This weak connection between the digital and the virtual becomes 
complicated because of the commonly held belief that the virtual is directly 
connected to the digital. Instead of associating the digital with a process of 
codification and the virtual with the multiplicity of compositional forces that 
have the potential to generate emergent forms, the virtual and the digital are 
often mistakenly linked through the notion of simulation. “Simulation means 
that physical processes that create visibility – such as the registration of light 
rays, or chemical and mechanical manipulations – are copied, or duplicated in a 
type of fakery which pretends (simulates) that we are all dealing with the actual” 
(Spielmann 1999: 135). In terms of video, when an analog electronic signal is 
converted to binary code by a tool like the Digital Image Articulator, the output 
of this analog-to-digital conversion is understood to be a simulation of an analog 
video image. The electronic signal that generates the analog video image is a 
physical process that creates something real, whereas the digital video image is 
the binary coded copy that simulates the analog electronic signal. The digital 
video image is understood to be a simulation of an analog video image. In this 
light, the term virtual, according to Lynn, “is often used interchangeably with the 
term simulation” (1999: 10). This undifferentiated use of the terms virtual and 
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simulation makes it possible to define the digital video image as a “virtual 
image.” 
This conception of an image generated by digital video as a “virtual 
image” pushes the notion of the virtual and the digital further away from 
Vasulka’s understanding of time/energy objects. This is because the common 
usage of the term virtual only takes into consideration the analog-to-digital 
conversion and views the resulting digital video image as a simulation of the 
“real” video image, the analog one. The problem with this conception of the 
virtual-as-simulation is the assumption that the digital video image is visible. 
When the electronic analog video signal is converted into digital binary code, the 
signal is changed into sequences of zeros and ones. Although this digital binary 
code is not visible as an image, it is not exact to say that it is invisible. With the 
use of a computer, one can gain access to this numeric code and see the millions 
of zeros and ones that the analog video image has been translated into. A digital 
image conceived under the common usage of the term virtual-as-simulation does 
not actually occur because there is no image to be seen. The “virtual image” is only 
a binary code and is not the simulation of a “real” analog image. According to 
Massumi: “Nothing is more destructive for thinking and imaging of the virtual 
than equating it with the digital” (2002: 137). This means that the notion of the 
virtual-as-simulation cannot be used in the conception of time/energy objects 
because it confuses the compositional forces that generate the topological figure 
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with the process of codification. A virtual process of generative compositional 
forces is not a digital process of numeric codification.  
Another consideration to be kept in mind is that because it is the virtual 
compositional forces that generate time/energy objects, if one were to stop at the 
analog-to-digital codification process of the electronic video signal, returning to 
the time/energy object, and therefore to the virtual, would be impossible. Recall 
that Vasulka specifically states that this codification process not only involves the 
conversion of the analog to the digital, but that it is also necessary for the digital 
to be converted back to the analog. This return to the analog from the digital is 
required, according to Massumi, because “digital technologies have a connection 
to the potential and the virtual only through the analog” (2002: 138; original 
emphasis). Once a video’s electronic analog signal is converted to digital binary 
code and is manipulated using a computer or some other digital tool, this binary 
code must be re-converted back to an analog electronic signal in order to be seen 
as an image. This means that “the digital is sandwiched between an analog 
disappearance in to code at the recording and an analog appearance out of the 
code at the [viewing] end” (Massumi 2002: 138). When Vasulka uses the Digital 
Image Articulator, time/energy objects are broken down into code only to be 
transformed and then recomposed into new time/energy objects. By converting 
the binary code back to an electronic analog signal, time/energy objects are able 
to re-emerge as the seen images that are experienced through the relational 
encounter with viewers. This re-emergence of time/energy objects does not 
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occur within the raster lines of the analog electronic signal; rather, it takes place 
on the level of the pixel.78   
 
Compositional Forces and Pixels 
In C-Trend, the compositional forces that transform the time/energy object 
are directly connected to the changing levels of brightness of an incoming 
electronic video signal, in which the visible effect was the metamorphosis of the 
contoured lines rising and falling. The compositional forces that transform 
time/energy objects after they have been digitally manipulated are more 
complex than those produced in videos like C-Trend because these forces operate 
on two levels: first, at the level of the pixel and, second, at the level of the overall 
image. The compositional forces generated by the changes occurring within just 
one pixel have the potential to transform an entire time/energy object. This is 
because compositional forces not only take place within each pixel, but also 
between pixels through the direct relations they have with each other. Pixels are 
more than simply a point within a grid. Like the squares found in John F. Simon 
Jr.’s internet artwork Every Icon discussed in Chapter 1, pixels are particular 
occurrences that have the potential to exceed themselves, affecting the encounter 
viewers have with the other pixels. The transformation occurring within one 
pixel has the potential to alter the relations among the pixels that surround it. 
This one alteration can generate a compositional force that has the potential to 
change the entire image. As Whitehead notes: “Any local agitation shakes the 
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whole universe” (1938/1966: 138). Because the compositional forces generated 
among the thousands of pixels create a multiplicity of potential, the entire field of 
pixels becomes a time/energy object. This pixel-field emerges as a time/energy 
object because there is the potential for change within and across every pixel.  
As stated earlier, compositional forces cannot actually be seen because 
they are virtual.  Only force-effects can be seen or felt. This means that the 
changing colours that are visible within each pixel are these force-effects. Each 
pixel has a limited number of colours it can generate. For example, the Digital 
Image Articulator uses a sixteen-shade grayscale that enables each pixel to 
fluctuate between white and black using sixteen gradations of grey (Kirby 1996). 
Returning to Lynn’s topological spline model, this means that each pixel has two 
splines – one pulling towards white and the other toward black. Each spline 
generates a virtual compositional force that enables pixels to change between 
these sixteen gradations. Any movement within a particular pixel occurs as the 
weight of one spline pulls more forcefully than the other. If one spline pulls with 
its full weight in one direction, the force-effect seen will be white in that direction 
and black in the other. If both splines pull with equal weight, then medium grey 
becomes visible. In contemporary digital video, each pixel has three splines that 
pull on the three primary additive colours: red, green and blue. Each of these 
three colours has two hundred and fifty-six gradations, enabling each pixel to 
fluctuate between just under approximately seventeen million colours 
combination. As well, similar to the black and white digital video technology 
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Vasulka was using, when the three splines pull at equal weight, the colour that 
becomes visible will appear grey. 
 The compositional forces pulling the splines within any of the pixels can 
also stabilize, thereby creating a colour that appears to be static. Yet, according to 
Lynn, for something to actually be static “motion [must be] eliminated at the 
beginning” (1999: 14). Because there is always the potential for movement to 
occur, the pixel’s colour cannot be considered static – or anything else for that 
matter. When the colour of a particular pixel stops changing for a period of time, 
it is because the forces that pull the black and white splines form a mutual 
equilibrium, or what Gilbert Simondon calls “metastability” (2009: 3).79 This 
metastable equilibrium can sustain itself for a long period of time, giving the 
appearance of stasis, but nonetheless has the potential to change at any moment. 
According to Simondon, stasis “corresponds to the lowest possible level of 
potential energy; it is the equilibrium that is reached in a system when all of the 
possible transformations have been realized and no more force exists” (2009: 3). 
One colour within a pixel may be on the screen for the entire duration of a video, 
or it can transform itself radically. Because there is always the potential for 
compositional forces to alter the colour found within a pixel, every pixel can be 
seen as a topological figure.  
The second level of compositional forces that impact the time/energy 
object that has been manipulated digitally is comprised of the relations between 
pixels. Each pixel has its own set of compositional forces and durations of colour. 
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A topological surface forms when a multiplicity of compositional forces from 
thousands of pixels emerge together simultaneously.80 “In this way, topology 
allows for not just the incorporation of a single moment but rather a multiplicity 
of vectors, and therefore, a multiplicity of times, in a single continuous surface” 
(Lynn 1999: 10). The digital time/energy object generates this single continuous 
surface that incorporates a multiplicity of singular pixels. On the one hand, the 
pixels are singular because they have their own compositional forces acting 
within themselves as the splines pulling colours. On the other hand, they are a 
multiplicity because compositional forces are generated among the relations 
occurring between them. As a multiplicity, each pixel exceeds its singularity, 
going beyond the forceful shifts in colour it is capable of generating. Through the 
relations between metastability and flux among the pixels, the force-effects that 
are seen in the emergent digital time/energy object appear as the movement 
viewers see.   
This relation between metastability and flux can be found in a particular 
section of Vasulka’s video Artifacts (1980). The section begins with an image of 
visual noise comprised of the fluctuation of thousands of pixels changing 
between various shades of black, white and grey. Within seconds, the pixels in 
the centre of the image begin to fluctuate more radically and to change their 
colour more quickly than those pixels surrounding it, and in doing so, produce a 
circular figure. As the video continues, the circular figure changes when the 
pixels that are concentrated in the centre stabilize, which produces a second 
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smaller circular figure. Vasulka then continually shifts the smaller circular figure 
from a state of flux to one of metastability. During this section, Vasulka, through 
voiceover, encourages viewers “to freeze and unfreeze the image a few times.” 
When the video is paused, both circular figures disappear and are 
indistinguishable from the other pixels that surround them. Viewers only see a 
frozen image of visual noise. The difference between stasis and metastability is 
demonstrated by the circular figure when the video is paused. When the virtual 
compositional forces that transform the pixels are frozen, so are the 
compositional forces that alter the topological surface of the digital time/energy 
object. When these two levels of compositional forces are momentarily 
restrained, the image that is generated runs the risk of being understood as being 
constituted by a cinematographic/Euclidian model instead of the topological 
one. This is because the paused digital video could be mistaken as a static image 
rather than of a metastable one.   
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Figure 4.6. Woody Vasulka. Artifacts (1980). Image captured from video. As this 
captured image reveals, the concentric circles are difficult to see without the 
movement occurring among the pixels. 
 
 As Vasulka’s videos demonstrate, time/energy objects can emerge from a 
digital source through the conversion of an analog video signal into a digital 
binary code and then back into an analog display of pixels. In videos such as 
Artifacts, in which the time/energy objects have been digitally manipulated, it is 
difficult to describe these digitally generated images in terms of linear 
perspective, the cinematic paradigm or the Euclidian model of space. As Vasulka 
states:  
Most of the work done with computers is labeled as patterning. It 
may look like patterns, but the images really are encoded processes. 
People may look for and try to decode the processes within these 
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images, but the processes are hidden; there is no way to decode 
them, no language in which to decode them (Vasulka 1978: 21). 
Often, what are described as Euclidian geometric patterns in digital video are 
actually emerging time/energy objects. The hidden processes that cannot be 
decoded are the virtual compositional forces that transform each pixel and the 
overall topological surface of time/energy objects. Attempting to decode these 
hidden compositional forces is impossible because only their force-effects are 
observable. Within digital time/energy objects these force-effects appear as the 
changing colours that are generated within each of the pixels. What at first seems 
to be a decodable Euclidian geometric pattern is in fact an emergent topological 
surface that is produced by the fluctuation of force-effects within the pixels. The 
perceived images emerge from this topological surface that is filled entirely with 
these colour-changing pixels. These compositional forces that are generated by 
the relations among the pixels produce the topological surface that enables 






The more you limit yourself, the more resourceful you become. 
– Søren Kierkegaard, Either/Or81 
 
Irwin’s Posture of Inquiry  
Robert Irwin is an artist motivated by problems that arose in the midst of 
his constantly evolving artistic practice. Every series of paintings Irwin created 
emerged from the problems generated by the previous series that he produced. 
Irwin states that “from about 1960 to 1970, in an almost reclusive and ‘deadly 
serious’ activity, I used my painting as a step-by-step process, each new series 
acting in direct response to the questions raised by the previous series” (1977: 
23). As Irwin would complete a new series of paintings, new problems would 
inevitably emerge that needed different solutions to address them.  These new 
problems would then guide his artistic practice through the next series of 
paintings. In order to satisfy these emergent problems Irwin had to respond to 
his work in a new and unique way. Irwin states: “Each time I had to find 
something materially, physically, that had the same scale as the questions I was 
asking” (Weschler 2008: 114). These new problems would then compel Irwin to 
reinvent the set of conditions that informed his painting practice. New 
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techniques needed to be constantly developed in order to solve these emerging 
problems. This is because, according to Henri Bergson, “stating the problem is 
not simply uncovering, it is inventing” (2007: 37). This continuous process of 
uncovering problems and solving them through inventive techniques was 
Irwin’s posture of inquiry that activated his painting practice.82  
As Irwin radically transformed his painting practice with each new set of 
problems that arose from his posture of inquiry (to the chagrin of his art 
dealer),83 he had one motivating inquiry that underscored all of the problems he 
encountered. He wanted his paintings to have “nothing to do with content but 
rather purely with its own physicality and how that physicality was experienced 
perceptually” (Irwin in Weschler 2008: 67). When viewers encounter his 
paintings, Irwin wanted to curtail the emergence of any potential 
representational readings or psychological interpretations. He did not want the 
experience viewers shared with his work to generate any sort of recognizable 
imagery or interpretive meaning. Instead, Irwin aspired to produce paintings 
that would enable viewers to experience an intensity felt in the seeing that went 
beyond the actual visibility of the marks and gestures on the canvas. The 
encounter between viewers and his paintings would generate a seeing that 
would exceed the work’s compositional elements as such. Specifically, Irwin’s 
interest lay in developing a set of conditions that would enable viewers to not 
just see the painting’s compositional elements but also to feel the intensive forces 
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these marks and gestures generate in the seeing as they act upon and affect each 
other. 
When viewers encounter Irwin’s paintings, or any work of art, they are 
always situated within a specific set of conditions. As Jonathan Crary notes, each 
particular viewer is “one who sees within a prescribed set of possibilities, one 
who is embedded in a system of conventions and limitations” (1990: 6). These 
conventions and limitations constitute the conditions of the work. When 
encountering an Irwin painting, viewers are not positioned outside of the 
experience of that work. The experience viewers have with one of Irwin’s 
paintings neither happens to them, nor is solely created by them. Viewers do not 
passively look at the set of conditions a painting offers them. They also do not 
generate what they see completely with or in their minds. Instead, according to 
Irwin, “we participate directly in the forming of that envelope of the world and 
our being in it, and we do so every moment of our lives” (1985: 20). The 
experience viewers have when encountering Irwin’s work is just as dependent 
on their ability to experience and perceive that work as it is contingent on the 
work’s set of conditions that inform that specific encounter. This is because, for 
Irwin, “the art act can only occur in response to a set of specifics” (1985: 23).   
Irwin began by experimenting with the compositional elements in his 
work because he was trying to discover what set of conditions either enabled or 
inhibited viewers from experiencing the intensive compositional forces they 
collectively generated in the seeing. He wanted to ensure that viewers 
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encountered a set of conditions that enabled them to attend to the work’s 
emergent compositional forces. The difficulty that would arise for Irwin in 
pursuing this problem of attuning viewers to the intensity generated during their 
encounter with an artwork is that there is not one specific set of conditions that 
can bring this about. This is because each work of art uses a completely different 
assortment of techniques in order to generate the emergent compositional forces 
viewers come to experience. The intensity felt in the encounter with two different 
artworks never emerges from the same sets of conditions.  
The artworks discussed in the previous chapters, for instance, all generate 
compositional forces felt in the seeing, but each work uses a completely different 
set of conditions to accomplish this. The intensity viewers experience in John F. 
Simon Jr.’s internet work Every Icon (1997) emerges from the transductive 
overlapping of scientific and artistic techniques in the form of a constantly 
changing black and white grid. In the paintings of Piet Mondrian, the forces felt 
in the seeing arise from a relational complex composed of perpendicular lines 
and coloured planes. The forces felt in the encounter with Paul Sharits’ 
N:O:T:H:I:N:G (1968) emerge from an informational system that is activated by a 
series of rapidly changing colour-light-fields. Finally, the compositional forces 
experienced in the encounter with Woody Vasulka’s videos emerge from time-
energy objects that undergo constant metamorphosis by either manipulating the 
electronic signal in his analog videos or the gradations of colour within each 
pixel in his digital work. What these previously discussed artworks demonstrate 
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is that there is not one particular set of conditions that is able to generate 
compositional forces for every work of art. Each work must use its own unique 
set of conditions to produce the intensity felt in the seeing. 
Throughout the 1960s, Irwin produced three distinct series of paintings 
that each had their own particular set of conditions. The “Lines” series (1960-64), 
the “Dot” series (1964-66), and the “Disc” series (1966-69) used different 
techniques in order to generate the intensity viewers came to experience in the 
seeing. The reason Irwin produced these three series, which were each radically 
different from each other both visually and experientially, was because he could 
not find a set of conditions that would satisfactorily solve his primary concern. 
He could not uncover the right techniques that would enable the compositional 
forces generated in his work to fully capture the viewers’ attention. Yet despite 
his best efforts, other problems would always get in the way of Irwin’s primary 
inquiry. When he completed a series of paintings, he would find new problems 
with the conditions that he had failed to take into consideration, such as the 
viewers focusing on the lines rather that the intensity these lines generated in the 
“Line” series of paintings; or the distraction the shadow that framed the “Dot” 
series produced, taking attention away from the compositional forces; or viewers 
interpreting the “Disc” paintings as an eye or a mandala, rather than 
experiencing the forces that are present in the encounter. Irwin felt that these 
new problems impeded the viewers’ ability to experience the force generated by 
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the painting’s compositional elements because they allowed viewers to interpret 
imagery or meaning into the work. 
 As will be discussed below, each new series of paintings would bring 
Irwin closer to his goal of inhibiting the viewers’ ability to encounter 
representational imagery and interpretive meaning in the work, allowing them 
to focus on the emergent compositional force felt in the seeing. If viewers are to 
experience anything while looking at Irwin’s paintings, it is the intensive 
presence that his works generated. According to Irwin, his work “was more 
about the feel in the painting, not about the pictures” (Feinstein 1997).  Irwin 
sought to create paintings not that were about something, but rather, that would 
offer viewers encounters with incipient action. 
 
Series One: The “Lines” (1960‐1964) 
Problem:  How  can  an  image  be  generated  without  any  recognizable 
imagery? 
Following in the footsteps of the Abstract Expressionist movement, which 
dominated American painting throughout the 1950s, Irwin was initially seeking 
to capture in his own work the same forceful physical presence that paintings by 
artists such as Willem de Kooning and Philip Guston generated.84 He was 
searching for new ways to approach his paintings that would enable them to 
produce a heightened intensity, which could be felt in the shared encounter with 
viewers. Irwin states: 
 167 
Strength was a big word in abstract expressionism; you were trying 
to get power into the painting, so that the painting really vibrated, 
had life to it. It wasn’t just coloured shapes sitting flat. It had to do 
with getting real tension going in the thing, something that made 
the thing really stand up and hum” (Weschler 2008: 64). 
Irwin wanted viewers to feel a similar dynamism in the shared experience with 
his paintings that he felt when encountering those Abstract Expressionist works 
he greatly admired. 
By the end of the 1950s, Irwin begins to experiment with the 
compositional elements in his work, paralleling the Abstract Expressionist 
tradition he admired. These works are quite nonrepresentational, filled with 
gestures of colour that feel spontaneously applied to the canvas. In works such as 
Ten Bulls (1959), viewers encounter vibrant swirls of reds, oranges, and blacks 
that generate a flame-like intensity. Like a blazing campfire with its dancing 
flames and billowing smoke rising upward, this work produces a sense of 
movement that draws the viewers’ gaze around the canvas towards the upper 
left corner. Like many of the paintings Irwin produced during this period, Ten 
Bulls generates a dynamic presence that is felt in the seeing through the 




Figure 5.1. Robert Irwin, Ten Bulls (1959). 
Reflecting on these early Abstract Expressionist works, Irwin thought that 
his paintings “were full of holes” (Feinstein 1997). These holes are areas or 
gestures of colour that fail to contribute to, and sometimes even inhibit, the 
intensity of the encounter occurring between the viewers and the painting. They 
are areas that can negatively affect the work as a whole, acting as vortical 
doldrums that suck the vibrancy out of the experience. These lifeless areas and 
gestures of colour generate inconsistencies in the seeing. According to Irwin, 
they produce contradictions “in terms of how they were physically read” 
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(Weschler 2008: 59). This can be seen in the muddy reddish-browns and blacks in 
the upper and lower right corners in Ten Bulls. These two areas in the painting 
appear to have very little vitality to them. They are holes that douse the intensive 
impact of the whole experience, countering the vitality of the swirling activity of 
colour in the center of the painting. Because Irwin felt that many of his abstract 
expressionist paintings had areas that seemed to impair the work, he believed 
there were still major aspects that needed to be adjusted so that only the 
compositional forces felt in the seeing would comprise the experience generated 
in the encounter shared between the viewers and the work.  
One of the key aspects Irwin thought needed to be changed in his work 
was the manner in which his paintings were composed. He wanted every mark 
and gesture of colour to play a significant role in maximizing the physical 
presence of the work. “A good painting has a gathering, interactive build-up in 
it.  It is a psychic build-up, but it’s also a pure energy build-up” (Irwin in 
Weschler 2008: 64).  This gathering of energy, or dynamism, within the work is 
generated because each element that composes the work is more than just a spot 
of paint or swirl of colour. These compositional elements always exceed 
themselves as such through the relations they enter into with the other 
compositional elements on the canvas. As these relations accumulate among the 
compositional elements, the dynamism that is felt in the seeing emerges.  
Irwin wanted viewers to actually feel this accumulation of the dynamic 
intensity produced in the encounter with his paintings. This meant that every 
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gesture within any particular work had to contribute to the production of these 
intensive compositional forces. Each mark had to be instrumental to the incipient 
action of the painting. This is because incipient action is what composes the 
about-to-become visible that is felt in the shared experience.85 It is what incites 
the emergence of images that are not yet visible, or the incipiency of images. 
Each mark and gesture had to be instrumental in generating the incipient action 
of the painting, contributing to the production of the felt intensive compositional 
forces. Any compositional element that either hinders or prevents the incipient 
action of compositional forces from gathering, thereby diminishing the 
dynamism present in encounter with a painting, Irwin would remove. “A canvas 
full of rhetorical strokes may be full, but the fullness may be just hollow energy, 
just as a scintillating wall of colours may be full of colours but have no colour” 
(Newman 1990a: 249). 
A second aspect that Irwin wanted to adjust in his paintings is the type of 
compositional elements he uses. He felt that he needed to find a very simple set 
of marks and gestures that he could use throughout his work that would shift the 
viewers’ attention towards their ability to perceive the incipient action generated 
within the paintings and away from their desire to interpret or find imagery. 
This is because imagery, for Irwin, “constituted representation, ‘re-presentation,’ 
a second order of reality, whereas I was after a first order of presence” (Weschler 
2008: 65). Irwin aimed to create paintings in which a series of simple marks and 
gestures on the canvas could be composed in such a way that viewers would be 
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unable to interpret the paintings as an image of something representational or 




Irwin was trying to find enabling constraints that he could use throughout 
his work in order to maximize the presence of compositional forces within the 
shared experience between his paintings and viewers, while simultaneously 
attempting to curtail the emergence of what Gilles Deleuze calls clichés. Before 
discussing Deleuze’s notion of clichés, an introduction to enabling constraints is 
necessary. Enabling constraints are techniques developed in order to modulate 
the compositional forces of a work into an emergent form. According to Erin 
Manning: “Enabling constraints focus multiplicity into emergence. Without this 
focus, multiplicity disperses with little or no diagrammatic force” (2010: 9). 
Diagrammatic force is not external to the work. It is how the work composes 
itself in the work. It is an artwork’s compositional force, which would be unable 
to emerge from the numerous elements that constitute the artwork without 
enabling constraints.  
It is important to note that the compositional forces felt in the encounter 
with an artwork are diagrammatic not because they offer viewers something 
representational to see, which would work against Irwin’s intention of 
foregrounding the dynamism his paintings generate. As Deleuze and Guattari 
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explain, the diagrammatic “does not function to represent, even something real, 
but rather constructs a real that is yet to come, a new type of reality” (1987: 142). 
Compositional forces are diagrammatic because they co-generate a seeing in the 
encounter with viewers that enables the dynamism generated by the incipiency 
of images to be felt. But in order for this dynamic intensity to be felt in the seeing, 
enabling constraints need to harness and shape these compositional forces into 
emergence. 
 Enabling constraints are a set of conditions that bring relations together 
by limiting the incipient action of compositional elements, while allowing 
innovations to occur. These innovations are the images that emerge 
compositionally from an artwork. Enabling constraints make the incipiency of 
images possible. Think of the grid in John F. Simon Jr.’s internet artwork Every 
Icon (1997) discussed in Chapter 1. In Simon’s work, the grid is an enabling 
constraint that modulates the incipient action of the flickering black and white 
squares into a dynamic movement that viewers feel flowing across the top of the 
grid itself. As each of the thirty-two squares in the top row of Every Icon’s grid 
oscillate between black and white at various intervals, with the square furthest 
left changing one hundred times per second and the square furthest right 
changing approximately every 1.36 years, the grid limits the incipient action of 
these squares by modulating the types of relations that can occur among them. 
The grid, as an enabling constraint, harnesses the incipient action of the 
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flickering squares into a compositional force, which in turn incites the incipiency 
of images viewers see in this work. 
Simon’s Every Icon demonstrates how enabling constraints provide a 
platform that gives an array of compositional elements the means to generate 
relations through the incipient action each element generates. These relations 
occurring among the flickering squares of Every Icon’s grid are not compositional 
afterthoughts; rather they emerge compositionally, taking form as the forces 
dynamically felt in the seeing. While discussing Lygia Clark’s “relational 
objects,” Manning explains: “Without a set of enabling constraints to make the 
work take form, Clark’s objects would melt into an already overcoded 
environment” (2009b: 219). Without enabling constraints to shape the incipient 
action of compositional elements, these elements that constitute an artwork 
would not be able to gather into the relations needed in order for compositional 
forces to emerge. If compositional forces cannot be generated, then viewers will 
not feel any presence or intensity within the artwork. When little to no 
dynamism can be felt, there is a risk that an artwork will proceed to slip into the 
realm of clichés.   
According to Deleuze, clichés are everywhere. They are “ready-made 
perceptions, memories, phantasms” (Deleuze 2003: 71). More specifically, clichés 
are that “which circulate in the external world, but which also penetrate each one 
of us and condition our internal world, so that everyone possesses only psychic 
clichés by which we think and feel, are thought and felt, being ourselves a cliché 
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among the others in the world which surround us” (Deleuze 1986: 208-9; 
translation modified). Clichés are techniques, ideas, or actual things that are or 
have become too familiar and are ready at hand for use. Clichés are not 
necessarily that which lacks originality; rather, they are that which no longer 
generates an intensively novel experience. For instance, someone who has never 
encountered snow falling from the sky who visits a place such as Canada, 
Norway, or Russia will likely find his or her first experience of white frozen 
flakes dancing down slowly in the air to be completely novel. There will be an 
intensity felt that is unique to this first encounter.  On the other hand, anyone 
who as lived in one of these locations for several years will potentially find an 
encounter with falling snow to be extremely familiar. There will be no forceful 
impact felt in the experience, making this encounter a clichéd one. Another 
example of an encounter with clichés is in advertising – once an advertisement 
has been repeatedly seen or heard, it may not have the same novel impact as it 
did the first time it was experienced. The more a particular advertisement is 
encountered, the more it risks becoming cliché. Because clichés are also widely 
distributed and easily available for experience, they can clutter almost every 
aspect of life. This makes them difficult to avoid and even more difficult to 
eliminate. 
With the plethora of clichés circulating in the world, it can be difficult to 
simply focus on experiencing a painting or any other artwork as such. When 
viewers encounter a particular painting, the work can, as Ronald Bogue asserts, 
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“become so invested with cultural codes, clichéd forms and conventional 
interpretations that it is no longer truly seen” (1996: 259). This is because long-
standing conventions, such as searching for representational imagery or literary 
and psychological meaning, have potentially generated a habituated way of 
encountering paintings. These habits are the clichés of experience, sight, and 
even thought.86 As a result of these habits, an instinctive attunement towards 
seeking clichés is foregrounded when encountering paintings. “We therefore 
perceive only clichés” (Deleuze 1989: 20).  
When clichés are at the forefront of the shared experience between 
viewers and a painting, then it becomes difficult for the incipiency of images to 
occur. This is because, according to Daniel W. Smith, “the cliché is precisely what 
prevents the genesis of an image” (2003: xxiii). Clichés have the ability to impede 
the incipient action that occurs among the compositional elements within a 
painting by offering an alternative compositional process to the work. Rather 
than allowing this incipient action to gather, which would enable images to 
emerge in the shared experience between viewers and a painting, clichés 
produce preconstituted formations that do not exceed vision or the work itself. 
There is little to no dynamism generated in works composed with clichés. Recall 
the areas of Irwin’s abstract expressionist painting Ten Bulls that were 
detrimental to the felt intensity the work generated. The muddy reddish-browns 
and blacks on the right side of the painting retain the look of gestures that would 
typically appear within an abstract expressionist painting, but they do not 
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generate the compositional force felt in the seeing. These gestures in Irwin’s 
painting take away from the incipient action gathering throughout the other 
areas of the work, obstructing or even possibly preventing the incipiency of 
images from taking place. Gestures like these are compositional clichés that have 
the ability to obstruct the incipient action compositional elements generated 
within an artwork, which in turn kills the incipiency of images. 
Having clichés creep into his work, Irwin was faced with the arduous task 
of becoming more attuned to how they are formed within his painting practice in 
order to devise a set of conditions that would draw the viewers’ attention toward 
the incipient action taking place within his paintings.87 Because clichés 
potentially appear everywhere within experience, they have a tendency to 
emerge on their own. This make them feel like such a naturalized part of any 
painting or artwork. As Deleuze states, “clichés are always-already on the 
canvas” (2003: 72). This means that before Irwin even began making paintings, 
he was already fighting the impact clichés would have on how his work was 
encountered. He explains how easy it is for artists to fall prey to the clichés that 
surround them: “[W]hat you normally do is you bring to the situation all your 
aspirations, all your assumptions, all your ambitions – all your stuff. And then 
you pile it up on your painting, reading into it all the things you want it be” 
(Irwin in Weschler 2008: 77). It is easy for artists, such as Irwin, to be blinded by 
the clichés that slide into their work. However, if Irwin was to create a set of 
conditions that avoided clichés altogether, he had to ensure that he was not 
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filling his work with them. He had to determine what the potential clichés were, 
how they could enter into his work, and understand how they inhibited the 
incipient action the compositional elements generated. Irwin had to constantly 
question whether the techniques used to compose his paintings generated clichés 
or not.   
Jackson Pollock notes that, “new needs need new techniques” (1999: 20).88 
The trap of clichés can be avoided when an artwork does not continually rely 
upon the same techniques that may have successfully captured the attention of 
viewers in the past. Techniques that artists have had available to them for 
generations, such as linear perspective or cross-hatch shading, may not be able to 
generate the same compositional forces to lure the focus of viewers like they had 
when they first debuted. As successful techniques are repeatedly used, the 
compositional forces generated in the encounter become more subdued, rather 
than producing an intensity that exceeds the techniques as such. When linear 
perspective is used to compose a painting today, it is often because it is a 
technique that is familiar and easily understood when encountered. It does not 
generate an intensity felt in the seeing that a more contemporary painting 
technique may be able to produce. As soon as a technique becomes so familiar 
that viewers are unknowingly attuned to seeing with it, then this technique can 
no longer generate the excesses in the seeing needed to capture their attention. It 
will have become just another habit of sight, another cliché.   
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Another way to ensure that artworks are not contaminated by clichés is 
for artists to devise a set of conditions that evades any predetermination of what 
a particular piece can do. Techniques or conditions that are used to establish 
what viewers will experience in advance of their encounter with an artwork can 
only rely on clichés. This is because clichés are always already known prior to 
any encounter. Although there is no guarantee that clichés can be completely 
removed from an artwork, if artists do not specify exactly what kind of 
experience viewers should have when encountering their work, then an artwork 
may be able to generate compositional forces that viewers can feel. Brian 
Massumi points out that enabling constraints are a set of conditions that do not 
prescribe what viewers will actually experience. They are “sets of designed 
constraints that are meant to create specific conditions for creative interaction 
where something is set to happen, but there is no preconceived notion of exactly 
what the outcome will be or should be” (Massumi 2009: 15). Artists who use 
enabling constraints cannot predict what will happen when viewers encounter 
their work. This is because enabling constraints only constitute part of the 
incipiency of images. They do not generate what will be seen completely on their 
own. Through their participation with an artwork, viewers may experience the 
intensity of the work’s compositional forces, while others who are too blinded by 
clichés may see nothing. 
 Irwin believed he found an enabling constraint that through its repeated 
use had the ability to generate compositional forces significant enough to lure the 
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viewers’ attention away from any circulating clichés. This enabling constraint 
was the straight line. “The simple straight line seemed to me to be the best 
possible tool, the clearest element I could find, with the least amount of literate 
associations to it, and the greatest amount of power on the other side” (Irwin in 
Weschler 2008: 66). Many of the paintings Irwin started in 1960 continued in the 
Abstract Expressionist action painting manner he had been employing up to this 
point, applying the paint with spontaneous gestures of colour. But rather than 
filling the canvas with these active marks, these new works used a limited 
number of straight lines. This more disciplined approach however did not 
sacrifice any of the intensity felt in the seeing. In fact, Irwin was able to generate 
the same quality of presence with fewer marks. The straight lines in these 
paintings are primarily horizontal but there are a small number of them that cut 
across the canvas diagonally and pass over the horizontal lines. The extremities 
of the lines never come into contact with each other or the edge of the canvas. 
The two ends of the lines also never come into contact or connect. In setting these 
conditions, Irwin believed that the viewers’ ability to see or find clichéd imagery 
would be inhibited. 
Ocean Park (1960-61) is a good example of Irwin’s initial line paintings. 
This work continues from Irwin’s earlier action painting style. Approximately 
twenty rough-looking straight lines appear in this work, seeming as though they 
were violently cut into the nearly monochromatic orange background. As 
viewers encounter the painting, their gaze is immediately drawn towards the 
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centre. This is because most of the lines conglomerate here, with the thickest and 
darkest of all the lines sitting almost exactly in the middle of the work. From this 
central weighty line, the other lines spread towards the top and bottom of the 
painting. As the lines scatter both upwards and downwards, they also become 
progressively thinner. The lines that are nearest to the top and bottom edges of 
the work are thin and made up of a yellow colour that verges towards orange 
and seem to almost melt into the monochromatic background. This gradual 
spreading and thinning of the lines draws the viewers’ gaze away from the 
centre towards the edges of the painting.  
 
Figure 5.2. Robert Irwin, Ocean Park (1960-61). 
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A tension emerges in the seeing of this painting because as the viewers’ 
gaze is drawn to the weight of the heavier lines in the centre, they also want to 
follow the dispersion of the lines towards the top and bottom of the work.  This 
tension generates a feeling of tumbling similar to that of waves in the ocean. As 
the viewers’ gaze moves away from the centre towards the top of the painting, 
their attention immediately falls back to the centre, only to be drawn away from 
the centre again. This feeling of perpetual tumbling is Ocean Park’s compositional 
force.  
 Despite the fact that Irwin succeeded in generating compositional forces 
that could be felt in many of his initial line paintings, he still continued to remove 
elements from his paintings. This was because he continued to find elements that 
did not truly contribute to the generation of the compositional forces in the work. 
Also, imagery could still be found in these works. His fear was that viewers 
could still find clichés in these paintings.  Irwin’s biographer Lawrence Weschler 
explains:  
Although Irwin had already broken down most of the pictorial 
elements in his painting… he was still left with a painting that was 
articulable. The eye followed the lines, form one energy nexus to 
another, from intersection to separation, and so forth. These 
relationships seemed to be what the painting was about (2008: 68). 
Viewers were about to read the lines like paths on a map that take them on a 
journey around the canvas. Even Irwin saw clichés in these initial line paintings. 
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He thought the paintings reminded him of a game of pick-up sticks, which is 
why he would end up calling these initial line works the “Pick-up Sticks” 
paintings.   
 
Perceptual Fields 
Undeterred by the imagery found in his initial line paintings, Irwin 
continued to reduce the number of lines in his work from twenty down to eight. 
By mid-1961, he had reduced the number of lines down to four, creating a series 
of paintings called the “Early Line” paintings. Finally, between 1962 and 1964, 
Irwin began to paint works with just two thin lines on a monochromatic colour-
field. These paintings are known as the “Late Line” paintings. When Irwin 
reached this point, he explains that “the rough lines straightened out, becoming 
simply horizontal, their presentation thinning to a spare ribbon” (Weschler 2008: 
68). The lines that Irwin used in these “Late Line” paintings had none of the 
dramatic expression that was seen in works like Ocean Park. They were thin 
strips of colour that extended across almost the entire width of the canvas, 
usually with one line placed in the upper half of the canvas and the other in the 
lower half.   
Nearly all of the ten “Late Line” paintings Irwin produced during this 
two-year period were kept within a narrow range of colour that consisted 
primarily of oranges and yellows. The colour of both the two lines and the 
monochromatic colour-field these lines resided in would often match or nearly 
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match. Irwin states that he used a bright orange paint straight out of the tube for 
the colour-field and then “applied it very evenly over the canvas, trying to avoid 
any discrepancies in the field while at the same time providing a definite 
texture” (Weschler 2008: 75). Then from the same tube, he applied the two lines 
onto the canvas. Irwin had reduced the enabling constraints of his work to 
almost the lowest degree of incipient action a painting could generate without 
adversely affecting the work’s felt intensity.   
 
Figure 5.3. Robert Irwin, Untitled (“Late Line” Series) (1963-64). 
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Although the initial line paintings and the “Late Line” paintings share 
similar compositional elements in that they are both constituted of straight lines 
on a monochromatic ground, they do not generate the same kind of experience 
for viewers. Irwin notes that despite the “Late Line” painting’s structural 
similarities, “on an experiential level, they are in an entirely different world” 
(Weschler 2008: 79). This is because, unlike his previous Abstract Expressionist 
style of painting, the intensity generated by these “Late Line” paintings no longer 
simply resides in the activity that occurs among the lines themselves. The space 
in-between these marks also plays a key role in producing the forces that viewers 
feel. According to Barnet Newman: “The artist’s function is to use, not to draw, 
what is in between the lines” (1990b: 83).89  
Irwin’s aim was not to have the lines appear as the subject matter of these 
paintings. He felt that the monochromatic colour-field that the lines resided in 
was just as essential as the lines themselves: together they produce the intensive 
compositional forces experienced by viewers. Irwin explains: “The lines were 
intended not really to dominate the grounds as a figure-ground thing” (Weschler 
2008: 78). When looking at the “Late Line” paintings, the lines do not thrust 
themselves to the forefront of the viewers’ attention. Because the colour of the 
lines is almost the same as the monochromatic colour-field, it can be quite 
difficult to even see the lines when first encountering one of these paintings. 
Although viewers may not be able to immediately see the lines, they can feel 
their presence. Rather than appearing as a fully formed figure to be looked at, the 
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lines imperceptibly quiver like prongs of a tuning fork that has been struck, 
producing a resonance that travels throughout the entire colour-field.  With each 
subtle twitch the lines make, new waves of compositional forces proceed to 
ripple throughout the colour-field. Viewers experience these waves of 
compositional forces as reverberations of colour that radiate out from the canvas. 
The quivering lines in the “Late Line” paintings and the reverberating colour-
field they co-create become so caught up with each other that a perceptual field of 
resonating colour emerges.   
This emergent perceptual field is relational, generating a seeing that is co-
composed in the shared experience between viewers and a particular “Late Line” 
painting. According to Manning, a field “forces a recombination of figural 
structures and qualities of ground” (2009a: 100). As viewers encounter Irwin’s 
work, the two lines and the monochromatic colour-field enter into relations in 
which neither is the sole focus of their attention. This is because both of these 
compositional elements are constantly fluctuating between foreground and 
background. They never stabilize or take a definitive position within the 
perceptual field. They are in a state of constant incipiency. The incipient action 
occurring between the two lines and the colour-field also makes it difficult for 
viewers to visually determine whether the paintings are offering an image of a 
colour-field with two lines cut into it, which provides a glimpse into an unknown 
world hidden behind it, or an image of two lines that sit atop a colour-field 
background. Since this fluctuation between figure and ground makes it difficult 
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for viewers to clearly see either one, it produces an intensity that can be felt. “The 
thing is you cease reading and you cease articulating and you fall into a state 
where nothing else is going on but the tactile, experiential process” (Irwin in 
Weschler 2008: 79). This experiential process creates an incipiency of images. The 
constant modulation between figure and ground, foreground and background, in 
the “Late Line” paintings produces an incipient action that generates a 
perceptual field experienced as a felt resonance of colour.   
The incipient action that occurs between figure and ground in Irwin’s 
“Late Line” paintings differs significantly from earlier painting traditions, in 
which the figure would be the focus of the painting and the ground was used as 
a support that further emphasized the figure. This difference can be seen when 
comparing the “Late Line” paintings with those paintings from the Renaissance 
that use linear perspective.90 In Renaissance linear perspective, the figure is given 
priority above the ground. Think of Leonardo da Vinci’s The Last Supper (1495-
98), in which Jesus is the focus of work, or Sandro Botticelli’s The Birth of Venus 
(1486), which pushes the goddess Venus to the forefront of the viewers’ 
attention. By prioritizing the figure, these paintings do not generate the same 
perceptual fields of compositional forces that are encountered in Irwin’s “Late 
Line” paintings. Instead, these works of linear perspective rely on a particular 
representational emphasis that backgrounds these forces, making it difficult for 
them to be felt in the seeing. This representational emphasis is produced in these 
paintings by lines that converge towards a centralizing vanishing point where 
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the figure is placed. In the Last Supper this convergent point is Jesus’ head and in 
The Birth of Venus, it is Venus’ navel.   
 




Figure 5.5. Sandro Botticelli, The Birth of Venus (1486). 
Since most of the lines in linear perspective paintings are directed towards 
the vanishing point, the figure becomes the primary focus of the viewers’ 
attention. It can be difficult for their attention to wander away from the figure in 
order to ponder the surrounding ground. This is because the ground is oriented 
so that the viewers’ gaze will always return to the centralized vanishing point, 
and thus to the emphasized figure of Jesus in da Vinci’s work or Venus in 
Botticelli’s painting. The figure becomes the primary focus of the work, while the 
ground hides itself by ushering the viewers’ attention away from it and back 
towards the figure again. Rather than generating a perceptual field that resonates 
throughout the entire canvas, like Irwin’s “Late Line” paintings, works 
employing linear perspective produce a perceptual field that emanates from and 
surrounds the centralized vanishing point. Because of the figure’s proximity to 
 189 
the vanishing point, a perceptual field appears to be generated by and attracted 
to the figure, which further enhances the figure’s ability to focus the viewers’ 
attention upon it. Much of the incipient action in these works is then directed 
towards distinguishing the figure from the ground. 
Yet, despite the ability of the vanishing point to focus the viewers’ 
attention on the figure, Massumi explains that there are two potential openings 
within linear perspective capable of generating compositional forces that enable 
it to exceed its own centralized organization. These two bifurcations appear both 
within and outside the space organized around the centralized figure. 
[Linear perspective] circles back from the virtual center, around to 
the outside of the frame. The scene is centered on the infinity of its 
spatial order, and is also fringed by it. It is immersed in it. The 
artwork is actually bounded by the frame, but its scene is virtually 
unlimited. It’s the semblance of a world, bounded and unlimited 
(Massumi 2008: 20). 
The first bifurcation concerns the vanishing point itself because it potentially 
continues on infinitely. The space behind both da Vinci’s Jesus and Botticelli’s 
Venus is never-ending, continuing on beyond the limits of what is actually 
visible in these works. This infinite space generates a force that has the potential 
to pull the viewers’ gaze beyond the limits of what they actually see within the 
paintings. The second bifurcation appears at the edges of the painting around 
frame. The space that the paintings depict potentially exceeds any frame that 
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slices it from a larger visual whole. The horizon in The Birth of Venus does not 
stop on the right and left edges of the painting, but potentially exceeds beyond 
these limits, and the room depicted in The Last Supper is designed to appear to 
extend into the space where the viewers are standing encountering the work. 
These two bifurcations are excesses in the seeing that both centripetally spiral 
down the vanishing point and centrifugally extend beyond the frame, generating 
felt compositional forces that potentially undermine the emphasis placed on the 
central figure.91 
 Although there is the potential for these bifurcations to emerge in the 
seeing, Renaissance linear perspective relies upon a set of conditions that is both 
familiar and easily understood when encountered in order to generate a 
perceptual field for the experiencing. The notion that the figure is the primary 
focus of a painting, which is supported by the ground, is a long-standing one. 
Despite the potential for compositional forces to emerge, Renaissance linear 
perspective offers viewers a clichéd seeing experience. The way techniques such 
as linear perspective thrusts the figure to the forefront of the viewers’ attention 
has become such a common method of structuring vision that it can often be 
mistaken to be the only means of making seeing possible. This means that other 
sets of conditions, such as the one proposed in Irwin’s “Late Line” paintings, are 
often dismissed as not being capable of rendering vision at all. As Jonathan Crary 
claims: 
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Over the last century vision has increasingly been denied any 
hierarchy of objects within which the important could be 
distinguished from the trivial, as figure might be isolated from 
ground. Without theses distinctions vision becomes a derelict and 
uninflected mode of reception and inertia, incapable of seeing (Crary 
2009: 14; emphasis added). 
If for Crary seeing is defined only as the ability to distinguish and isolate 
particular entities from their surrounding environment, then what Irwin is doing 
with his “Late Line” paintings falls outside this definition. The felt resonance of 
colour that viewers experience in the encounter with Irwin’s paintings would not 
be considered seeing in this sense because viewers do not perceive any 
distinguishable representations of objects. In the  “Late Line” paintings, there is 
an intensity that is generated during the act of seeing that exceeds the viewers’ 
vision as such. As the two lines and the monochromatic colour field of the “Late 
Line” paintings affect each other, they generate excesses in the seeing that 
viewers experience as the incipient action of compositional forces. If viewers are 
not searching for a figure to focus on and approach these works perceptually, 
then, according to Irwin, “you find that your eye ends up suspended in midair, 
midspace, or midstride: time and space seem to blend in the continuum of your 
presence.” (Weschler 2008: 79). The viewers’ vision exceeds the act of seeing in 
order to co-generate the emergent perceptual field with the particular “Late 
Line” painting that is encountered. Viewers feel the intensity that the perceptual 
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field produces as it emerges from the relations that occur between themselves 
and Irwin’s work in the midst of the seeing. 
 Again, like the “Pick-up Stick” paintings, many viewers were unable to 
feel the intensity that the perceptual field generated by the “Late Line” paintings 
because they could not approach the painting without looking for 
representational or conceptual imagery. For some who could feel the intensive 
resonance, as soon as they discovered that it was the two lines on the 
monochromatic colour-field that produced what they felt, the paintings could no 
longer generate a perceptual field. Like the magician’s illusionary trick that has 
been revealed, once the audience knows how the trick is performed, the felt force 
the illusion generated disappears. When viewers could discern the two lines 
from the colour-field, the modulating figure-ground relationship was lost. 
Instead, viewers would resort to a clichéd form of seeing. What they would see 
was a painting that was about two lines that were the same colour as the ground 
that they were placed upon. Weschler explains that no matter what Irwin had 
intended for “Late Line” paintings, “they still read as lines, the paintings seemed 
to be paintings of two lines, and that prepositional tendency had the effect of 






 Irwin could have taken the next logical step in his process of reducing the 
number of compositional elements in his work by removing the lines completely. 
His paintings would then only be composed of a monochromatic colour-field. 
This would eliminate the possibility of viewers seeing figures on a singularly 
coloured ground because there would not be any visible marks on the canvas. 
Without anything that could be considered a figure occupying the forefront of 
the viewers’ attention, there would potentially be nothing to distract viewers 
from encountering Irwin’s work perceptually as such. This absence of any marks 
or gestures within the monochromatic colour-field may be able to inhibit viewers 
from interpreting representational imagery in the painting, but can a felt 
perceptual field be generated in the seeing? Is there any incipient action in a 
painting that is comprised of a singular colour? 
Although the lines in the “Late Line” paintings can be understood as a 
series of abstract figures on a ground, they also co-produce a felt resonance of 
colour with the monochromatic colour-field. The constant modulation that 
occurs between the two lines and the colour-field generates compositional forces 
that are felt in the seeing. However, it is also possible to generate a felt 
compositional resonance with just the monochromatic colour-field. The lines are 
not necessarily needed. Yves Klein’s Blue Monochrome (1961), which is comprised 
entirely of a singular blue colour, is capable of generating compositional forces 
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that produce a resonant perceptual field. For Deleuze and Guattari: “The 
coloured or, rather, colouring void, is already force” (1994: 181). The blue in 
Klein’s painting is able to generate compositional forces because all colours 
incessantly vibrate, radiating out into the world in search of other colours to 
enter into relations with them. The colour of Blue Monochrome does not suddenly 
begin to quiver ever so slightly because viewers encounter the work or because 
there is some external force or element is acting upon it. Rather, the blue in 
Klein’s painting, like all colours, according to Henri Bergson, “amounts, in itself, 
to a series of extremely rapid vibrations” (2007: 124). Colours simply vibrate: that 
is what they do in and of themselves. 
 
Figure 5.6. Yves Klein, Blue Monochrome (1961). 
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Yet despite this extraordinary ability for colours to incessantly vibrate, 
viewers cannot actually perceive this subtle quivering movement. Even when 
viewers are inches from Klein’s painting, encountering the blue colour that 
populates it, they cannot see the vibrations that the blue generates. The work’s 
incipient action is not visible. This is not because their ability to see is flawed. 
Anyone with excellent eyesight would still not be capable of actually seeing the 
quivers of colour. Rather, it is because the viewers’ perceptual threshold gets in 
the way. According to Steve Goodman: “If we subtract human perception, 
everything moves. Anything static is so only at the level of perceptibility. At the 
molecular or quantum level, everything is in motion, is vibrating” (2010: 83). 
Although the viewers’ perceptual limits prevent them from directly perceiving 
the vibrations of the colour blue occurring within Klein’s painting, the 
imperceptible incipient action is felt in the seeing. This is because in any visual 
encounter, viewers will always feel more than they see.  
Like the unseen colours viewers felt in the seeing when encountering Paul 
Sharits’ film N:O:T:H:I:N:G (1968), as discussed in Chapter 4, there is a seeing 
generated between viewers and Blue Monochrome that exceeds actual perception. 
Because colour is always vibrating, the blue of Klein’s painting will constantly 
surpass the viewers’ perceptual limits to see the colour as such. Colour has an 
elasticity that is not restricted to any particular perceptual threshold. The 
colour’s incipient action extends beyond the colour itself. This enables the colour 
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to potentially affect all that it relationally encounters or conversely encounters it. 
“All entities are potential media that can feel or whose vibrations can be felt by 
other entities” (Goodman 2010: 83). The blue of Klein’s canvas has the ability to 
affect the colours neighbouring it through the vibrations it generates. As the blue 
colour quivers, it extends out beyond the painting itself and affects all the colours 
that surround it. This, in turn, affects how these colours surrounding Blue 
Monochrome emerge into perception. Conversely, the blue of Klein’s painting will 
also be affected perceptually by the fluctuations generated by the surrounding 
colours.  
According to Josef Albers, “we almost never (that is, without special 
devices) see a single colour unconnected and unrelated to other colours” (2006: 
5). This is because colours always seek relations with other colours through the 
incipient action they generate. As both the blue in Blue Monochrome and the 
colours surrounding this work vibrate and extend beyond themselves, they enter 
into relations that mutually affect how each comes to be perceived. Once Klein’s 
blue and the surrounding colours mutually enter into relations with another, it is 
through their contrast that compositional forces are generated.92 For Deleuze and 
Guattari, “the area of plain, uniform colour vibrates, clenches or cracks open 
because it is the bearer of glimpsed forces” (1994: 181). Viewers encounter these 
compositional forces, produced by the contrasting colour relations, as a 
perceptual field of resonating colour. Assuming that viewers encounter Klein’s 
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painting mounted on a white wall, the resonance that is felt in the seeing 
produces a vibrant blue.  
Klein’s Blue Monochrome demonstrates that a painting does not need any 
marks and can composed exclusively of a singular colour in order to produce an 
intensity that is felt in the seeing. It also shows that the incipiency of images not 
only involves the compositional elements within an artwork, but also those 
conditions within the surrounding environment. A perceptual field can emerge 
when viewers encounter a monochromatic colour-field painting, through the 




Although Irwin did ponder the idea of producing purely monochromatic 
paintings, he did not act upon this thought. This is because, at the time, he 
believed that the decision to remove the lines from his work would not properly 
address the problem of generating a felt intensity within the work.  It would be 
decision based on an intellectual problem and not a perceptual one. He states 
that, “in terms of where I seemed to be heading, it would have been – let’s say on 
an intellectual level – it would have been closer to where things were going” 
(Weschler 2008: 78). Because Irwin’s interest lay in the perceptual aspects of 
paintings, investigating intellectual problems was not an avenue that he wanted 
to go down. In fact, he thought that if he began making monochromatic colour-
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field paintings, any intellectual considerations that arose would ultimately 
distract viewers from feeling the intensity generated by the compositional forces. 
Irwin states: “I was interested in terms of how one could read this actuality, this 
physicality, without those kinds of what I had come to consider distractions” 
(Weschler 2008: 79). This rejection of producing purely monochromatic paintings 
did not deter Irwin from devising a new set of conditions that would enable 
viewers to experience the generation of compositional forces, while inhibiting 
any possible representational or conceptual readings. Instead of completely 
removing marks from his paintings, Irwin decided to make the marks so small 
that they became almost imperceptible. 
 In 1964 Irwin abandoned the use of straight lines as an enabling constraint 
in his work because of their inability to generate an intensity that would inhibit 
viewers from seeing representational or conceptual imagery. The lines could not 
disable viewers from seeing clichés.  Instead of using a constraint that the 
viewers could easily see, in a tactical shift, Irwin began to paint a series of works 
that were composed of minuscule green and reddish-magenta dots on a white 
colour-field. Because these paintings were composed of thousands of dots, they 




Figure 5.7. Robert Irwin, Untitled (“Dot” Series) (1964-1966). 
Reminiscent of Georges Seurat’s pointillist technique, Irwin applied the 
dots onto the canvas using only the tip of a fine paintbrush.93 He would alternate 
a dot of green with a dot of reddish-magenta. If viewers were to look at these 
painting up close, they would notice that the dots are mostly concentrated in the 
centre of the painting, where they are separated by a space equivalent to the 
width of one dot. As the viewers’ gaze moves away from the centre of the 
painting towards the edge of the canvas, they will notice that the space between 
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the dots gradually increases. Before the viewers reach the edge of the painting on 
this up-close inspection, the dots stop altogether and all that remains is the white 
colour-field.   
 
Figure 5.8. Robert Irwin, Untitled (“Dot” Series) (1964-1966) (detail). 
Standing further back in order to see the painting in its entirety, viewers 
will not be able to see the green and reddish-magenta dots that are dispersed 
throughout the centre of the painting. The dots become almost imperceptible, yet 
the field they create can be felt in the seeing. This is because, as Irwin explains, 
the two colours the dots are comprised of “essentially cancelled each other out, 
so that you [don’t] see either green or red but rather the energy generated by 
their interaction between the two” (Weschler 2008: 91).94 Green and reddish-
magenta are complementary colours of light. When they are within close 
proximity to each other, as they are in Irwin’s “Dot” paintings, the one colour 
will effectively nullify the ability of the other to be seen. This is because, 
according to physicist Ogden Rood: “Any two colours which by their union 
produce white light are called complementary”  (1879: 161). Rather than seeing 
an array of green and reddish-magenta dots, viewers see only a white light 
emanating from the canvas. This white light emerges from the modulation that 
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occurs between the green and reddish-magenta dots. Like the modulation of 
figure and ground in the “Late Line” paintings, the dots generate a perceptual 
field that viewers experience as a felt resonance of colour-as-light. As viewers 
look at the “Dot” paintings, they see a white monochromatic colour-field that 
vibrates in the centre. They experience a painting in which the intensity emerges 
through contrast. 
In order to enhance the felt resonant intensity generated by the contrasting 
coloured dots, Irwin altered the frame of the “Dot” paintings by making the 
frame perceptibly square. The “Dot” paintings measure two hundred and ten by 
two hundred and fifteen centimeters. Although the paintings are not 
mathematically perfect squares, viewers perceived them as though they are. 
Irwin decided on this perceptibly square, yet mathematically rectangular shape 
because, as Weschler states, “a square would read more neutrally than a 
rectangle, [yet] an actual square still harboured a disturbing tendency not to read 
as one at all but rather as something vaguely rectangular” (2008: 92). Irwin 
wanted viewers to approach the “Dot” paintings perceptually and not be 
distracted by any other concerns. By making the paintings a perceptible square 
(an actual rectangle), Irwin’s hope was that the shape would be innocuous 
enough not to divert the viewers’ attention away from the incipient action 
occurring within the painting.   
 In addition to making the shape of the “Dot” paintings perceptibly 
square, Irwin also altered the way the canvas was stretched in order to enhance 
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the viewers’ ability to experience the intensity generated by the contrasting 
coloured dots. As Weschler explains: “Irwin ballooned the center of the canvas 
forward, only slightly (no more than two inches) in an even swell, not enough to 
be noticed as such but enough that the painting’s edge seemed to fall away” 
(2008: 93). Irwin constructed the frame beneath the canvas so that it caused the 
centre of the painting to subtly protrude away from the wall.95 He was careful 
not to push this curve in the canvas out far enough so that it would create 
shadows. Irwin wanted to make sure that the viewers could not see that the 
paintings were actually not flat, which would create another distraction. What 
the curving of the “Dot” paintings did was amplify the intensity of the 
contrasting dots. According to Irwin, curving the canvas would “maximize the 
energy or the physicality of the situation and minimize the identity or idea or 
imagery of the situation” (Weschler 2008: 94). Because the dots are more 
concentrated in the center of the canvas, subtly thrusting the centre forward by 
two inches further emphasizes the intensity the colour-light field generates, 
while simultaneously inhibiting the viewers’ ability to rely on clichés and see 
representational or conceptual imagery.  
Yet despite Irwin’s best intentions, upon seeing these paintings hung in a 
gallery setting for the first time he felt that, “the shadow around the frame would 
almost be stronger than anything else” (Feinstein 1997). The shadow that 
bordered the edge of these paintings distracted him so much that he felt it 
overpowered the intensity of the compositional forces that these the paintings 
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generated. For Irwin, the frame became more alluring than the painting itself. 
This prompted Irwin to question, for the first time, the need for the frame in 
painting. He believed that the frame acted as “a structure that prestructured 
everything we did” (Irwin in Feinstein 1997; emphasis added). Irwin came to the 
realization that the frame imposes a particular organization that affects how a 
painting is encountered before the first brushstroke is even made.   
The frame became the ultimate cliché that Irwin had to inhibit in his work 
in order for viewers to be able to experience the work’s intensity. He began to 
question what the function of the frame actually was in painting and whether the 
frame was even necessary.  Irwin specifically asked: “What kind of ‘reality’ was 
this that allowed itself such abstraction as to demand that the world end at the 
edge of the canvas? Yet what kind of world would it be if there were no such 




The series of paintings that resulted from Irwin’s questions about the 
frame became known as the “Disc” series. These paintings, which were produced 
between 1966 and 1969, are noteworthy because they do not end at an edge, but 
rather appear to continue on into the gallery environment. Unlike most 
paintings, these works have no frame. This is because when Irwin looks at the 
world around him, he sees that there are no distinct frames that shape what is 
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seen. For him, “the world is continually knitted as an envelope all the way 
around you” (Irwin in Feinstein 1997). To reflect Irwin’s observation on how 
vision functions, the “Disc” paintings created a situation that made it difficult for 
viewers to separate the paintings from the wall they were mounted on. This was 
done through the manipulation of shape, lighting, and colour.  Irwin states that 
he wanted “to get the painting caught up in the space around it” (Feinstein 1997). 
The incipient action of the “Disc” paintings would not only occur within the 
work, but would also involve the world around them. Irwin wanted the 
threshold between the paintings and the surrounding gallery environment to 
disappear so that there was no longer a clear distinction between the two. 
Weschler states: “Irwin was trying to create a painting that would simply dissolve 
into its environment” (2008: 103; original emphasis). 
When walking into a room in which the “Disc” paintings are presented, it 
is easy for viewers to feel unsettled. This is because one of the first things many 
of them notice is that there appears to be nothing in the gallery. There are no 
frames, or even edges, on the walls to clearly indicate that there are paintings 
actually mounted in the room. It is difficult for viewers to see anything because 
there are no visual clues or clichés for them to rely upon. Despite the fact that 
they cannot see anything in the room, they can sense that there is something 
different about the gallery space. There is something uncanny occurring in the 
seemingly empty gallery that is making it feel different. Viewers can feel 
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incipient action resonating throughout the gallery space but cannot pinpoint 
where it is being generated.   
 
Figure 5.9. Robert Irwin, Untitled (“Disc” Series) (1966-1969). Aluminum version. 
After a few minutes of exploring the gallery trying to discover what is 
producing the uncanny feeling in the room, viewers eventually begin to notice 
white disc paintings ambiguously floating just beyond the surface of the gallery 
wall. As viewers spend more time in the gallery, they realize that the floating 
discs are actually Irwin’s paintings, which are mounted parallel to the wall by a 
metal tube that pushes them approximately fifty centimeters away from the wall 
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and into the gallery space. The discs themselves consist of a circular, convex 
shape and are approximately one hundred and fifty centimeters in diameter.96 
Because of their convex shape, the discs curve slightly towards the wall, muting 
the visibility of the edges.  
It is important to note that Irwin produced two versions of the “Disc” 
paintings: one was made of lightweight aluminum, while the other was made of 
translucent acrylic plastic. Both versions produce the unsettling feeling 
experienced by the viewers but in slightly different ways. The aluminum version 
is painted entirely white and generates the feeling that part of the wall is 
somehow either protruding out or receding inward. Sometimes it can feel like 
both at the same time. The plastic version is also painted white except for an one 
horizontal line running through in the centre of it, exposing the translucent 
plastic. Again, viewers experience the feeling that something is protruding and 
receding from the wall. But with the plastic version it is not the wall that viewers 
feel is moving, rather it is the horizontal line that is fluctuating. In both versions, 
viewers experience an intense resonance that is felt throughout the room where 
the paintings are mounted.   
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Figure 5.10. Robert Irwin, Untitled (“Disc” Series) (1966-1969). Plastic version. 
Although unconventional in their design, the “Disc” paintings on their 
own are not capable of generating the intensity that viewers felt in the seeing. 
The compositional elements that constitute the paintings are not the only 
enabling constraints used to produce the experienced incipient action. In order 
for the “Disc” paintings to dissolve into the surrounding gallery environment, 
Irwin integrated the lights and the gallery walls the paintings were mounted on 
into the design of the work. He devised a set of conditions that extended beyond 
the work itself, involving elements that were never intended to be used to 
actually activate the compositional forces in the encounter with a painting.97 
Weschler states, for the “Disc” paintings, the “light and backdrop themselves 
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were about to become active, positive elements in the game of presence” (2008: 
102). Viewers would experience a seamless transition between the “Disc” 
paintings, the gallery walls, and the illuminating lights, unable to clearly 
distinguish where one of these three components began or ended. In order to 
prevent the visual separation of the “Disc” paintings and the gallery space, Irwin 
would paint the walls a similar shade of white found in the paintings. He then 
devised a strategy for the lighting, effectively eliminating any shadows that 
would enable viewers to distinguish the paintings from the walls they were 
mounted on. According to Weschler, “light and paint had now become equal 
elements in Irwin’s new palette” (2008: 103).  
By integrating the gallery space and the lighting into the set of conditions 
that activated the “Disc” paintings, Irwin felt these works “achieved a balance 
between space occupied and unoccupied in which both became intensely 
occupied at the level of perceptual energy” (Weschler 2008: 108). As viewers 
encounter Irwin’s work, the paintings, the lighting and the walls all take part in 
generating the incipient action viewers experience in the seeing. Viewers begin to 
feel a resonance that flows equally though the “Disc” paintings and the 
environment they are situated in, turning the gallery itself into a vibrant colour-
field for the seeing. The “Disc” paintings transform the entire gallery space into a 
set of conditions that generate emergent compositional forces for the incipiency 




Despite the fact that Irwin’s “Disc” paintings are able to co-generate with 
viewers an experience of incipient action without the use of a frame, any 
examination of these works must consider the role that the frame plays in the 
practice of painting. According to Jacques Derrida, no theory, art practice or 
theoretical practice concerning painting “can intervene effectively in this field if 
it does not weigh up and bear on the frame” (1987: 61).  As a device that 
supplements the paintings’ ability to lure the viewers’ attention, Derrida 
suggests that the frame functions like a parergon. In painting, a parergon 
traditionally is something subordinate or accessory to the main subject of a work. 
It is an ornamental addition that embellishes what is already established within a 
painting.98 Derrida, however, does not understand a parergon to be something 
that merely supplements a painting from within. Derived from his reading of 
Immanuel Kant’s Religion within Limits of Reason Alone (1793), Derrida states that 
a parergon is “neither work (ergon) nor outside the work [hors d’oeuvre], neither 
inside nor outside, neither above or below, it disconcerts any opposition but does 
not remain indeterminate and it gives rise to the work” (1987: 9; original 
emphasis).99 For Derrida, a parergon is what lies amidst more established 
oppositions and does not hold any hierarchical status. It is neither more nor less 
important than the work or the surroundings outside the work. As well, a 
parergon is neither above nor below the status of the work or its surroundings 
and holds no dominating power over either. Instead, a parergon disrupts any 
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direct contact these two dichotomous entities may have by slipping between 
them. It activates a space during the encounter with the work that is not a part of 
either side.  
Although this in-between space a parergon produces is distinct from both 
sides of the dichotomy, it is also connected to both of them. On the one hand, 
from the perspective of the work, the space of a parergon is outside it and thus is 
a part of the surrounding environment. On the other hand, from the perspective 
of the surrounding environment, the space activated by a parergon is not a part 
of the surroundings because it is distinct from the environment itself. A parergon 
therefore must be a part of the work. Despite the claims of both perspectives, a 
parergon’s space is neither a part of the work nor the surroundings of the work. 
It functions as a supplement to the work in order to create a greater 
differentiation between the work and its surrounding environment. By 
separating the work from its surroundings, the space a parergon opens 
emphasizes their difference. This emphasis is what gives rise to the work. A 
parergon accentuates the difference between the work and its surroundings so 
that the work is foregrounded when it is encountered.  
 In The Truth in Painting, Derrida gives the example of the frame in 
painting in order to further explain his conception of a parergon. For Derrida, the 
frame of a painting stands out both from the painting and from the wall in the art 
gallery (1987: 61). Like a parergon, the frame is distinct from both the work, 
which in this case is the painting, and its surrounding environment, which is the 
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gallery wall. Derrida specifically points out that the frame “does not stand out in 
the same way as the work” (1987: 61). The frame is distinct but not in the same 
manner as the painting. This is because when viewers encounter a particular 
painting, their attention is not focused on the frame in the same way that it is on 
the painting. The frame acts as a device that lures the viewers’ attention towards 
the painting and away from itself. Like a parergon’s relationship to the work, the 
frame assists in emphasizing the painting as it is encountered by highlighting the 
difference between the painting, as such, and the surrounding gallery 
environment is situated it in. The frame does this by disrupting the dichotomy 
between the painting and the gallery wall. The frame generates a space that 
separates this opposition, but while doing so, it also simultaneously and 
paradoxically connects itself to both opposing sides. In short, the frame 
emphasizes the painting by separating it from the surrounding gallery 
environment, while at the same time, connects itself to both sides of the painting-
gallery opposition. 
In order to understand how the frame functions like Derrida’s parergon, 
both sides of the paradoxical relationship it has with the painting and the gallery 
environment need to be taken into consideration. From the perspective of the 
painting, the space the frame opens between it and the gallery wall cannot be 
considered part of the artwork as such, yet the frame is connected to the painting 
as it accentuates the painting’s ability to lure the viewers’ attention, 
foregrounding the artwork above its surroundings.  
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When these relationships the frame has with both the painting and the 
gallery wall are brought together, then the frame as a parergon is, according to 
Derrida, “a hybrid of outside and inside, but the hybrid which is not a mixture or 
a half-measure, an outside which is called to the inside of the inside in order to 
constitute it as an inside” (1987: 63). The frame is outside the painting but is 
surrounded by the gallery wall.  It is both outside the work and inside the milieu. 
However, because of the differential space the frame opens between the painting 
and the gallery wall, it shifts the viewers’ attention from the milieu of the wall 
and defers it towards the painting. This deferral of attention from the wall 
through the frame to the painting thus activates the painting for the viewers. 
When the painting is activated by the viewers’ attention, the frame then 
disappears. Derrida writes: 
There is always a form on a ground, but the parergon is a form which 
has as its traditional determination not that it stands out but that it 
disappears, buries itself, effaces itself, melts away at the moment it 
deploys its greatest energy. The frame is in no case a background in 
the way the milieu or the work can be, but neither is its thickness as 
margin a figure (1987: 61). 
In the instance the frame lures the viewers’ attention from the gallery wall to the 
painting, the frame, according to Derrida, begins to generate its power to both 




After examining Derrida’s understanding of the frame as a parergon in 
painting, at first glance, it seems odd that Irwin would take such a radical step as 
eliminating the frame from the paintings in the “Disc” series. This is because, as 
Derrida notes above, the frame is usually not perceived in relation to the painting 
it surrounds. Unlike Irwin’s experience with his “Dot” paintings, the frame is not 
supposed to be noticed when viewers encounter a painting. The frame, as a 
parergon, should separate the painting from the surrounding gallery 
environment, calling attention to the painting while simultaneously not calling 
any attention to itself. It supplements the painting’s ability to lure the attention of 
viewers without becoming a distraction onto itself. The frame serves as a 
focusing device that assists in activating the relations experienced between 
viewers and the painting, and does so through difference and deferral. Is it then 
possible to say that Irwin’s concerns with the frame are actually in line with 
Derrida’s thoughts of the frame as parergon?  
Both Derrida and Irwin tend to agree that the frame is a device that shapes 
the viewers’ attention and assists in differentiating the work from the 
surrounding environment. Irwin states that a painting’s frame produces 
“perceptual boundaries between what is seen and what isn’t” (1985: 15). Recall 
the shadow that surrounded Irwin’s “Dot” painting, the shadow that he worked 
to remove in the “Disc” paintings so that the viewer would not predetermine, or 
“preframe,” the experience of seeing the work’s dynamic movement. As Irwin 
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writes, “I had not worked that out philosophically, I had not even begun to dig 
into the root question of how an orthodoxy like that becomes so deeply rooted 
that it becomes hidden” (Weschler 2008: 101). He had to determine what the 
frame’s function was in order to remove it. 
If we follow Derrida’s assertions as concerns the parergon, the foregone 
conclusion would be that it is ultimately impossible to create a work that is 
“unframed.” Remember that for Derrida there is always a form on a ground, 
even if that form takes on a parergonal configuration that disappears the 
moment it is encountered. Even as he deconstructs the dichotomy between form 
and ground, painting and gallery environment, through the parergon, he asserts: 
“Deconstruction must neither reframe nor dream of the pure and simple absence 
of the frame” (Derrida 1987: 73). Yet, as Irwin turns away from canvas, it seems 
that the frame is effectively removed. How is this possible? 
As an example of the first works that physically exceed the space of the 
canvas, the “Disc” paintings come to Irwin through the process of trying to 
conceive of an art experience that was not framed in advance. Recall that as 
viewers enter a gallery displaying these paintings, they do not actually see these 
works hanging on the walls. When encountering the plastic version of these 
paintings, viewers perceive a transparent horizontal line floating in front of the 
gallery wall. Both ends of the line also appear to dissolve into the same gallery 
wall. This makes it difficult for viewers to know exactly where the line is actually 
situated in relation to the wall and to themselves. In the case of the all-white 
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aluminum version, viewers at first do not see “anything.” They believe that the 
white walls do not have anything hanging on them and that the gallery itself is 
empty. Yet at the same time, the space does not feel empty. Viewers then become 
overwhelmed by an unsettling feeling because they are able to experience an 
incipient action resonating throughout the space but cannot perceive what is 
enabling this dynamic occurrence. Both versions of the “Disc” series generate an 
unframed experience where viewers cannot distinguish the work from gallery 
environment. Because the “Disc” paintings do not rely upon a frame to 
supplement the work’s ability to lure the viewers’ attention, they enable a seeing 
that goes beyond the clichés experience likes to rest on. This does many things, 
amongst them destabilizing viewers, who feel the need to walk up to the “Disc” 
paintings to be able to differentiate them from the surrounding environment. 
What Irwin has done with this series of paintings is uncover a way to paint the 
gallery space in its totality by breaking away from clichéd ways of seeing that 
rely on the frame for activation. By painting the wall the same colour of white 
and tweaking the lighting to hide differentiations between the work and the 
walls, Irwin invents a new set of conditions that effectively eliminates the need 
for the frame in painting. These “Disc” paintings alter how art is experienced, 
generating a seeing that can only take place in the midst of the encounter. 
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Figure 5.11. Robert Irwin, Untitled (“Disc” Series) (1966-1969). Plastic version. Side 
view. 
Perhaps the key difference between Derrida’s and Irwin’s perspectives on 
the frame is that they draw on two sides of experience. For Derrida, the frame 
constitutes the parameters of seeing at the level of the macroeconomies of 
experience. He is concerned with only those forms that are fully actualized and 
perceptible. For Irwin, what is at stake is microperception. Like Derrida, Irwin 
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would certainly agree that the problem with the frame is that it structures not 
only the viewers’ attention, but also an entire system of values surrounding 
vision. The frame transforms vision into a clichéd form of seeing.  “Our 
perception in the world, once it has become thus structured, simply omits or 
habituates out (ignores) that which is deemed to have no value” (Irwin 1985: 15). 
But where they differ is that Irwin does believe that there can be an act of 
creation – or an act of perception – that can exist unframed. We are talking here 
of a microperception, a level of analysis which is not present in Derrida’s 
analysis. At the level of the institution, of the exhibition, of the art world, Derrida 
is perfectly right as regards the parergon. There is no experience, which is not 
framed. And yet at another level, at the level of microperception and experience, 
what Irwin’s “Disc” paintings do is give viewers an encounter with the 
dynamically unframed; that is, an experience of incipiency itself. 
When Irwin devised a set of conditions that enabled him to remove the 
frame in his “Disc” paintings, the dichotomies between the painting and the 
gallery environment that Derrida claims the frame mitigates, begin to vanish. 
Weschler states:  
But if the discs had effectively eliminated the frame from the art 
object, they still required an attitude of focus; they still demanded a 
heightened level of attention aimed at one area of the room. Irwin, 
meanwhile, had become fascinated by everything else that was 
already going on in the room anyway, and he was coming to see 
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that the very attitude of focus needed to be brought into question 
(2008: 113).  
Without a frame to assist in differentiating Irwin’s paintings from everything 
else, all the elements in the gallery – the paintings, the lighting, and the gallery 
space itself – now had to be understood as being co-constitutive. Irwin explains: 
“When I married the painting to the environment, suddenly it had to deal with 
the environment around it as being equal to the figure and having as much 
meaning” (Weschler 2008: 112). By removing the frame through the complex use 
of light, shadow, and the gallery space itself, Irwin’s “Disc” paintings place the 
artwork on an equal footing with the dynamics of the environment, generating a 




The collapse of the “Disc” paintings into their surroundings is exactly 
what Irwin intended, having worked towards this moment through his posture 
of inquiry, which began with the problem of creating a work that foregrounded 
the feeling of incipient action. Irwin succeeds with these “Disc” paintings – and 
in fact almost all of his subsequent work – in creating artworks that activate the 
relations in the shared encounter with viewers. The work’s incipiency of a 
specific viewer-artwork encounter does not survive outside of the experience 
that is co-generated between viewers and the paintings. The incipient action that 
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activates the perceptual field in the encounter with Irwin’s paintings brings the 
world to the work in a different way. Paradoxically, Irwin’s “Disc” paintings 
show that the perceived image was never on the surface of the canvas within the 
confines of a frame. It occurs in the relation. It takes place within the 
environment that the viewer-artwork encounter inhabits. 
By rigorously following his posture of inquiry in questioning the clichés 
surrounding representational imagery, the mark, and the frame, Irwin not only 
challenged many of the assumptions concerning painting, but he also questioned 
assumptions concerning the act of seeing itself. His three series of paintings, and 
much of his subsequent work, make viewers aware that every encounter is filled 
with the incipient action of compositional forces. For Irwin, “everything acts 
within a set of conditions” (Irwin and Davies 2008: 54). The experiences viewers 
encounter with the world involve a set of conditions that always have the 
potential to be actively felt in the seeing. Once viewers experience the feelings 
that incipiency activates, they can then feel this intensity at any time. Irwin 
explains: “It’s something that once you gain it, you carry it with you all the time 
and you live in an enriched world. The beauty of all this is that it is totally free. 
It’s something you have every moment of your life as you walk through the 
world” (Irwin in Feinstein 1997). Viewers can feel incipient action as it is 
generated in the perceptual field encountered and created in the continuously 
emerging relations with the world. In other words, viewers experience what 
Manning and Massumi would call a worlding of incipient action.100 To see is to 
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encounter an ever-present feeling of intensity. This intensity cannot be framed or 
represented because it is constantly in the process of exceeding itself, making its 
own incipiency felt.  
Art is one conduit to this dynamic experience, but it is not the only one. 
Sunsets, as Michael Taussig has written, are one example of a threshold 
experience that exceeds the frame.101 The desert, for Irwin, is another, 
particularly at dawn and dusk. He believes that the dynamism of the desert has a 
particular magical quality to it. “It just suddenly stands up and hums, it becomes 
so beautiful, incredibly, the presence is so strong” (Irwin in Weschler 2008: 164; 
original emphasis). The images that emerge from these experiences are images, 
one could argue, of the felt. Images composed only of incipient action. Images of 
incipiency itself. 
Generating images of incipiency is, according to Weschler, what Irwin set 
out to do: Irwin “began to wonder how it might be possible to make an art of the 
incidental, the peripheral, the transitory – an art of things not looked at (indeed, 
invisible when looked at directly) yet somehow perceived” (Weschler 2008: 114). 
What Irwin was attempting to capture in his artwork was an encounter with the 
ephemeral in the moment of its genesis, making it not only felt in the seeing but 
also actually visible. Like all of the artists discussed throughout the previous 
chapters, Irwin sought to catch an “aspect of our experience that is both there 
and not there, the object and not the object of our sensations, perceived but 
seldom attended to” (Weschler 2008: 115). Ultimately, as Irwin makes clear, the 
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encounter with art is not about seeing something that is recognizable, but about 
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Simon created versions of the work that are to be mounted on a wall, which 
comprise of modified computers and monitors.  He even made versions for 
projection and Palm Pilot, an early Personal Digital Assistant device (PDA) 
popular in the late 1990s (Ploug 2003).  Recently, a version of Every Icon has been 
made available as an application for Apple’s iPhone and iPod Touch. 
9 In fact, these three statements are included in every edition and version of Every 
Icon. For a detailed account of the various versions see Note 8.  As well, when the 
work is presented as a still image for publication these three statements are 
shown alongside an image of the grid. See Eckmann and Keopnick (2006: 10), 
Green (2004: 91), and Rush (1999/2005: 213). 
10 At the time this chapter was written in March 2011, there were three black 
squares in the second row from the top.  The squares in the first two columns 
from the left and the fifth square from the left were black. 
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11 The reason Simon chose a thirty-two by thirty-two square grid was because, as 
he explains, “that was the original Macintosh definition for an icon, when the 
first Mac system came out.  With the old Macs, you went to the icon editor 
‘ResEdit’, where you could design your own icon by clicking on the different 
fields of the grid”  (Baumgärtel, 1999). 
12 For further discussion on linear perspective see Alberti 1972; on the videos of 
Woody Vasulka see Dunn, Vasulka and Vasulka 1992, Hatanka, Koizuiai and 
Ekiguchi 1998, Sturken 1996b, and Vasulka and Weibel 2008; and finally, on 
Seurat’s pointillist painting technique see Broude 1978, Fénéon 1966 and Homer 
1985. Also, see Chapter 4 for an analysis on liner perspective in connection to 
Vasulka’s videos and for additional discussion on the pointillist painting 
technique see the section in Chapter 5 on Robert Irwin’s “Dot” series of 
paintings. 
13 According to physicist Ogden Rood: “Any two colours which by their union 
produce white light are called complementary” (1879: 161). Because magenta and 
green are complementary optical colours, when they combine, viewers will see 
neither magenta nor green. Instead, they will see the colour white. A more 
detailed analysis of this phenomenon is explored in Chapter 5. 
14 For further analysis on pixels see Chapter 4. 
15 Stacy Reed notes: “Some popular raster file types you are sure to come across 
are JPG, GIF, BMP, TIFF and PNG” (Reed 2006). 
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16 For further discussion on the use of primary colour within the raster technique 
see Chapter 4. 
17 It must be remembered that internet art was still fairly new when Every Icon 
was uploaded to the World Wide Web in 1997. “By 1997, net art had become an 
established pocket of relatively autonomous art-making, though it had not 
succeeded in reaching a wider public. Beyond the spheres of internet 
communities, media festivals and artists’ immediate social and professional 
circles, there was little interest in and even less money for net artists’ work” 
(Green 2004: 73). 
18 The term “enabling constraints” has been in use for more than a decade prior 
to Manning’s adoption of it. Despite this, she has been one of the few researchers 
– along with Brian Massumi – to fully develop the conception of this term. For 
early uses of the term “enabling constraints” see Massumi 1998 and Hansen 2002. 
For further investigations into the conceptualization of this term see Manning 
2009b and Massumi 2009. For further analysis on enabling constraints see 
Chapter 5. 
19 These planes cannot be directly perceived. According to Deleuze and Guattari: 
The plane can be a hidden principle, which makes visible what is 
seen and audible what is heard, etc., which at every instant causes 
the given to be given, in this or that state, at this or that moment. 
But the plane itself is not to be given. It is by nature hidden. It can 
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only be inferred, induced, concluded from that to which it gives 
rise (1987: 265). 
20 For reference, one billion is ten to the ninth power (109 = 1,000,000,000). 
21 This rate of change in Every Icon, as presented on Simon’s website, can be 
verified by finding the square in which the one hundredth change takes place 
and timing that specific square’s rate of change. If that particular square cycles 
between white and black only once per second, then the entire work displays one 
hundred images every second. The square in which the one hundredth change 
takes place can be ascertained by converting the number one hundred to its 
binary base equivalent. Because Every Icon is essentially a counting machine that 
works in binary numbers, once the number of digits necessary to express the 
number one hundred in binary is discovered, then the number of squares that are 
needed for the first one hundred changes can be easily ascertained. The number 
one hundred expressed in binary is 1100110. This binary number uses seven 
digits. Therefore, the one-hundredth change in Every Icon takes place in the 
seventh square from the left of the top row. When observing this seventh square 
from the left, it does indeed cycle between white and black once every second, 
thus proving that Every Icon, as presented on Simon’s website, shows one 
hundred images per second.  
22 The United States Geological Survey estimates that the age of the Earth is 4.54 
billion years old. See “Age” 2007. 
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23 For a more detailed analysis on Cartesian space in relation to static form in art 
see Chapter 4, as well as Lynn 1999 and Manning (2009b: 163-168). 
24 In the exhibition catalogue for the art exhibition entitled [Grid< >Matrix], 
which they also curated, Eckmann and Koepnick specifically discuss Mondrian’s 
painting Composition of Red and White (1938-42).  
25 Several other authors have drawn a connection between the digital and the 
concept of the matrix. Tim Lenoir, like Eckmann, understands the digital image 
to be “a matrix of numbers, a table of integers a grid of cells capable of being 
stored in computer memory, transmitted electronically and interpreted into an 
image by a display device (such as a video screen) or printer” (2004: xiii). 
However, one of the most notable and earliest conceptual examples of the digital 
matrix can be found in William Gibson’s science-fiction novel Neuromancer 
(1984). In the novel the matrix is the equivalent of an immersive version of the 
internet in which users, such as the protagonist Case, experience “bright lattices 
of logic unfolding across [a] colourless void” (1984: 4-5). Media critic Lev 
Manovich in his book The Language of New Media applies Gibson’s conception of 
the digital matrix as a void in order to differentiate digital, or computer, space 
from human space. He states: 
In contrast to human space, in which the verticality of the body and 
the direction of the horizon are two dominant directions, computer 
space does not privilege any particular axis. In this way it is similar 
to the space of El Lissitsky’s Prouns and Kazimer Melevich’s 
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suprematists compositions – an abstract cosmos, unencumbered by 
the earth’s gravity or the weight of a human body […] William 
Gibson’s term “matrix,” which he used in his novels to refer to 
cyberspace, captures this isotropic quality (Manovich 2001: 262).  
Manovich understands digital space of the matrix as having no particular 
grounding; unlike human space, which emerges from the horizontality of the 
actual ground and verticality of the body. 
26 For more on John F. Simon Jr.’s Every Icon see Chapter 1. 
27 In their introduction to the catalogue for the art exhibition [Grid< >Matrix], 
Eckmann and Koepnick clearly state that the distinction between grids and 
matrices “form a central dialectic of modernism and postmodernism” (2006: 8). 
Although it would be interesting to challenge this claim, it steps outside the 
scope the present discussion. 
28 Beyond Mondrian, Keoepnick also claims that the grids depicted in paintings 
of Theo van Doesburg have the ability to exceed their structure (2006: 55). As 
well, Rosalind Krauss mentions several other artists who use grids in their work 
that similarly exceed their compositional structures, such as Josef Albers, 
Ellsworth Kelly, and Sol LeWitt (1985: 22). 
29 In his address at the Fourth Annual Conference of the Whitehead Research 
Project titled “Consequences of Panpsychism," Shaviro suggests that rocks and 
other non-organic entities not only feel but that they also have minds and the 
ability to think.  This concept that all entities are able to think is called 
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panpsychism. Shaviro summarizes this concept stating: 
We cannot restrict mentality just to human beings; nor can we 
restrict it to mammals, or to organisms that have nervous systems, or 
even to the entire animal kingdom. Rather, we must say that plants, 
fungi, and unicellular organisms think; and what is more, that 
nonliving entities, like stars and lumps of granite, think as well 
(Shaviro 2010a: 1). 
So not only does Mondrian’s painting have experiences, it also has the ability to 
think on a very rudimentary level. 
30 The notion of the relational complex is to the notion of the “diagram” in the 
writings of Deleuze and Guattari and “significant form” in the writings of 
Susanne K. Langer. See Deleuze and Guattari 1987, Deleuze 2003, and Langer 
1953 and 1957. Also see Chapter 5. 
31 When Mondrian moved to New York in 1940, he began to experiment with the 
compositional elements in his paintings. This can be seen in his New York series 
of painting, produced between 1941 and 1942, in which the perpendicular lines 
were no longer coloured black. Instead, he used a variety of red, yellow, and blue 
lines. This use of coloured lines foreshadows the fragmented coloured lines seen 
in Broadway Boogie Woogie and the painting left on his easel upon his death, the 
uncompleted Victory Boogie Woogie (1942-1944). 
32 For a more detailed analysis on incipient action see Manning 2009b and 
Massumi 2002, as well see Chapter 5. 
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33 In replacing the term biosphere with bioscleave, Gins and Arakawa wanted to 
emphasize the dynamism and tentativeness they believed was missing in most 
standard descriptions of the natural environment. In the following they define 
what they mean by this new term. They state: 
All species belonging to bioscleave exist only tentatively (which 
remains true whatever turns out to be the truth about natural 
selection, whether it happens randomly or with directionality), 
with some species, all things being unequal, existing on a far more 
tentative basis than others. Additionally, bioscleave stays 
breathable and in the picture only so long as elements take hold of 
each other in particular ways, only so long as there can be a 
cleaving of a this to a that and a cleaving of a this off of a that. So 
that there might be new and different link-ups, fresh points of 
departure, ever renewed tentative constructing towards a holding 
in place, a firm and definite taking hold, which gives one sense of 
the term to cleave, must also readily entail cutting apart, cut-off, 
relinquishment, the other sense of the term (Gins and Arakawa 
2002: 48). 
34 The phase originally stated: “She holds the architecture that holds her” (Gins 
and Arakawa 2002: 82). 
35 See Bergson (1998: 279). 
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36 Although N:O:T:H:I:N:G is composed almost entirely of colours, Sharits does 
include images of two objects, a light bulb and a chair. In the following, he 
describes what occurs when these two objects appear: 
The major image is that of a light bulb, which first retracts its light 
rays; upon retracting its light, the bulb becomes black and, 
impossibly, lights up the space around it. The bulb emits one burst 
of black light and melting; at the end of the film the bulb is a black 
puddle at the bottom of the screen.  The other image… is that of a 
chair, seen against a graph-like background, falling backwards onto 
the floor (actually, it falls against and affirms the edge the frame); 
this image sequence occurs in the center, ‘thing le’ section of 
N:O:T:H:I:N:G (Sharits 2008: 269). 
According to Sharits, these two images serve as markers of the film’s passing. As 
he noted above, the middle of the film is signified by the image of the falling 
chair. The light bulb, on the other hand, is repeated throughout the film at 
regular intervals. Each appearance of the bulb is slightly different as indicated in 
Sharits’ description above. Sharits states that the reason for placing these images 
in N:O:T:H:I:N:G is because: 
You get to the point [when watching the film] where you almost 
forget the whole development which is going on and then there is 
an image which reminds you again of the chain of logic (or illogic) 
which is very gradually being enunciated at the level of 
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referentiality. They are markers – real metric markers – markers of 
time. But they are markers which you are experientially unable to 
relate rhythmically (Sharits and Cathcart 1976: unaginated). 
Several authors have also noted that the light bulb and chair imagery in 
N:O:T:H:I:N:G may be references to the light bulb of the film projector and the 
seats in the film theatre. See Sitney (2002: 360-362), Chodorov and Deville (2003: 
18), and Krauss 1976. 
37 Black and white are included in this list of colours because it is possible to treat 
them as colours, rather than the absence of colour, in the case of black, or the 
presence of all colours, in the case of white. Those who Deleuze calls “colourists” 
have no difficulty with this classification and take the position that black and 
white are indeed actual colours because they “tend to substitute relations of 
tonality for relations of value” (2003: 112). Colourists treat black and white as 
hues (relations of value), like the colours red or green, as opposed to the 
extremes of the tonal range of colour. “Colourists can indeed make use of black 
and white, light and dark; but this is because they treat light and dark, black and 
white, as colours, and establish tonal relations between them” (Deleuze 2003: 
112).  
38 Sharits has commented on the pulsating effect in his work stating that “in the 
final section of T,O,U,C,H,I,N,G (1968) I wanted to visualize ‘inverse pain’ as a 
kind of imploding reverberation of the picture edge – the screen appears to 
collapse, in rhythmic pulses, into itself” (1978: 257-8). Wees has also noted that 
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the flicker in Sharits’ films can produce both enlightening and unpleasant effects 
for viewers.  For some viewers the flicker can produce a "meditational-visionary 
experience" (Wees 1992: 152). For others, the same flicker can induce “headaches, 
nausea, and even for a small number of people, epileptic seizures” (Wees 1992: 
147). Sharits was aware that his films could produce both of these effects.  He 
described the structure of several of his films as “mandalas”, such as Piece 
Mandala/End War (1966), N:O:T:H:I:N:G, and T,O,U,C,H,I,N,G. By referring to the 
mandala, Sharits was drawing a connection to Buddhist meditation practice. 
However, he states that he is “not interested in the mystical symbolism of 
Buddhism, only in the strong, intuitively developed imaginistic power” (2008: 
269). In response to the more violent effects of the flicker, Sharits produced a 
two-projector film installation entitled Epileptic Seizure Comparison (1976), in 
which viewers see a flicker that alternates between images of colour or 
depictions of people in the midst of having epileptic seizures.   
39 This pinkish-orange colour was actually seen by the author. However, because 
of the tenuous nature of Sharits’ film, other viewers may not see this exact colour 
at the particular moment that the author saw it. 
40 Erin Manning, in her paper “Colouring the Virtual,” develops a similar notion 
concerning the imperceptible aspects of seeing, which she calls “the not-seen of 
actual experience” (2008a: 331; original emphasis). Although Manning defines 
the not-seen as that which is visually imperceptible and yet still experienced, the 
use of the prefix “not-” can convey the idea that what is imperceptible in the 
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moment of seeing is not present during seeing experience. However, I believe the 
term “unseen” does communicate the notion that there is something 
imperceptibly present during the seeing experience. As well, Paul Virilio 
develops a conception of the term “unseen” that is similar to the one developed 
in this chapter. See Virilio 2009. 
41 The range of audible frequencies that humans can hear is “traditionally said to 
span the range of about 20 Hz [hertz] to 20 kHz [kilohertz] are perceptible to the 
ear” (Roads 2001: 7).  This range may vary between individuals. However, any 
sound below 20 Hz and above 20 kHz for humans will be experienced as an 
unsound. 
42 For more detail concerning the term “relational complex” see Chapter 2. 
43 Deleuze is elaborating on an example that Leibniz gave in his Discourse on 
Metaphysics. See Leibniz 2005, particularly p. 40-41. 
44 Although humans cannot see any colours beyond the limits of infrared and 
ultraviolet, Thompson discusses how some creatures, notably pigeons, are able 
to see outside the range of human vision. See Thompson (1995: 168-177). 
45 Throughout The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque Deleuze calls microperceptions by 
several other terms: tiny perceptions, molecular perceptions, minute perceptions, 
inconspicuous perceptions, and more (1993: 86-99). He also described 
microperceptions as subjective perceptions in Cinema 1: The Movement-image 
(1986: 63-64) and as little perceptions in Difference and Repetition (1994: 213). For 
Deleuze, the notion of microperceptions has its origin in the writings of Leibniz; 
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however, Leibniz never used this term. In The Mondaology, Deleuze’s 
microperceptions are what Leibniz calls “representatives.” See Deleuze (1993: 
154n4) and Leibniz, The Mondaology §63 (2005: 58). 
46 Use of the term microperceptions is not exclusive to Deleuze. Although he 
defines microperceptions as those relational entities that compose perception, 
this is not the only way this term has been used. Don Ihde has a different 
understanding of the term.  He defines microperceptions as “what is usually 
taken as sensory perception (what is immediate and focused bodily n actual 
seeing, hearing, etc)” (Ihde 1990: 29).  For Ihde, microperceptions are not 
elements that compose what is perceived, but rather they are that which is 
actually perceived. Ihde’s microperceptions are what are visible and audible. 
Although it would be interesting to compare the use of the term 
microperceptions by Deleuze and Ihde it is outside the scope of the current 
discussion. For further analysis on Ihde’s microperceptions see Verbeek 2005. 
47 For further discussion on the mixing of colour, particularly the difference 
between mixing coloured pigments and mixing coloured light, see Rood (1879: 
124-160). 
48 For further analysis on the process of addition and subtraction regarding 
perception see Manning 2008b.  
49 According to Massumi, some proponents of “pure” science would prefer to 
discard microperceptions and discount them as irrelevant and “even lacking in 
reality” (2002: 234). This is because the “excess” or “surplus” of microperceptions 
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that do not emerge into perception and remain unfolded tend to obscure 
scientific results by creating “surprising” results that cannot be explained 
quantitatively. These “surplus” results tend to add qualitative data that cannot 
be confirmed or denied by a quantitative methodology.  So instead of enquiring 
further into this excess, “pure” science dismisses the results as anomalies. See 
Massumi (2002: 208-256). 
50 This process of luring the viewers’ attention, or what Whitehead calls the “lure 
for feeling” or a “proposition” is further developed in Chapter 1. Also see 
Whitehead 1978, Manning 2008b and 2009b, and Shaviro 2010b. 
51 See in particular Libet 1985. For an application of Libet’s work in connection to 
the philosophy of perception and affect see Massumi 2002 and 2010. 
52 This cinematic paradigm is actually older than film itself. In Creative Evolution, 
Henri Bergson gives a detailed analysis of the history of this paradigm, or what 
he calls the “cinematographical model.”  He shows that this paradigm takes its 
foundation from the philosophical thought of Zeno of Elea and he then traces the 
philosophical history of this model up until the end of the nineteenth century. 
See Bergson 1998. For further analysis and critique of this paradigm see 
Bragaglia 1970, Crary 1990, and Deleuze 1986 and 1989. Also see Chapter 4. 
53 Up until the late 1970s, the moving images the viewers see were explained to 
be the result of a cognitive phenomenon known as the “persistence of vision.” 
“This is held that the human brain continues to ‘see’ a projected image 
momentarily even after it has ceased to be projected, thereby enabling a seamless 
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transition from one [projected] image to the next to be perceived” (Enticknap 
2004: 6). With the invention of electronically produced images, such as television 
and both analog and digital video, as well as recent research on the perception of 
motion, this concept is shown to provide an insufficient explanation. On the 
conceptual origins of the persistence of vision see Crary (1990: 108-112). On the 
debunking of “persistence of vision” see Enticknap (2004: 6), Bill Nichols and 
Susan J. Lederman 1980, and Joseph and Barbara Anderson 1980 and 1993. 
54 The interaction that occurs between the viewers’ visual system and the film 
itself is what Lev Manovich calls “psychological interaction.” He states that this 
type of interaction is “the psychological processes of filling-in, hypothesis 
formation, recall, and identification, which are required for us to comprehend 
any text or image” (Manovich 2001: 57).   
55 On the specific psychological and physiological functions of vision see 
Thompson 1995. 
56 “Lesions in area V4 [of the brain] 1ead to achromatopsia, in which patients see 
only in shades of gray. This syndrome is different from simple colour blindness: 
not only do such patients fail to see or know the world in colour, they cannot 
even recall colours from a time before the lesion formed. Nevertheless, if their 
retinas and V1 regions [of the brain] are healthy, their knowledge of form, depth 
and motion remains intact” (Zafi 1992: 73).  
57 In many of Jacques Derrida’s writings, he demonstrates how hierarchies that 
are established within dichotomies are easily inverted and further problematized 
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through his notion of deconstruction. Throughout his career, Derrida has 
explored this concept extensively in relation to the visual art, particularly 
painting and drawing; however, he has never turned his attention to film. For 
examples of Derrida’s notion of deconstruction in connection to painting and 
drawing see Derrida 1987 and 1993, as well as Derrida and Thévenin 2000.   
58 Some of the filmmakers that fall into Sitney’s conception of “Structural Film” 
are Tony Conrad, Michael Snow, Hollis Frampton, Joyce Weiland, Ernie Gehr 
and Sharits. He also sees Kubelka and Andy Warhol as “forefathers” of this film 
movement. See Sitney 1970 and 2002. Although Sitney includes Sharits in this 
group, as this chapter will show, Sharits does not assert that the work’s system 
should be emphasized over the viewers’ visual system. Sharits is concerned with 
the attributes involved in the film itself and how these attributes are usually 
ignored; however, he does not disregard the viewers’ visual system in his 
understanding of cinema.  
59 Michael Snow’s film Wavelength (1967) may be one of the best examples of 
exploiting the projector’s lens because the film is structured around its inherent 
linear perspective. This film is basically a forty-five minute zoom across a room. 
Beginning from the widest perspective, the film slowly creeps towards the 
closest view possible with the lens that was used to produce it. The zoom in this 
film reminds the viewers that the space depicted in the moving image they see is 
constructed with the use of a single lens around a central vanish point. For a 
more detailed analysis of this film see Elder 1989 and Legge 2009. 
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60 Many films have called attention to the filmstrip in different ways. Andy 
Warhol’s Screen Tests (1964-1966) emphasized the filmstrip by showing a single 
unedited shot of a person. Each single shot would use the entire load of film in 
the camera. This tended to be four hundred feet of 16mm film, which is 
approximately eleven minutes when filmed and projected at twenty-four frames 
per second. As well, these single shot films would also begin and end with the 
light flares created when the film is loaded in and removed from the camera, 
which called the viewers’ attention to the filmstrip. See Comena (No Date). Other 
filmmakers have produced films that call attention to the filmstrip itself, either 
by asserting its physicality, like purposely scratching filmstrip, or by showing 
aspects of the filmstrip that the viewers do not see, like the sprocket holes. 
Examples of these works include George Landow’s Film in which there appears 
sprocket holes, edge lettering, dirt particles, etc. (1966) and Sharits’ 
S:TREAM:S:S:ECTION:S:S:ECTION:S:S:ECTIONED (1970).  
61 There were two different techniques that were used in order to call attention to 
the projected images. The first technique involved changing the projected images 
as quickly as possible, meaning every twenty-fourth of a second. These films 
focused on the modularity of the projected images and often produced a “flicker 
effect.” This technique can be seen in films such N:O:T:H:I:N:G, Tony Conrad’s 
The Flicker (1966), Keewatin Dewdney’s The Maltese Cross Movement (1967). The 
second technique took a different approach repeating the same projected image 
for longer periods of time, thus emphasizing the photographic qualities of each 
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projected image that composes film. This technique can be seen in several films 
produced by David Rimmer, such as Surfacing the Thames (1970) and Waiting for 
the Queen (1973). For further writings on flicker films see Conrad 2008 and 
Dewdney 2001. For further writings on Rimmer’s use of the photographic 
technique see Hoolboom 2001 and Russell 1993. 
62 See Vasulka (1992: 12). 
63 For more detailed information and instructions on the functionality of the 
Rutt/Etra Scan Processor see “Rutt/Etra Scan Processor” 2002 and “RE Video 
Synthesizer Systems: Model RE4-A and RE4-B” 1974. 
64 Bill Etra and Steve Rutt have called this specific effect generated by their Scan 
Processor the “Vasulka Effect” (1992: 139). This is likely because Vasulka used 
this effect in several of videos he produced, such as C-Trend, The Matter (1974), 
and Explanation (1974), or in videos he produced in collaboration with his wife 
Stiena Vasulka, such as Noisefields (1974). 
65 To see a catalogue of the other video manipulating devises that Vasulka and 
other video artists used or invented throughout the 1970s and 1980s see Dunn, 
Vasulka and Vasulka 1992. 
66 It is also important to state that many of the innovations and inventions 
Vasulka produced were in collaborations with others, particularly with his wife 
Steina Vasulka. Despite this collaborative practice, Martia Sturken notes: 
Both of the Vasulkas have explored the capacity of electronic 
technologies to remap space; while for Woody this has been a project 
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of mapping virtual and cartographic space, for Steina this has meant 
a concern with the viewer's phenomenological relationship to the 
landscape and natural processes. Indeed, one could say that while 
Woody has investigated the mapping of virtual and physical 
"indoor" space, Steina has mapped "outdoor" space-sky and 
landscape (Sturken 1996a: 43). 
Although an exploration of the differences between Woody’s and Steina’s 
individual video practices would be interesting, it is outside the scope of this 
particular project. 
67 Although the plane of organization that linear perspective generates does 
attempt to prevent any bifurcations from opening, like the plane of reference 
discussed in Chapter 1, there will always be crack in the plane’s construction. For 
more on how bifurcations emerge in linear perspective see the “Perceptual 
Fields” section in Chapter 5. For further analysis on the organization and 
bifurcations of linear perspective also see Massumi 2008. 
68 The Broadcast Signal Generator “is a mathematical tool, a clock, that was 
needed in early television to generate the broadcast signal of NTSC” (Spielmann 
2004: 5). NTSC is the video signal standard used in North America and Japan. 
Throughout the world there are different systems used for video signal scanning. 
Spielmann states these differences: 
Here various standards are customary: whereas in the North 
America and Japanese system (NTSC) the vertical field is 
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constructed of 262.5 half lines, in the European PAL system, the 
vertical field consists of 312.5 half lines.  The term frame refers to an 
image format, which numbers 525 lines, 30 images per second (60 
half-images/second) with 60 hertz in NTSC, or, alternatively, 625 
lines, 25 images per second (50 half-images/second) with 50 hertz 
in PAL and SECAM (2008: 47). 
69 More specifically, Vasulka is not discussing the cinematic experience of 
perceiving movement, which Gilles Deleuze calls the movement-image. For 
Deleuze, cinema “is an immediate image, to which movement is not appended or 
added; the movement on the contrary belongs to the intermediate image as 
immediate given… it immediately gives us a movement-image” (Deleuze 1986: 
2). This conception of the experience of perception in cinema counters Bergson’s 
understanding of the cinematic paradigm found in Creative Evolution with his 
own notion of images conceived ten years earlier in Matter and Memory. Deleuze 
notes this bizarre discrepancy in Bergson’s thought. “The discovery of the 
movement-image, beyond the conditions of natural perception, was the 
extraordinary invention of the first chapter of Matter and Memory. Had Bergson 
forgotten it ten years later?” (Deleuze 1986: 2). For further analysis of the 
cinematic paradigm and the cinematic experience of perceiving movement see 
Chapter 3. 
70 Vasulka’s position that there are no individually rigid frames is similar to the 
notion of images as information stated in Chapter 3. 
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71 For further discussion on the relational complex see Chapter 2. 
72 NTSC is the video signal standard used in North America and Japan. For more 
detail see Note 69. 
73 Both Massumi and Lynn discuss the topological transformation of a ring into a 
cup. See Massumi (2002: 134, 184) and Lynn (1999: 18, 22).  
74 This situation is similar to Zeno’s paradox in which the distance between two 
points can always be divided in order to accommodate more points. For further 
reading on Zeno’s Paradox see Bergson (1998: 308-314) and (2007: 118-121). 
75 For further discussion on topological architecture design see Lynn 1998 and 
Massumi 1998 and 2002. 
76 For further reading on the notion of the virtual see Bergson 1991, Massumi 
2002, Murphie 2002, and Deleuze (1994: 208-221). Also see Chapter 1. 
77 Youngblood’s use of the term “synaesthetic” differs from the clinical definition 
of this term.  Synesthesia is when the operation of one bodily sense occurs in 
another. For example, being able to taste the colour red. Massumi explains 
synesthesia further stating: 
Clinical synesthesia is when a hinge-dimension of experience, 
usually lost to active awareness in the sea change of adulthood, 
retains the ability to manifest itself perceptually. In synesthesia, 
other-sense dimensions become visible, as when sounds are seen as 
colors. This is not vision as it is thought of cognitively. It is more 
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like other-sense operations at the hinge with vision, registered from 
its point of view (2002: 186). 
Youngblood appears to be using the term metaphorically because of the way in 
which images are generated in synaesthetic film through the use a various 
media, such as film, computers, and analog video. 
78 William J. Mitchell states, “a pixel value is a sample in time and space of light 
intensities projected onto the picture plane – a discrete datum” (1992: 66). For 
more on the history and technical particularities of the pixel see Lyon 2006 and 
Smith 1995. 
79 Also see Simondon 1989/2007. 
80 Standard-Definition digital video displays 355,200 pixels, whereas High-
Definition digital video presents over two million pixels.  
81 See Kierkegaard (1992: 233). 
82 The phrase “posture of inquiry” comes from Irwin’s essay “Notes Towards a 
Model” published in the catalogue for his 1977 exhibition at the Whitney 
Museum of American Art.  It is here that he first questions exactly what it is 
viewers experience when encountering a work of art.  He explains that if we 
“allow this process of intimate questioning to bring us, in time, to the periphery 
of what is now held to be true, we will have gained a unique – and precarious – 
posture of inquiry, a perceptual/conceptual equilibrium from which we can now 
begin asking that question: ‘Why this art?’” (1977: 24; original emphasis). 
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83 His former art dealer Irving Blum states that whenever Irwin created a series of 
paintings,  
he pretty much exorcised them in his own head and then set 
another standard very quickly and another set of ambitions and 
went on to pursue that phase of his evolution. Which was fine. 
Only, in the process, everyone who I had painfully developed in 
terms of a kind of sympathy to the earlier work couldn’t make 
heads or tails of the new, so that the process of education had to 
start over as if from scratch. Being Irwin’s dealer during that period 
presented some extraordinary challenges (Weschler 2008: 90). 
84 For Irwin on de Kooning see Weschler (2008: 58) and on Guston see Weschler 
(2008: 63-4). 
85 For further analysis on incipient action see Manning 2009b, as well as Massumi 
2002. 
86 As Simon O’Sullivan notes, one way of understanding Deleuze’s notion of 
clichés is “as habits, habits of sight and habits of thought” (2006: 63). 
87 Deleuze make the point that if painters do not remove clichés or purposely 
work with them, they perpetuate their circulation.  He writes: 
[I]f the painter is content to transform the cliché, to deform or 
mutilate it, to manipulate it in every possible way, this reaction is 
too intellectual, too abstract: it allows the cliché to rise again from 
its ashes; it leaves the painter within the milieu of the cliché, or else 
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give him or her no other consolation than parody” (Deleuze 2003: 
72). 
88 Jackson Pollock explains this need for new techniques further stating: 
It seems to me that the modern painter cannot express this age, the 
airplane, the atom bomb, the radio, in the old forms of the 
Renaissance or of any other past culture.  Each age finds its own 
technique (1999: 20). 
89 Like Newman, other painters who were a part of the generation just prior to 
Irwin also arrived at this same conclusion. Joseph Albers further explains the 
notion of how the space between the marks made on the canvas were just as 
important as the marks themselves through a demonstration using his two index 
fingers. 
Look here: One finger and on finger are two fingers (both are my 
forefingers, in a vertical position). Now try to forget that we are 
dealing with fingers and concentrate on their width, which is about 
three-quarters of an inch. Now I place them closer together 
(parallel) at a distance of also three-quarters of an inch. And now – 
one finger and one finger present three equal distances – in short, 1 
+ 1 = 3 (and it is easy to continue 1 + 1 = 4, etc.). Such counting is 
possible only in visual formulation (Holloway, Weil and Albers 
1970: 462). 
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This observation can be traced back even earlier to the writings of Michel Eugène 
Chevreul.  In his 1839 treatise The Principles of Harmony and Contrast of Colours and 
Their Application to the Arts, he noted: “The Ground, as well as the interval we 
place between the coloured materials, have some influence upon the effect of 
colours” (1967: 106; original emphasis).  
90 In De pictura (On Painting), Leon Battista Alberti wrote the earliest conception 
of linear perspective. See Alberti 1966. For further discussion on linear 
perspective also see Chapter 4. 
91 For a further discussion on the emergence of centripetal and centrifugal forces 
in art see Chapter 2. 
92 For more specific analysis on how relations generate forces see Deleuze 1998b 
and Chapter 2. 
93 For further analysis on Seurat’s pointillist technique see Broude 1978, Fénéon 
1966 and Homer 1985. 
94 Although Irwin states that the two colours used in the “Dot” series paintings 
are green and red, upon closer inspection of the paintings the red dots appear 
more magenta.  In terms of light, magenta and green are complementary colours, 
not red and green.  Because of this discrepancy between red and magenta, the 
term reddish-magenta has been adopted for the chapter. 
95 By pushing the surface of the canvas outward, Irwin is also challenging what 
many thought was the only unique attribute to painting.  This was the flatness of 
the painting produced by the canvas being stretched across the frame. According 
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to Clement Greenberg: “Because flatness was the only condition painting shared 
with no other art, Modernist painting oriented itself to flatness as it did to 
nothing else” (Greenberg 1993: 87). Although it would be interesting and 
worthwhile to further examine how Irwin’s “Dot” paintings challenge the 
Modernist painting orthodoxy that was being discussed at the same time by critic 
like Greenberg, it falls outside of the scope of the present discussion.  
96 Not all of Irwin’s “Disc” paintings were approximately one hundred and fifty 
centimeters in diameter.  There were some that were made smaller in size.  See 
Weschler (2008: 103). 
97 Irwin’s “Disc” paintings moved his artistic practice even further than his “Dot” 
paintings had from the Modernist tradition espoused by critics like Greenberg. 
Paintings were defined as such through the use of three essential constraints: a 
flat surface, a frame, and the use of paint itself. Greenberg specifically states: 
“The limitations that constitute the medium of painting [are] the flat surface, the 
shape of the support, the properties of the pigment” (1993: 86). As stated in Note 
95, Irwin’s “Dot” series broke away from the use of a flat surface, in favour of a 
subtly curved canvas. With the additional use of light, shadow, and the gallery 
space itself, Irwin’s “Disc” painting moved even more radically away from the 
Modernist understanding of painting. Again, it would be fruitful to examine how 
Irwin’s painting practice challenges Modernist orthodoxy, but it falls outside of 
the scope of the present discussion. 
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98 This definition of the term parergon is derived from the Oxford English 
Dictionary. See “Parergon” 2011. 
99 Regarding Derrida’s reading of Kant and the parergaon, he specifically states: 
[The parergon] is a concept of the remark, of this “General 
Remark,” insofar as it defines what comes to be added to [Kant’s] 
Religion within Limits of Reason Alone without being a part of it and 
yet without being absolutely extrinsic to it. Each part of the book 
comprises a “General Remark,” a parergon concerning a parergon. 
As there are four parts to Religion, then the book is in a manner of 
speaking framed, but also squared up by these four remarks on 
parerga, hors-d’oeuvres, “additives” which are neither inside nor 
outside (1987: 55). 
100 For more on the concept of worlding see Mannign 2009b and Massumi 2002. 
101 See Tassig 2009. 
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